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PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM

JANUARY
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THE COUP IN MOSCOW

Khrushchevism • *Merle Fainsod*

The Party • *Richard Lowenthal*

Kremlinology • *Robert Conquest*

"Third World" • *Uri Ra'anan*

THE NEW SOCIOLOGY

Czechoslovakia . *Edward Taborsky*

East Germany . *Peter C. Ludz*

Poland . *Emilia Wilder*

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The Coup and After

EDITORS' NOTE: As this issue goes to press, the new Soviet leaders have still not favored us with a single mention of the man whose wisdom they had extolled for over a decade, whose services to their own cause they had praised, and whose power they have now so unceremoniously usurped. Perhaps one of these days Russia's rulers will realize that it hardly redounds to the credit of "the first socialist country in the world" to announce periodically that all its leaders since 1924 have been criminals, inveterate bunglers, sworn enemies of the Communist Party, and cunning practitioners of the "cult of personality." In the meantime, the outside world can only be wryly amused, while observing and trying to fathom the mechanics of this continuously bizarre political system.

What were indeed the mechanics of the latest coup? How could it have happened? What were the factors that contributed to Khrushchev's ignominious debacle and what may we expect from the Kremlin in the near future? These are some of the questions to which the following articles are addressed. In the first, Mr. Fainsod offers an historical appraisal of the Khrushchev era. In the second, Mr. Lowenthal probes into those dialectical tensions of Khrushchev's reign that finally brought about his downfall. In the third, Mr. Conquest casts a backward glance at the various theories about the succession problem that were propounded (frequently in these pages) before the fateful day of October 14, 1964, and indicates some lessons to be learned from a confrontation between theories and reality. Finally, in "Moscow and the Third World," Mr. Ra'anan provides both an example of "Kremlinology" as well as additional insights into an important political issue that has preoccupied and will continue to preoccupy the Soviet leadership in the years ahead.

Khrushchevism in Retrospect

By Merle Fainsod

To understand Khrushchevism, one must begin with Khrushchev the man, with what he was like in his days of power. Shrewd, earthy, endowed with boundless energy, a bouncing confidence, and a quick, if coarse, wit, he was the very epitome of the self-made man in any society. Like most self-made men, he believed profoundly that the social order which nurtured him and conferred its highest honors on him was a society whose virtues could not be impugned. When Spyros Skouras, the movie magnate, during a Hollywood luncheon for Khrushchev, cited his own rise from rags to riches as a symbol of the opportunities that America holds out for the lowly, Khrushchev replied: "Mr. Skouras said he had risen from the ranks. . . . Would you

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like to know what I was? I began working when I learned to walk. Till the age of 15 I tended calves, then sheep, and then the landlord's cows. I did all that before I was 15. Then I worked at a factory owned by Germans and later in coalpits owned by Frenchmen. I worked at the Belgian-owned chemical plants, and now I am Prime Minister of the great Soviet State." [1]

In the course of his lifetime, Khrushchev saw Russia transformed from a relatively backward country into one of the world's leading industrial and military powers, and he was understandably proud of this rapid progress and his own role in it. He gave every evidence of believing that the Soviet Union not only embodies the most progressive and just social structure that mankind has attained, but that it is also blazing a trail into the future that people everywhere will enthusiastically follow. "I am convinced more than ever," he told reporters toward the end of his American trip, "that the holiest of holies, the best that man can create, is socialist society, the Communist system." [2]

Nor can such remarks be dismissed as mere propaganda—the public pronouncements which a Soviet leader is duty-bound to make, and which do not necessarily mirror his fundamental outlook. Difficult as it is to be certain that one has ever penetrated the inner recesses of a man's character, the self-portrait that emerges from Khrushchev's countless impromptu remarks is fairly clear: he saw himself as a man of faith, believing that communism provides a key to the world's problems. He was a propagandist in every fiber of his being, but propaganda in his case was inseparable from his deepest convictions. In a characteristic speech to the Fifth World Congress of Trade Unions in 1961, he observed: "It may be said that Khrushchev is again handing out propaganda. If you think so, you are not mistaken. Yes, I was, am, and always shall be a propagandist. As long as the heart continues beating in my breast, I shall propagate the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, the ideas of Communist construction!" [3]

[1] *Let Us Live in Peace and Friendship—The Visit of N. S. Khrushchev to the U. S. A.*, Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1959, pp. 191-92.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 338.

Professor of Government at Harvard University, Mr. Fainsod is one of America's most distinguished scholars of the Soviet political system. This article is shortened and revised from an essay in Marxism in the Modern World, *edited by Milorad Drachkovitch and to be published this spring for the Hoover Institution by Stanford University Press, copyright © 1965 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University.*

The School of Stalinism

A man of limited formal education, he found his teacher in the Communist Party. The party provided him with a view of the world that confirmed his own experience, and its simple tenets were endlessly reiterated in his speeches: Capitalism is a system of exploitation whose days are numbered; communism represents the wave of the future because it is a superior social and economic system that frees the masses from exploitation and promotes the well-being and happiness of all mankind; the Communist Party, which led the working class of old Russia to victory, provides a pattern of organization and leadership which can alone guarantee the triumph of communism on a world scale. For Khrushchev these propositions were sacred and unassailable.

As one of Stalin's lieutenants, he was chained to a jealous master who demanded unquestioning obedience and obsequiousness from all who served him. The evidence now at hand makes clear that Khrushchev chafed under the restrictions, but at the time no one could match him in fulsome tributes to his mentor, and no one was more zealous in defending Stalin's course. The purges that meant catastrophe for countless of Khrushchev's colleagues spelled opportunity for him. With every turn of the wheel, his fortunes prospered; on those rare occasions when he suffered a temporary setback, he demonstrated a remarkable resilience in bouncing back. Khrushchev obviously possessed the qualities of toughness and ruthlessness that were required to maneuver one's way to a top place in Stalin's entourage. Trained in the Stalin school of falsification, he demonstrated an impressive capacity to meet the expectations of his master.

Against the background of the Stalinist years, it is tempting to dismiss Khrushchev as a cynical manipulator for whom ideology had at best an instrumental significance. It is a temptation that should be resisted. The evil that men do in order to survive and gather power may corrupt the ends they serve, but it does not necessarily lessen the need for a justifying vision. Indeed, in some cases it may intensify it. For Khrushchev the justification was found in

[3] N. S. Khrushchev, *Communism—Peace and Happiness for the Peoples*, Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1963, Vol. II, p. 365.

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Stalin's construction program, in building the greatness of Soviet power and helping to lay the foundations for Communist victory at home and abroad.

His administrative assignments under Stalin were largely confined to the party apparatus. Although Stalin heaped increasingly heavy responsibilities on him, they remained party-centered. His were the typical practical concerns of the party apparatchik, prodding and driving his subordinates to meet the ambitious targets of the Five-Year Plans. Already under Stalin he was the agitator par excellence, not content to direct proceedings from a remote office, but enjoying face-to-face contacts, constantly roaming his domain and making frequent appearances at the construction sites and collective farms over which he exercised supervision.

His experience until Stalin's death was narrowly provincial. His secretarial duties within the party provided no opportunities for foreign travel and little in the way of foreign contacts. The world outside the Soviet Union was *terra incognita,* to be comprehended largely in terms of Marxist-Leninist categories. His first direct view of the West did not come until he had passed his sixtieth birthday; it would have been remarkable indeed had he been able to free himself of the stereotypes he brought to that exposure.

Yet there were elements in Khrushchev's character that were responsive to fresh experience. He had a pragmatic bent for testing ideas by their workability. An avid learner in practical affairs and a man of wide-ranging technical curiosity, he was quite prepared to borrow techniques from the West when he thought they could advance his own purposes. Nor were his travels abroad without influence on his assessment of Western developments. "I have seen the slaves of capitalism—and they live well!" Khrushchev declared while visiting the farm of Rosswell Garst in Iowa in September 1959.[4] The significance of this spontaneous tribute was not diminished by the fact that it went unreported in the Soviet press.

At the same time, his awareness of the superiority of Western living standards was matched by a conviction that capitalism is a dying system and that the Soviet Union would soon outstrip America in both productivity and welfare. Running through many of Khrushchev's speeches is a curious defensiveness, an extraordinary sensitivity to outside criticism of Soviet weaknesses, which is overcompensated by a boastful pride in Soviet achievements. Plans for the future tend to be presented as if they were actualities, and demagogic promises mask very real problems. But beneath the rhetoric, one could also detect a growing conviction that the Soviet system would be judged by its results, and that the competition with capitalism could not be won by words alone. "Now I ask you," he said in one of his more homely moods, "would it be bad if we spread our Marxist-Leninist teachings with a piece of butter? I say that with a good bread spread like that, Marxism-Leninism would be even more tasty. And with good housing, with a better and more abundant life, with good schools, we will win all the peoples for socialism and communism." [5]

Choices and Imperatives

To understand Khrushchevism as it took shape after Stalin's death, one must begin with the man; but one must also understand the situation in which he found himself and the necessities to which he was compelled to adapt. Stalin's legacy to his successors was replete with problems. His impressive achievements in forcing the pace of Soviet industrialization, in building military power, and in expanding his domain into Eastern and Central Europe, were all purchased at a heavy price. Soviet agriculture remained backward and stagnant, and the food available to Soviet consumers was monotonous, scarce, and high-priced. Stalin's obsession with the development of heavy industry meant that light industry was ignored and underdeveloped, and shortages of consumer goods and housing were acute and widespread. The system of terror on which Stalin relied to protect his own security and to enforce his regime of deprivation and sacrifice had its debilitating effects. It bred a cowed and submissive populace for whom the regime was "they" and not "we." Frightened bureaucrats shrank from exercising initiative; there was a frozen and congealed quality about Soviet life that tended to rob it of all dynamism and revolutionary appeal. The East European satellites formed an extension of the Soviet prison-house. Yugoslavia, to be sure, had broken away amid the curses of the Cominform; and in the East, Communist China pre-

[4] Quoted in Thomas P. Whitney, *Khrushchev Speaks* (Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan Press, 1963) p. 5.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 4.

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sented a special case with its own independent power base. For the rest, the Communist bloc was managed by puppets utterly dependent on Stalin. The Soviet empire was, in effect, sealed off from the West, and as a result of the Korean War the Soviet Union and the United States were involved in a spiraling arms race that threatened the world with a nuclear holocaust.

This was the situation that confronted Stalin's successors. As Communists, the choices open to them were not infinite. They could not be expected to preside over the liquidation of Stalin's empire. As party leaders, they might seek other means than Stalin's to promote Communist objectives; but they shared with him not merely a common experience but also a common commitment. What they now also shared with one another was a responsibility they could not escape: they had to make their own decisions.

The tone set by the new leadership in the months after Stalin's death was one of relaxation of tension at home and abroad. Amnesties, price cuts, and promises of more consumer goods and housing augured a new disposition to seek popular support. The ending of the Korean War contributed toward an easing of relations with the West. So far as we know, Khrushchev participated in and approved of these actions, as he no doubt also ratified the decision to suppress the East German rising in June 1953 and joined in the purge of Beria soon afterward.

At the September 1953 session of the Central Committee, he was elected First Secretary. His report to the Central Committee on the agricultural situation, which was delivered on September 3, represented his first important independent pronouncement in the post-Stalin period. It contained a blunt and even sensational acknowledgment of the seriousness of the agricultural crisis that the new leadership had inherited from Stalin. Although many of the reforms that Khrushchev advocated had been foreshadowed by earlier Malenkov proposals approved by the Supreme Soviet in August, there was a quality of frankness in Khrushchev's speech that was novel. In essence, he argued that Soviet agricultural productivity could not be raised unless additional incentives were offered to the collective farmers. His propensity for bold and daring ventures became more clearly manifest in early 1954, when he obtained the approval of the Central Committee for his virgin-lands program. Undeterred by the obstacles to its success, he pressed ahead and gambled his political future on harvests that might not materialize. Fortune favored him in the early years.

As his power and prestige mounted, the range of his interest broadened, and he began to place his own personal stamp on foreign as well as domestic policy. The Khrushchevian style was characterized by boldness as well as opportunism; above all, it was marked by a willingness to experiment and to strike out in new directions without necessarily calculating or anticipating costs and consequences. Khrushchev's most dramatic initiatives during this period were reserved for the field of foreign affairs. Of these, perhaps the most impressive were his efforts to woo Tito back into the Soviet bloc and to strengthen Soviet influence among the new nations of Asia and Africa.

The Watershed

While the new dynamism thus introduced into Soviet foreign policy reflected the Khrushchevian touch, it remained for the 20th Party Congress, held in February 1956, to define the content of what has since come to be described as Khrushchevism. The high spot of the Congress was the "secret speech" in which Khruschev combined a wide-ranging condemnation of Stalin's methods of rule with sensational disclosures of his terrorist crimes. What inspired Khrushchev to open this Pandora's box is still open to debate and may long remain so. Khrushchev himself defended the speech as a necessary surgical operation to restore the health of the party. In repudiating Stalin's terrorist practices, he in effect offered his personal guaranty that he would not repeat them. More positively, he held out a vision of a Soviet society in which citizens could breathe more freely, officialdom could exercise initiative without fearing the consequences, the bond between party and people would be strengthened, and the authority of the regime would be built on the rational foundations of regularized procedures, concern with popular welfare, and confidence rather than fear.

The destalinization campaign, the restatement of the theory of peaceful coexistence, and other innovations launched by Khrushchev at the 20th Party Congress were intended both to broaden the appeal of the Communist movement and to strengthen Khrushchev's own position within it. In the end, they came close to destroying Khrushchev, and they released divisive forces within the Communist world that have not yet run their full course. Within the Soviet Union, the ferment stirred up by Khrushchev's "secret speech" infected wide circles of the intelligentsia and student youth, inspiring a protest literature that went beyond denuncia-

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tions of Stalin to criticism of the Soviet system itself. Within the bloc, the disarray assumed proportions serious enough to threaten the Soviet hold over Eastern Europe.

The gathering unrest came to a climax in October 1956. The bloody repression of the revolt in Hungary and the reimposition of cultural curbs within the Soviet Union in reaction to the revolt served to tarnish the image of Khrushchev as the great liberalizer. In the aftermath of Hungary, Khrushchev's prestige declined sharply. His handling of Hungarian events contributed to an exacerbation of relations with Tito. The Chinese party leadership gave him public support, but as subsequent disclosures have made clear, they were privately highly critical of his destalinization campaign, of his ideological initiatives, and above all of his failure to consult with them. Within the Soviet party itself, his Presidium opponents began to organize a cabal to unseat him, and by dint of the additional support they gathered in opposition to his industrial reorganization plans, they were able, by May 1957, to mobilize a seven-to-four majority against him and to confront him with a demand for his resignation.

It is a measure both of the power concentrated in the office of the First Secretary and of Khrushchev's capacity to turn adverse developments to his own advantage that he was able to triumph even in these circumstances. By transferring the arena of the struggle to the Central Committee, where his followers were strongly installed, he turned the tables on his opponents and emerged from the encounter stronger than ever. In October of the same year he further consolidated his position by ousting his erstwhile supporter, Marshal Zhukov, from the Presidium and moving quickly to bring the armed forces under firm party control.

At this stage of Khrushchev's career, fortune seemed to be smiling on him. He had rid himself of his Presidium opponents, and his position as party leader appeared to be unassailable. He had surmounted the crisis in Eastern Europe, and while restiveness was still evident, there were no threats of armed uprisings. The ferment among Soviet youth and intellectuals gave every outward appearance of having subsided; in any case, it presented no organized challenge to the regime's power.

Most important of all, the world was now treated to a startling demonstration of Soviet accomplishments in rocketry. In the excitement that attended the launching of Sputnik I on October 4, 1957, the simultaneous dismissal of Marshal Zhukov was all but forgotten. The Soviet space exploits had obvious military implications, and Khrushchev was not slow to point out that they marked a significant shift in the balance of power. He quickly initiated a major drive to translate Soviet rocket superiority into diplomatic gains. In a militant speech to a Polish-Soviet Friendship Meeting in Moscow on November 10, 1958, he ignited the Berlin crisis with a demand for the liquidation of the occupation regime in West Berlin. This time, Khrushchev overreached himself. The decision of the Western powers to stand firm exposed the emptiness of his ultimatums, bluster, and threats.

New Alternatives

It is worth pausing at this point to sketch out the problems and choices that Khrushchev faced. Despite undoubted industrial progress and dramatic space achievements, there were limits to the pressure that Moscow could apply on the West. The United States was still a formidable thermonuclear power with larger resources than the Soviet Union, and any confrontation that imperiled vital American interests raised the danger of a thermonuclear holocaust, with potentially disastrous consequences for both sides. As long as relations between the United States and the Soviet Union remained tense and difficult, the stage was set for the continuation of an expensive arms race that diverted resources from domestic development and spelled persisting hardships for the Soviet people. An easing of relations with the United States, by contrast, opened up tempting perspectives of more rapid improvement in the Soviet standard of living and accelerated economic development.

A real détente with the West, however, could only be achieved at the price of accepting the status quo in world affairs and foregoing opportunities for revolutionary advance, at least for a defined period. However expedient such a course of action might appear from the Soviet point of view, it held out dangers for Soviet relations with its allies in the world Communist movement. It subordinated their interests to those of the Soviet Union. It implied, for example, that Communist China would not be able to count on Soviet assistance in pressing its campaign to regain Taiwan, and that Chinese expansionist ambitions elsewhere would have to be curbed to serve Soviet national needs. It meant that Khrushchev might be forced to impose brakes on the revolutionary enthusiasm of Communist parties anxious to come to power,

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The Leader and Leadership

BEFORE . . .

On the day I left to come here, I had a telephone conversation with Nikita Sergeievich Khrushchev . . . [He] asked me to transmit to all workers, agricultural toilers, and intelligentsia of Soviet Moldavia his most heartfelt congratulations. . . .

—N. V. Podgorny in Sovetskaia Moldavia, *October 11, 1964*

Permit me in the name of the Moldavian people . . . to express our sincere and heartfelt gratitude to our great friend, the faithful Leninist, our dear Nikita Sergeievitch Khrushchev for his paternal care in the development of our region. . . .

—I. I. Bodiul, First Secretary of the Moldavian CP, ibid.

The Kazakh people consider it good fortune that . . . the Central Committee has been headed by Nikita Sergeievitch Khrushchev, who is devoted to the ideas of Lenin, who knows well the life and laws of development of the socialist economic system, and who has a firm will and untiring energy.

—M. Beisebaiev, First Dep. Chairman of Council of Ministers of the Kazakh SSR, ibid.

. . . The historic victory of the Soviet Army in the battle on the Volga laid the basis for the turning point in the course of the Great Patriotic War. An outstanding role in organizing this victory belongs to Nikita Sergeievitch Khrushchev.

—A. Y. Pelshe, First Sec. of Latvian CP, Sovietskaia Latvia, *October 14*

Along with the need to develop beet growing, Nikita Sergeievitch Khrushchev directed our attention to the raising of cotton. . . . The measures to put into effect the advice and instructions of Nikita Sergeievitch Khrushchev, which were worked out by a plenum of the Kirgiz Central Committee, were enthusiastically supported by the party organizations . . . and all agricultural toilers of Soviet Kirgizstan. . . .

—A. Chubarov, First Sec. of Kirgiz CP, Selskaia zhizn, *October 14*

& AFTER . . .

The party, in uniting and directing the creative activity of the masses toward a single great goal, is guided by an accurate compass—the life-giving Marxist-Leninist theory. . . . The Leninist party is an enemy of subjectivism and drift in Communist construction. Harebrained scheming; half-baked conclusions and hasty decisions and actions, divorced from reality; bragging and bluster; attraction to rule by fiat; unwillingness to take into account what science and practical experience have already worked out—these are alien to the party.

—Pravda, October 17, 1964

Genuine exactingness is unthinkable without the strict observance of the norms of intraparty life, the principles of Soviet democracy—that is, all that enables the masses to check and, if necessary, to correct leaders, whether it is the director of an enterprise, the secretary of a primary party organization or a state and party figure of the highest rank. All of them are invested with the faith of the party and the people and all answer for the results of their activities. And the higher an official's post, the higher is his responsibility. . . .

Leaders who are experienced, influential, and know their business enjoy deserved authority. . . . But legitimate respect has nothing in common with the excessive exaltation and praise of a leader, where every word of a person "at the top" is represented as revelation and his acts and deeds are considered infallible. Such an approach leads to no good and can only revive the morals of the period of the personality cult. . . . We cannot permit even the most authoritative person to get away from the control of the leading collective or party organization and to get the idea that he knows everything and can do everything and that the knowledge and experience of his comrades is of no use to him.

—Editorial, Partiinaia zhizn, *October 1964 (signed to press October 17)*

Two heads are better than one.

—Krasnaia Zvezda, October 24

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and might thus be maneuvered into a position where he could be accused of betraying the revolutionary cause.

It is unlikely that these sharply defined alternatives were either recognized or accepted by Khrushchev. Like leaders elsewhere who face multiple pressures and impulses, he sought to escape hard choices and found himself responding to events and pursuing policies with contradictory implications. Thus, Khrushchev's professed, and probably real, desire to achieve a relaxation of tension with the United States which would enable him to concentrate greater resources on internal development was periodically negated by actions that placed a strain on the Soviet-American relationship. The Berlin ultimatums and the building of the wall between East and West Berlin, the Congo adventure, and the Cuban missile crisis were symptomatic of an unresolved dilemma in an area where doctrinal commitments and considerations of *Realpolitik* clashed.

Equally difficult problems and choices confronted Khrushchev in working out his relations with his main ally in the Communist bloc. The alternative of responding to Chinese demands for increased militancy opened up serious risks. In the underdeveloped areas, it meant breaking the links that Soviet foreign policy had so carefully forged with the neutralist leaders of the new nations. In relations with the West, it meant risking a sharp increase in the danger of thermonuclear war and intensifying the arms race. In domestic terms, it meant slowing down the Soviet rate of economic growth and negating Khrushchev's vision of a welfare communism which would magnify the Soviet appeal both at home and abroad.

Faced with these alternatives, Khrushchev chose to stand firm on the policy lines to which he was committed. Indeed, as the bitterness and virulence of the Sino-Soviet dispute mounted and prospects of reconciliation faded, the positions of both sides hardened. In the wake of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, with its sobering reminder of how close the world had come to thermonuclear extinction, Khrushchev demonstrated a renewed eagerness to improve his relations with the United States and the West. He turned his back on Communist China to sign a nuclear test-ban treaty with the United States and Britain, joined in establishing the so-called "hot line" between Washington and Moscow, undertook in cooperation with the United States to ban missiles in orbit and to cut back the production of fissionable material, negotiated a consular convention with the United States as well as a number of agreements on cultural exchanges, pressed restraint on Castro, and relaxed tension over Berlin. All these efforts to "normalize" relations with the West were greeted by Peking as additional confirmation of Khrushchev's apostasy from true Marxism-Leninism. They served to deepen a split that was rapidly becoming unbridgeable.

Khrushchev's decision to seize the "peace issue" even at the cost of further alienating Peking was not without its positive advantages. To the extent that Khrushchev could make good his indictment of the Chinese leaders as "madmen" and "adventurers" who were prepared to risk world destruction in order to realize their ambitions, he could count on widespread support not only in the Soviet Union but among all people, Communist as well as non-Communist, who feared nuclear war.

Difficulties on the Home Front

Perhaps the most compelling reasons for Khrushchev to seek a détente with the West had their origins in domestic strains and difficulties. The decision of the post-Stalinist leadership to provide more food, consumer goods, and housing whetted the appetite of the Soviet populace, but did not satisfy it. The widespread yearning of Soviet consumers for a rapid improvement in their standard of living, an aspiration that Khrushchev intensified by his promises of plenty, could not be met without a diversion of investment from armaments and heavy industry to light industry and agriculture. The situation in agriculture was particularly troublesome. The banner harvest of 1958, which was largely attributable to uniformly favorable weather, was followed by a series of mediocre harvests. Disaster struck in 1963, when bad weather and widespread drought sharply curtailed output and compelled the purchase abroad of approximately 12 million tons of grain to meet minimal consumer needs.

While the causes of the decline in agricultural output were many, the most important among them was probably the failure to allocate adequate capital for the land. In a belated effort to face up to the problem, Khrushchev launched a large-scale program for the expansion of the chemical industry, the building and importation of many new fertilizer plants, the increased output of agricultural machinery, the construction of irrigation facilities, and other measures that required substantial new capital

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input. With resources already overstrained, the reallocation of the limited capital available meant cuts in such branches of heavy industry as iron and steel, as well as reduced investments in other sectors, including the military.

Nor were Khrushchev's problems limited to agriculture. While the Soviet rate of industrial growth remained high, official statistics made clear that it was declining, despite desperate measures to maintain and increase it. This drop and the sharp fall in agricultural output combined to produce a dramatic decline in the overall 1962-63 rate of growth, a development that hardly tended to enhance Khrushchev's prestige, even though a recovery in agriculture from the 1963 low point appeared highly likely.

The difficulties on the domestic front engaged a large share of Khrushchev's attention and offered no temptations for foreign adventure. While there were few clear indications at the time that his position as leader of the party and government was in peril, the image of success and assertiveness that he had previously radiated appeared tarnished. The promises of rapid improvement in living standards that he had made to his own people were belied by food shortages and an apparent inability to master the agricultural problem. The enthusiasm and initiative he had hoped to evoke by his destalinization measures and his efforts to revitalize the party were strangely absent. Instead, the prevailing mood was one of uncertainty, shaken confidence, and lack of a sense of direction. The dynamism that Khrushchev had initially generated showed signs of slackening. Established routines and traditional attachments resisted dislodgement. The continuing debate on allocation policy that was cautiously aired in Soviet journals revealed the usual rivalry of bureaucratic vested interests, each seeking to defend its special position. Despite Khrushchev's efforts to resolve intractable economic problems by periodic reorganization of the state and party machinery and despite his calls for innovation and sacrifice, the Soviet Union was beginning to display many of the signs of a mature and immobile society not easily moved from the grooves into which it was settling.

The Unfilled Balance Sheet

It is still too early to attempt more than a provisional assessment of Khrushchevism. The announcement in the Soviet press on October 16, 1964, that the Central Committee of the party had met two days earlier and "granted" Khrushchev's request that "he be released" from his responsibilities "in view of his advanced age and deterioration in the state of his health" obviously could not be taken at face value. The first indictment of Khrushchev, which appeared in *Pravda* on October 17, 1964, listed among his "sins"—without using his name—"harebrained schemes; half-baked conclusions and hasty decisions and actions, divorced from reality; bragging and bluster; attraction to rule by fiat; unwillingness to take into account what science and practical experience have already discovered. . ."

During the ensuing weeks, Khrushchev's successors poured specific content into these general charges. Public polemics with Peking ceased. Khrushchev's drastic reorganization of the party and governmental structure into parallel industrial and agricultural hierarchies was cancelled. A campaign was initiated to free Soviet agricultural research of Lysenko's baneful influence. The new leaders announced the removal of "unwarranted limitations" on the size of private plots and private livestock holdings. In industry the way was opened for reforms in the incentive system designed to provide increased rewards for managerial efficiency in the use of resources.

The direction of these reforms pointed up the sources of dissatisfaction with Khrushchev's performance. Yet it would be less than fair to rest an appraisal of the Khrushchev era on the latter-day criticisms voiced by his successors. What can be said is that Khrushchev's record at home was not without its achievements, though it was far from a series of unbroken successes. The apogee of his prestige was reached with the space triumphs for which his regime took credit, but the drain on domestic resources which those triumphs entailed and his inability to translate them into concrete foreign policy gains created their own complex of problems. Under his aegis, the Soviet Union continued for a time to make rapid industrial progress and to narrow the gap separating it from the United States, but there were also disturbing indications toward the end of his reign that the industrial growth rate was slowing and that planning and managerial problems were becoming increasingly complex and difficult. Agriculture, with which Khrushchev was most closely identified, was also the area in which least progress was registered.

On the other hand, a reduction in working hours, larger social security benefits, and the increased availability of consumer goods and housing gave some content to Khrushchev's blueprint of welfare communism. Gratefully welcomed by the beneficiaries, these gains however still fell far short of need and sharpened

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the demand for more. Khrushchev's destalinization program evoked widespread popular support, but it, too, posed its problems, of which one of the most delicate was Khrushchev's own involvement in Stalin's crimes. The flood of disillusionment, criticism and airing of grievances that destalinization released threatened for a time to pass out of control. Though Khrushchev managed to contain its domestic manifestations, the restrictions that he imposed on creative freedom and the repressive measures he invoked to enforce them alienated some of the most talented voices in the younger generation and left a residue of smoldering resentment which he was powerless to stamp out. In domestic affairs Khrushchev suffered the fate of many essentially conservative transitional figures who undertake to build a bridge from the old to the new. As the limits within which he was prepared to tolerate change became apparent, his reputation as an innovator dimmed. His early accomplishments and bold initiatives tended to be taken for granted and forgotten, while he found himself increasingly measured by the expectations he had aroused and failed to fulfill.

Lessons in Failure

Khrushchev's record was least impressive in the foreign policy field. Whereas Stalin could point to a vast expansion of the Communist empire in Europe and Asia, achieved in a period when the Soviet Union was in a much weaker position vis-à-vis the United States, Khrushchev, with much greater power at his command, was unable to register any large-scale gains. The accessions of North Vietnam and Cuba to the Communist camp were not insignificant victories, but taken together they hardly began to match Stalin's triumphs. In Europe Khrushchev was unable to break out of the stalemate inherited from Stalin; his unsuccessful efforts to dislodge the Western powers from West Berlin by threats and ultimatums that had to be withdrawn represented a major loss of face. The rebuff he received during the Cuban missile crisis further tarnished the myth of Soviet invincibility and revealed Khrushchev as an adventurer whose bluff could be called by a willingness to stand firm.

Fortunately for the world, Khrushchev's determination to test the resolution of his antagonists was combined with a vivid appreciation of the dangers of thermonuclear warfare. In contrast to Stalin, Khrushchev operated under a compelling necessity to adjust the strategy and tactics of Soviet foreign policy to the realities of the thermonuclear age. These realities not only brought to the fore the common interest that he shared with Western leaders in avoiding mutual destruction; they also impelled him to seek ways of advancing the Communist cause that would minimize the risks of igniting a thermonuclear holocaust. Khrushchevian policies in the underdeveloped world fitted into this pattern. Trade, military and economic aid, technical assistance, and cultural penetration were the prime levers by which the Soviet Union sought to heighten its influence in these areas. In the interest of cementing relations with the nationalist leaders of these states, Khrushchev discouraged premature revolutionary bids for power by local Communists. From the point of view of the latter, anxious to strike out for power, Khrushchevism was all brakes and no forward charge. However valid Khrushchev's long-term prognosis for the underdeveloped world may turn out to be, it was ill-suited to a mood of revolutionary impatience, and it only provided fuel for the Chinese charge that Khruschevism represented a betrayal of the cause of world revolution.

Whatever Khrushchev's claims to greatness, his contributions to the unity of world communism are not likely to be listed among them. In the eyes of his Chinese antagonists and their allies in the international Communist movement, Khrushchevism became a term of contempt, the symbol of a peculiarly degenerate form of revisionism that sacrifices the revolutionary élan of Leninism to serve the bourgeoisified interests of a chauvinist great power masquerading as a Communist state. His most poignant legacies to his successors may well be the recognition that a common ideological heritage provides no guaranty of political unity among Communist powers, and that imperial conflict is no monopoly of the capitalist world. It should, perhaps, come as no great surprise that so powerful a force as nationalism should reappear in a Communist guise, but for those who have taken professions of brotherhood among Communist nations at face value, it has nevertheless come as a profound shock.

That Khrushchev should have contributed to the disintegration of the Communist world empire is a phenomenon that invites explanation. But it would be superficial to attribute the development solely to Khrushchev's personal idiosyncracies. However much clashes of personality may have served to exacerbate relations between Khrushchev and Mao, the causes of their differences were more deep-seated, with roots in the very different array of domestic and foreign problems to which they felt impelled

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to respond. When a Communist regime sinks its roots in national soil, its perception of its needs cannot avoid being colored by the environment in which it functions and by the pressures under which it operates.

End of an Era?

Insofar as Khrushchevism was something more than Khrushchev, it must be seen as an ideological expression of the stage of development in which the Soviet Union found itself. After decades of deprivation and sacrifice under Stalin, the regime came under strong pressure to raise the living standards of its own people and was understandably reluctant to make further sacrifices to lift the level of poorer Communist countries up to its own. A relatively advanced industrial power with a vested interest in preserving its hard-won gains, the Soviet Union was not prepared to support a reckless and adventurous revolutionary strategy that would pose unacceptable risks of thermonuclear extinction. As the historic leader and most powerful nation in the Communist camp, it was anything but eager to build up rivals who would challenge its mandate to direct Communist tactics everywhere. As a residuary legatee of Russian national interests, it tended to see China as a threat, in national as well as in Communist terms. In all these senses, Khrushchevism served to articulate the conservative interests of a mature Communist power with a relatively high stake in the preservation of the status quo.

If Khrushchevism bred its polar opposite in Maoism, both unwittingly conspired to create a situation in which even such a previously abject Soviet satellite as Rumania was emboldened to proclaim its economic independence and every Communist regime or party is now tempted to place its own interests in the forefront whenever and wherever it can. The confrontation of Khrushchevism and Maoism became more than a contest for world Communist leadership; it set the stage for the emergence of Communist forces that sought to escape the discipline of both. The ultimate irony of Khrushchevism was the belated discovery that a Communist world empire could not be built on Soviet interests alone.

The Revolution Withers Away

By Richard Lowenthal

The overthrow of N. S. Khrushchev, who for eleven years was First Secretary and for seven years the undisputed leader and spokesman of the Soviet Communist Party, by the Presidium and Central Committee of that party is an event without precedent in the annals of modern party dictatorship. The deposition of Benito Mussolini by the Fascist Grand Council in July 1943—the nearest formal analogy that comes to mind—took place under the impact of military defeat, with enemy troops on Italian soil; and even then, it was only made possible by the collusion of the dictator's inner-party opponents with the King and the leaders of an army that had never been brought under effective party control—that is, by the fact that Fascist rule over Italy had never become fully totalitarian. Khrushchev's "resignation," on the other hand, came about in the absence of any acute external crisis of the Soviet state; and whatever role the armed forces and the security services may have played in his removal—a subject on which the amount of Western press speculation is in striking disproportion to the paucity of reliable evidence—must have been performed by them in the framework of their formal subordination to the party as the only bearer of legitimate political power. It was,

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after all, as the successful champion of the party's claim to indivisible supremacy that Khrushchev had established his own position of undivided leadership of the Soviet Union between 1953 and 1957; the institution whose victory he had then helped to assure was now the one to oust him.

Who Was Right?

That it could in fact do so was nonetheless a surprise—not only for Khrushchev himself, but also for Western students of the Soviet political system. We knew, of course, that one of the differences between Khrushchev's rule and Stalin's personal despotism was that Khrushchev had to operate within the institutional mechanism of the party; we also knew that he was far from enjoying Lenin's unique authority over his colleagues. Evidence that some of his policies could be opposed with impunity and occasionally defeated within the leading organs of the party had accumulated over the years and was not seriously in dispute. Yet, against this, one had to set the fact that he had defeated all apparent rivals of substance and reputation—men like Malenkov, Beria, Molotov, Zhukov and Bulganin—within a few years; had cumulated the office of First Secretary of the party, the chairmanship of its newly-created Bureau for the RSFSR, and the premiership; and had taken care to work with different deputies in each of these roles, and even to change his "heirs apparent" in the Secretariat from time to time.

From this, many Western observers (including the present writer) had concluded that while Khrushchev might have to yield to adverse majorities within the party Presidium on specific issues, his position was strong enough to prevent the formation of any faction that was systematically opposed to his leadership or general policy, and to remove the instigators of any attempt in that direction.[1] Another school of thought had interpreted the evidence of inconsistencies and zigzags in Soviet policy as proof of a persistent and systematic challenge to Khrushchev's leadership within the Presidium, but had identified the challengers as a faction of "conservative" opponents of his "reforming" policies.[2]

Clearly, the outcome has not been consistent with either hypothesis. For though there is much to indicate that Khrushchev's policies were indeed seriously challenged by a "conservative" opposition headed by F. R. Kozlov during the winter and spring of 1962-63,[3] it is obvious that he successfully survived that crisis and subsequently reinforced his position through the entry of L. I. Brezhnev and N. V. Podgorny, two loyal supporters of his policies, into the Secretariat. What is more, he has now been replaced, not by his "conservative" critics, but by his own designated successors—men who have hastened to renew their commitment to the decisions of the three Khrushchevian party congresses and to the "revisionist" program of 1961, in the teeth of all "dogmatist" attacks from Peking. This suggests that the basic cause of Khrushchev's overthrow was not any major difference over foreign or domestic policy, but rather the institutional question of the relative powers of the leader and the highest constituted organs of the ruling party. In fact, the party bureaucracy seems to have developed a degree of oligarchic solidarity and asserted a measure of collective control not hitherto observed in any totalitarian state.

The Man and the Apparat

In retrospect, it is possible to view much of the internal history of the Khrushchev era as having revolved around this institutional question. In denouncing Stalin's arbitrary rule not only for its lawlessness and cruelty, but also for its failure to respect the party statutes and to submit all policy decisions to regular meetings of the party congress, Central Committee and Politbureau, Khrushchev had in fact given the party bureaucracy a double pledge: that he

[1] See R. Lowenthal, "The Nature of Khrushchev's Power," *Problems of Communism*, July-August 1960, and T. Rigby, "How Strong is the Leader," *ibid.*, September-October 1962.

[2] See R. Conquest, "The Struggle Goes On," *ibid.*, July-August 1960, Carl Linden, "Khrushchev and the Party Battle," *ibid.*, September-October 1963; R. C. Tucker, "The Conflict Model," *ibid.*, November-December 1963.

[3] See especially the article by Carl Linden quoted in note 2; also Priscilla Johnson, "The Regime and the Intellectuals: A Window on Party Politics," *ibid.*, Supplement, July-August 1963; M. P. Gallagher, "Military Manpower: A Case Study," *ibid.*, May-June 1964; R. Lowenthal, "Fortschritt und Reaktion in der Innenpolitik," *Osteuropa* (Stuttgart), November 1964.

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would not use the secret police against them, and that he would consult them according to the statutory rules. In establishing the party's supremacy over the other power machines which Stalin used to balance its influence, Khrushchev had in fact become increasingly dependent on the support of the party machine. That dependency and those pledges were the price he had to pay for rising to unrivaled power as the exponent of the ruling party; and many of his subsequent actions, beginning with his assumption of the premiership in March 1958, can best be understood as part of an effort to free himself from these self-imposed shackles.

One of the characteristic features of Khrushchev's style of rule was his fondness for appealing to "the people" against "the bureaucrats"—and it would be quite wrong to assume that "the bureaucrats" were not intended to include the *apparatchiki* of the party, at least during the later years. This anti-oligarchic element was particularly strong in Khrushchev's educational reform—one of his most sternly-resisted policies.

The early struggles over the treatment of the defeated "anti-party group" should be seen in the same light. There is considerable evidence that an attempt to force the expulsion of Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich from the party, with a possible view to their subsequent trial for complicity in Stalin's crimes, was made and defeated at the 21st Congress in early 1959.[4] The view that Khrushchev favored such an attempt appears highly plausible in the light of his published remarks at the preceding Central Committee plenum of December 1958. Yet it does not follow that the victorious opponents of that attempt—who seem to have included the bulk of the party Presidium—were politically opposed to destalinization: prominent among these were Anastas I. Mikoyan, who had been the very first publicly to criticize Stalin at the 20th CPSU Congress, and M. A. Suslov, who —despite frequent allegations to the contrary— has been an equally consistent critic of the Stalinist past but seems to owe much of his prestige within the party oligarchy to his vigilant defense of party's institutions against the tendency to develop a "personality cult" of Khrushchev. Not factional resistance to destalinization, but collective Presidium opposition to measures that might place the dangerous weapon of the purge into Khrushchev's hands seems to be the explanation of his failure to achieve the expulsion of his rivals in 1959.

Further, beginning in December 1958, Khrushchev sought to reduce his dependence on the Central Committee by turning the meetings of this body into semi-public shows, attended by hundreds or even thousands of outside experts on whatever happened to be the main subject—kolkhoz chairmen and agronomists, industrial managers and technicians, economists, scientists, or literary men. Some parts of the CC meetings were still reserved for members and candidates only, and their debates remained secret; but minutes of the enlarged sessions were published, including Khrushchev's frequent interruptions of speeches by other party hierarchs. This dilution of the Central Committee meetings amounted to a serious depreciation of their deliberative character: the pledge to submit all major issues to regular meetings was formally honored, but their policy-making authority was skilfully undermined.

Pressure and Resistance

It was thus inevitable that the small Presidium, shielded as it was from the glare of demagogic publicity, should become the main focus of oligarchic resistance to the First Secretary's efforts at achieving personal rule. In contrast to the Central Committee, its members were all responsible for specific sectors of party or state affairs and had a working knowledge of other issues as well. In contrast to the Secretariat, the Presidium was not an executive organ for the disciplined implementation of decisions, but a policy-making organ whose members voted as equals. Even so, it was often challenged by the outside political speeches of the First Secretary, who sought to anticipate its decisions by publicly defending his own and attacking opposing points of view. In the last two years, Khrushchev had even begun to publish some of the policy memoranda he had circulated to the Presidium members before critical sessions—thus allowing readers to admire his initiatives and, by comparing the First Secretary's memoranda with the subsequent decisions, to deduce the extent of resistance to them.[5]

But the major blow intended by Khrushchev both against the oligarchic cohesion of the party bureaucracy in general and against the authority of the Presidium in particular was undoubtedly his dramatic reorganization of the party in November 1962, its division into separate industrial and agricultural sectors up to the level

[4] See Robert Conquest, *Power and Policy in the USSR*, London, St. Martin's Press, 1961, Ch. XIV.

[5] In his collected writings on agriculture, *Stroitelstvo kommunizma v SSSR i razvitie selskovo khoziaistva*, Vol. I-VII, Moscow 1962-63. See review by Jerry Hough, *Problems of Communism*, July-August 1964.

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of the national republics, and the simultaneous creation of a new organ for party and state control, which was vested with very considerable powers. There were, of course, other reasons for this move as well: as will be discussed below, the reorganization also constituted an attempt to maintain the party's rule in a period of concentration on the non-revolutionary tasks of economic construction—to adapt it to those tasks, and to shift its legitimation to the economic field. Yet, implicit in the scheme of reorganization was an all-round reduction in the role of the formally elected, policy-making party committees in favor of new, quasi-managerial bureaus for industry and agriculture appointed from the top and controlled by the central party Secretariat.

Further, the resulting upheaval was bound to give rise to a massive turnover of the party's bureaucracy on all levels, again with the selection in the hands of the Secretariat. Finally, the new Party-State Control Committee, whose purpose was to collect the complaints of the public against state and party bureaucrats and to purge them if it thought fit, was to be headed by A. N. Shelepin—a member of the Secretariat, who was also appointed a deputy premier in connection with his new task, yet did not—at that time—become a member of the party Presidium. It was without precedent for any man to hold simultaneously posts in both the Secretariat and the government without sitting in the party Presidium, and it clearly indicated Khrushchev's wish to keep the head of the new control organ as his personal subordinate, outside the discussions of the highest policy-making body. The intention to bypass this body was indeed so tangible that during the decisive Central Committee meeting, only two other Presidium members—Podgorny and Voronov—spoke up in favor of Khrushchev's scheme.[6]

Danger Signals

But Khrushchev's intended *coup de parti* was never fully consummated. In the months that followed the Central Committee plenum of November 1962, the division of the party organization into industrial and agricultural sectors was indeed carried out, but the Presidium succeeded in considerably limiting the changes of personnel as well as the powers of the Party-State Control Committee. During the same period, a campaign to bring Soviet literature and art under more effective party control, which Khrushchev himself had helped to set in motion, was effectively used for the most serious counterattack yet on the First Secretary, whose halo had already been seriously dimmed by his repeated failures in agriculture, foreign policy, and the world Communist movement. This time, the attack was political as well as institutional: it was accompanied by calls for a halt to destalinization, and Khrushchev was driven to the point where he had publicly to defend his own record during the Stalin era.[7] But his opponents seem to have overplayed their hand, and by the spring of that year Khrushchev was able to defeat a faction whose platform was out of tune with the real interests of the Soviet Union, and to get approval for his policy on the nuclear test-ban and emancipation from Chinese pressure.

Even so, the danger sign had been clear: it was still possible for Khrushchev to retain his leadership despite the various setbacks suffered by his policies, but not to increase his personal power and to free himself from institutional controls in the face of these setbacks. Yet with the more favorable atmosphere created by the 1964 harvest, Khrushchev again seemed to embark on a policy of enhancing his personal power. Towards the end of September, while preparations for a Central Committee session in November were in progress, he convened a combined meeting of the party Presidium, the Council of Ministers, the heads of the various planning bodies, the provincial party secretaries, and the chairmen of the regional economic councils—but without the full membership of the Central Committee—and used this highly irregular gathering as a sounding board for his proposed directives for a long-term economic plan along highly popular pro-consumer lines.[8]

The report on Khrushchev's speech which finally appeared in *Pravda*—after a delay of several days[9]—is a good indication of the struggle that must have been going on at that time. Khrushchev succeeded in placing the constituted organs of the party under popular pressure before they had come to a decision, but even that victory was rather abortive, since the full text of his remarks was never allowed to appear in print. It may well have been this specific action, combined with Khrushchev's reported plan to put his son-in-law in charge of a new agricultural reorganization, that finally precipitated his overthrow—not just by the op-

[6] For an earlier discussion of the party reorganization by the present writer, see "Chruschtschews unfertiger Staatsstreich," *Der Monat* (Berlin), March 1963.

[7] See the articles cited in note 3 above.

[8] *Pravda*, Oct. 2, 1964.

[9] The *Pravda* report gave no date for the meeting, but said that it had been held "recently."

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ponents of the policies advocated, but by a common front of the oligarchy in defense of institutional procedures.

With Khrushchev out of the way, the victors hastened to undo what was left of his November 1962 reorganization: they decided to merge once again the industrial and agricultural party units on a territorial basis; they reserved the necessary changes in personnel for the collective authority of the Presidium; and they promoted Khrushchev's protégé, Shelepin, who had presumably joined them at the critical moment, to membership of the Presidium—thus bringing the controller under control.

But if, in the light of the outcome, this interpretation of the politics of the Khrushchev era as a persistent but vain struggle by the leader to break out of the institutional limitations of his power may well seem plausible, it remains unsatisfactory by itself. Why, we must ask, could a totalitarian system that from its inception had been geared to one-man leadership, and that was clearly still in need of a visible, personal embodiment of its authority, develop an oligarchic cohesion that proved, again and again, strong enough to defeat the ambitions of a leader of Khrushchev's vital energy and demagogic gifts? For an answer, we must look beyond the mechanics of institutional power to the underlying changes in the social and political dynamics of the system as a whole—changes that may well be regarded by future historians as the chief result of the Khrushchevian era of transition.

Revolution Without Terror

The starting point of these changes was the abandonment of mass terrorism as a method of government. Stalin had understood that totalitarian rule could only be maintained in the long run by ever new revolutions from above—by the ruthless use of state power to transform society in the direction of the ideological goal and to prevent its structure from setting into any firm and stable mold. In 1937, he had expressed this *arcanum regni* in his notorious doctrine of the necessary sharpening of the class struggle as socialist construction progressed; in 1952, he had insisted in his last pamphlet, *Economic Problems of Socialism*, that the transition to the higher stage of communism could not be achieved by a mere improvement of productivity and organizational efficiency, but required another structural transformation to turn the kolkhoz farmers into state laborers. If the next turn of the wheel of permanent revolution had required another massive dose of violence, Stalin would not have shrunk from it.

Yet, the economic cost of repeated violent upheavals, which had been bearable during the period of Russia's forced industrialization, was bound to appear prohibitive once an industrially mature Soviet Union had to strive for further advances in productivity in competition with other mature industrial powers. In dissolving the forced labor camps and taking steps to raise the incomes of the mass of kolkhoz peasants and unskilled workers, Stalin's heirs deliberately shifted the balance of their levers of control from coercion to incentives. In repudiating Stalin's doctrine of the progressive sharpening of internal class struggle as well as his practice of blood purges, Khrushchev proclaimed the end of the role of mass terrorism as a basic element of the Soviet political system.

This repudiation of government by massive violence did not then mean, in Khrushchev's mind, the renunciation of further revolutionary changes in the social structure of the Soviet Union. An ideological believer as well as a modernizer, he was convinced that the ideological imperative of state-directed social transformation could be reconciled with the economic imperative of a continuous growth of production stimulated by material incentives: was not this the only possible justification for restoring the supremacy of an ideological party, yet pressing for the modernization of its methods of rule? When, in late 1958, Khrushchev responded to the challenge of the Chinese "people's communes" by elaborating his own program for the "building of communism," he emphasized that the goal could only be reached on the basis of the most advanced technology, but he stuck to Stalin's view that the disappearance of the structural difference between collective farms and state farms was a precondition for reaching the "higher stage."

True, the concrete road forward was to be quite different. For while Stalin had envisaged centrally organized barter between the collective farms and state industry as a way of overcoming the remnants of kolkhoz independence, Khrushchev believed in the need to raise kolkhoz productivity by making all costs and returns comparable in monetary terms; hence, he actually strengthened their independence by allowing them to acquire the equipment of the Machine Tractor Stations and converting their various types of delivery obligations into sales to the state at a unified price. Nevertheless, in his speech to the 21st Party Congress in early 1959 and as late as the December Central Committee plenum of the same year, he insisted that the transition to communism required struc-

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tural changes in the collective farms, and that concrete measures must be taken not only to replace the "labor day" system of remuneration by fixed monthly cash advances, but also to reduce the role of the peasants' private plots and herds and to prepare for their resettlement in "agrotowns" in which the private plots would be eliminated altogether.

Totalitarianism Without Revolution?

In practice, however, the structural changes propagated by Khrushchev proved incompatible with a steady growth of productivity. Wherever the peasants were "persuaded" to sell their private cattle to the kolkhoz, the results were so discouraging that propaganda for such sales was soon followed by warnings to local party officials to avoid undue pressure. The requirements of economic rationality and of ideological transformation were thus manifestly in conflict, and a choice had to be made. The answer was given in the new Party Program of 1961: here, the reduction and eventual abolition of private plots and herds and the creation of agrotowns no longer appeared as concrete tasks for party action, but were merely forecast as future by-products of an eventual rise in kolkhoz productivity which would eliminate the peasant families' need for their own private produce. For the first time, the task of "building communism" was no longer defined in terms of structural change, but merely in terms of the struggle for steady quantitative improvements in both productivity and the standard of living.

The 1961 Party Program thus marked the end of the Soviet Communists' commitment to imposing a "permanent revolution from above" on Soviet society; indeed, a commitment to stop this permanent revolution was implied in the Program's political thesis that, owing to the disappearance of hostile and exploiting classes, the Soviet state had ceased to be a "dictatorship of the proletariat" and become a "state of all the people"—in other words, that the internal class struggle in the Soviet Union had ended. Contrary to Khrushchev's original belief, it had proved impossible to continue transforming the social structure in accordance with preconceived ideological blueprints without mass terrorism; for the first time since the consolidation of totalitarian party rule in Russia, the economic dynamism of Soviet society had proved stronger than the ideological dynamism of the totalitarian system. The program amounted to an assurance to all Soviet citizens that henceforth they could go about their business without fear of further social upheavals imposed by the ruling party; in however obscure terms, it announced the "withering away" of the revolution. The Chinese were thus right in denouncing it as a "revisionist" document.

Yet the program was *not* intended to announce the withering away of one-party rule; on the contrary, it claimed that this rule, now exercised by a "party of all the people," was no longer dictatorial, and that the party's "leading role" would even outlive the attainment of full communism and the disappearance of the state. In fact, the party's monopoly of power was to be maintained indefinitely—if under another name—even though the original justification of this power by the revolutionary transformation of society had expired. This raised the problem of finding a new legitimation for maintaining Communist party rule in the Soviet Union. Nor could this need be evaded by putting more stress on the international aspect of the party's revolutionary task, for in this field, too, Khrushchev's attempt at a Leninist revival had ended in disillusionment. By 1962, hopes of a Soviet-led revolutionary breakthrough in world politics were finally sunk in the Caribbean, while the course of the Sino-Soviet conflict proved beyond doubt that not every advance of Communist revolution would necessarily redound to the greater glory of the Soviet Union. The



AN ITALIAN COMMENT

The cartoon above, captioned "Who will hang Brezhnev?," appeared originally in *Il Travaso* (Rome). It is reproduced here from *The New York Times*, November 8, 1964.

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CPSU, having lost its former international authority, had compelling reasons also to renounce its claim to world revolutionary leadership just when it recognized that its revolutionary role had ended at home.

Khrushchev's solution to the problem of a new legitimation for the party's power was his 1962 doctrine of the primacy of constructive economic tasks, bolstered by the timely discovery of an unpublished Lenin text[10] and dramatized by the radical reorganization of the party on a production basis. If the party could no longer aspire to transform society at will, it had to make itself useful to society; if its officials were not to be looked upon increasingly as phrase-mongering parasites, they had to prove themselves effective animators of economic progress—and the party organization had to be revamped in order to enable and even force them to do so. The wheel had indeed come full circle: instead of changing the structure of society in accordance with the ideas of the party, the structure of the party was now to be changed in accordance with the supposed needs of society! But the solution was more apparent than real; for the *apparatchiki* of the party were often unqualified for the performance of strictly economic tasks and reluctant to make the necessary adjustment, while the real need of the Soviet economy was not for more production-minded bureaucrats, but for greater managerial freedom from bureaucratic interference—as, indeed, Khrushchev's successors have recognized.

Dynamism Manqué

If we look back on Khrushchev's persistent but ultimately unsuccessful struggle against the oligarchic tendencies of the party apparatus in the light of these changes in the evolutionary trend of the Soviet system, the basic reason for his failure becomes plain: Khrushchev tried to furnish dynamic leadership at a time when the totalitarian dynamism of the Communist regime was running down. He offered new experiments and a revival of faith to a bureaucracy exhausted by the historic horrors of Stalinism and longing ever more strongly for stability and routine. He imagined he could be a milder, more benevolent Robespierre when the time had come for the *Directoire*.

Though Khrushchev helped to start the new trend by turning his back on Stalin's methods, he was not its conscious architect and master, and he ultimately became its victim. Indeed, the resistance he encountered, far from always being motivated by a nostalgia for Stalinism, was often more in tune with the new times than were his own proposals. It was a merit of the party oligarchy that it welcomed—and perhaps exacted—his pledge to end terroristic rule, yet refused to let him use his criticism of the past as a purge weapon against his rivals. Again, his colleagues seem from the beginning to have been doubtful about his plans for reducing the peasants' private plots and resettling them in agrotowns—the resolution of the 21st Congress was far less outspoken on these points than his own report, and the plots have indeed now been restored to their pre-Khrushchevian size. Generally, the routine-loving bureaucrats may have been more willing to listen to scientific advice on plant biology and agricultural management than was a would-be charismatic leader seeking miraculous results by perennial campaigns, be it for the extension of corn cultivation, the ploughing-up of virgin soils, or the reduction of fallow periods.

Yet Khrushchev was both sincere and consistent in his conviction that a modern party dictatorship can only survive if it remains an agent of dynamic change; and once he had reconciled himself to the fact that change could no longer be imposed according to ideological prescriptions, he sought to counter the regime's tendency towards bureaucratic inertia by making himself increasingly the spokesman of genuine social needs—of the demands for more food, more and better consumers' goods, better housing, and so on. But the more he identified his own struggle for personal authority and for a permanent circulation of the elites with those popular demands, the more his activities must have come to appear to the entire party bureaucracy as a threat to their rule.

When Khrushchev came to power, he had been determined both to restore the institutions and to revive the dynamic faith of the regime; in the end, it was the growing rigidity of the restored institutions that defeated his own dynamic faith. The contradiction, basic to the present phase of the Communist regime in the Soviet Union, may well be implicit in the nature of long-term totalitarian rule. Totalitarianism may be defined either by the institutions of single-party government, combined with a monopoly of organization and information, or by the dynamics of permanent revolution from above—of ever new social transformations enforced by political power in accordance with an (unattainable) ideological goal. In theory, it can be shown that the dynamics of permanent revolution require these institutions, and that the institutions can only be justified by this kind

[10] *Pravda*, Sept. 28, 1962.

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of dynamic purpose. Yet in practice, the maintenance of the dynamism requires an all-powerful leader who, while using the institutions, remains above them and often even disorganizes them to assure his personal power, as Stalin (and Hitler) did, while the institutions become stable only as the supposed *perpetuum mobile* is grinding to a halt and oligarchic rigidity sets in.

The fall of Khrushchev means that this stage has been reached in the USSR. The formal continuity of the party regime remains unbroken, but the erosion of its ideological dynamism is far advanced. The new men are both objectively and subjectively unable to continue the revolution; they will have to be content with administering its results. When all necessary reservations about historical analogies are made, the comparison wrongly applied by Trotsky to Stalin's rule seems to fit the *Directoire* of Khrushchev's successors much more closely—a regime of "Thermidorian" bureaucrats. As the revolution withers away, its heirs are reduced to the conservative role of stabilizing its institutions and defending their oligarchic privileges. No outside challenger to their domination is in sight. But perhaps it is not too sanguine to hope that their regime may prove more calculable and even more nearly legal, as well as less inspired and inspiring, than that of their predecessors, and that it may thus at last give a chance for the quiet maturing of new minds and forces that will one day break out of the shell of a dead tradition.

After the Fall: Some Lessons

By Robert Conquest

For the past few months political observers have studied the events surrounding the fall of Khrushchev for clues to future trends in Soviet domestic and foreign policy. The purpose of this brief inquiry, however, is different: it is to examine Khrushchev's fall for the lessons it may teach us regarding the general nature of Soviet leadership politics.

If the principals in the latest upheaval had been specifically asked to provide us with a dramatic illustration of how Soviet politics works, they could not have chosen a more auspicious time. For during the past few years a certain air of accord had seemed to emanate from the Soviet political scene, and it had again become possible for those so inclined to dismiss as fantasy interpretations of Soviet events that pointed to discord at a high level.

This view, which does not recognize conflict as the dynamic force activating Soviet political life at its highest reaches—and which may be conveniently called the "non-conflict model" of Soviet politics—had made its appearance in the pages of this journal itself. To be sure, other observers were quick to combat it.

In 1961, this writer stated in his *Power and Policy in the USSR:* [1]

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[1] New York, St. Martin's Press, 1961.

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To assume that harmony now prevails among the Soviet leadership would be to assume that a very extraordinary change had taken place in the system. This is not, perhaps, impossible, but at least one can say the assumption is the most speculative that could be made. It would be uncharitable to name the sources, but I have seen the assumption that stability has been achieved at last and that a collective leadership based on mutual restraint has finally emerged, put forward after the death of Stalin; after the fall of Beria; at the time of the 20th Congress; and at almost every other critical point in recent Soviet history. . . .

Perhaps a momentary lapse from charity will be conceded, just to provide one recent, if extreme, illustration of a basically erroneous attitude toward Soviet politics. In *Problems of Communism* of May-June 1964, a correspondent (A. Allison) expressed notions which in a general way still affect some students. He held that those who find Soviet political life permeated with conflict rely on "inferential and selective evidence while heavily discounting what appear to be simple and obvious realities." Such "realities" included the public appearance of harmony, or at any rate of political stability, in the highest party councils.

But it is ancient history that public figures are capable of public behavior—indeed of private behavior—which conceals their political aims. An example among thousands that come to mind is to be found in Lytton Strachey's *Elizabeth and Essex:*

Raleigh himself was utterly unsuspecting; there seemed to be a warm friendship between him and the Secretary. . . . His earlier hopes had been shattered by Essex; and now that Essex had been destroyed he was faced by a yet more dangerous antagonist. In reality, the Earl's ruin, which he had so virulently demanded, was to be the prologue to his own.

That is, a skilled operator was capable of deceiving not merely the public but even fellow-members of the Council! In any case, we *know* that similar practice has been common in the USSR. Malenkov and Beria were in public—and perhaps in private—notable cronies until the moment of truth; and similarly with Khrushchev and Bulganin. No, to take such superficial observance of the conventional amenities as meaning anything at all in any political society is to mislead oneself.

All this is far indeed from the cold-bloodedness of the Soviet oligarchy and the harshness of the struggle for power which recent events have just revealed in all their true crudity. We recognize the complexity, and the idiosyncrasies, of the polity to which we are accustomed, but we are all too apt to oversimplify our ideas of societies of which our knowledge is more indirect. We are inclined to construct models of strange political systems on too simple a basis, especially when the true facts are not readily available. Our notions about the Soviet polity are distorted by the fact that these events are taking place in the 20th century, among people who wear flannel suits and are called "Minister." If they wore turbans and were known as "Wazir," we would be less inclined to make mistakes about them. And similarly, their "Marxism" is a dialect, however debased, of the political language of the West.

What is more, a faint notion of people discussing scientific propositions still attaches to the political polemics of the Kremlin; this, too, is to some extent delusive. In any society, even the most primitive, policy matters are debated in a more or less rational way, but this in itself does not necessarily mean that the political style resembles that of the advanced democracies. It is quite inappropriate to think of Soviet politics in anything like Western terms, if only because there is no mechanism in the USSR for the social forces to express themselves. In advanced countries, society and polity virtually coincide; in the Soviet Union, the political world is limited to a few thousand members of a self-perpetuating elite. Moreover, this elite was originally formed, and has been trained for decades, to force its will upon society as a whole.

In the overthrow of Khrushchev, one of the most striking things of all was the absolute passivity of the Russian masses. Another was the absolute inattention of the leaders to the views of the people; the citizens' right to information, let alone participation, seems to have occurred to no one in the Kremlin. The gulf between this sort of attitude and anything resembling democracy is going to be a major crux as the Soviet Union faces problems which can scarcely be settled without the genuine involvement of the public. In fact, far from democracy being anywhere visible, it became clear from the pronouncements of the new regime that not even rational and consistent oligarchy could be found at the basis of the system. For Khrushchev had, it was now alleged, put through a whole series of hastily prepared and ill-considered schemes, disrupting industry, agriculture, and the party organization itself over the past few years, without the other leaders being able to do anything effective to stop him.

In his *L'Esprit des lois* (Book XI, Chapter 4), Montesquieu wrote: "C'est une expérience éter-

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nelle que tout homme qui a du pouvoir est porté à en abuser: il va jusqu'à ce qu'il trouve des limites." [2] In democracies these limits are fairly well defined. In the Soviet Union there is no such specificity, no properly established institutional bar. The ruler goes as far as he can until *ad hoc* opposition is mustered in sufficient strength to stop him.

The *mode* of Khrushchev's dismissal is in itself a great demonstration of the nature of Soviet politics. It was carried through with all the correct Moscovite trappings—almost to the point of caricature: the complete secrecy; the sudden coup; the issuing of a short and almost perfunctorily misleading statement about age and health; the simple cessation of reference to the name of the man who had just been the most powerful in the country; the oblique, but obvious, attacks on his methods; the removal from office of his closest adherent (Adzhubei) without comment or announcement until his replacement was mentioned casually a week or so later. . . . In particular, the evident absence of any idea on the part of the new rulers that such procedures might be found odd by anyone (including foreign Communist parties) shows flatly a complete, unself-conscious attachment to the traditionalisms of Soviet politics.

But to return again to Western analysis. The non-conflict model of the Soviet political system is defective on three counts. First, there is no such thing as non-conflict politics. "To govern is to choose," and so there will always be "conservative" and "progressive," "left" and "right" divisions in any political grouping, however narrow its spectrum of ideas. The only exception must be a one-man dictatorship so pure that no subordinate dare venture an opinion at all. Even Stalin's Russia did not reach that position.

Second (and still arguing *a priori*), the Soviet system is especially susceptible to conflict because it is constructed to force ideological solutions upon the recalcitrant crises it must continuously deal with; because it is based on an ideology that is liable to various interpretations and subject to fissiparous trends; and because its leaders have over the years been selected for their ruthlessness, ambition and intrigue. Third (and at last *a posteriori*), evidence showing or suggesting conflict within the system is continually available.

[2] "It is an invariable experience that every man who has power is led to abuse it: he goes on until he finds limits."

And Now, Dr. Castro?

I have a magnificent impression of Comrade Khrushchev. . . . He is extraordinarily human. . . . He has an extraordinary mental energy, and a complete, complete, complete mental lucidity . . . without a doubt one of the most brilliant intellects that I have ever known . . . a militant revolutionary . . . a veritable authority on economic problems. . . . There exists [in the Soviet leadership] a spirit of collective discussion; yet amidst this . . . one is quite aware of Khrushchev's authority and prestige in the collective management. . . .

—*Fidel Castro, Havana, June 4, 1963.*

Against all this, there is only one serious consideration. Since Soviet convention demands that all party decisions be the product of monolithic agreement, evidence of dispute at the highest level is not allowed to appear in open form—or at least not at the time of the agreement. Thus, those who take the view that conflict does not occur are free to regard the obliqueness of the evidence as a sign of its nullity.

But there are many circumstances, in many fields, where evidence must be indirect. The logic of the other way of thinking is as follows: "The visible part of the iceberg must constitute the whole of it. It is true that some observers claim to see something below the waterline, but even they admit that the submerged part is only obscurely and temporarily visible, and that it may well be something else really, such as a reflection, or a delusion, or a whale. Then again, they deduce from the movements of the visible portion and the laws of dynamics that there must be something below; but after all, this is mere deduction. In fact, the whole evidence is circumstantial, and I prefer to believe what I can see with my eyes." Such a view is not simply mistaken at a superficial level; it reflects a wholly and basically erroneous notion of the nature of Soviet politics.

"In the West . . . there is a lack of knowledge about the different situations in different Socialist countries. . . . Some situations seem difficult to understand. In many cases one has the impression that there are differences of opinion among the leading groups, but one does

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not know if this is really so, and what the differences are." So wrote Togliatti (if only for public consumption) in the memoir composed shortly before his death—and not long before the overthrow of Khrushchev. His basic conclusion was right; and so were his feelings about the difficulty of following the course of the political struggle in the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, throughout the period he was concerned with, much evidence of disunity at the top was available.

Item: There have been issues in Soviet political life on which it has been impossible to make any decision at all. For example, no official account, true or false, of the 1936-38 trials has been available for eight or nine years.

Item: There have been sudden shifts from one policy to another, associated with the rise or decline in prominence of a particular spokesman. Note, for example, the tough approach to literature in early 1963, associated with Kozlov, and the change of the May 1st, 1963, slogan on Yugoslavia, coincident with his fading-out.[3]

Item: There have been sudden unexplained promotions and demotions, such as the relegation of the then heir apparent, Kirichenko, from all his posts in 1960, or the demotion of Kirilenko from the Presidium and the promotion of Spiridonov to the Secretariat at the 22nd Congress (October 1961)—followed, in early 1962, by a reversal of both moves.[4]

Item: There have been violent agitations in favor of policies which nevertheless were either never carried out or effected only much later. Take, for example, the calls at the 21st Congress (1959) for the expulsion from party membership of Molotov and Malenkov, which was only to be announced in 1964.[5]

Item: Discussions have taken place in which different party organizations have taken different lines. For example, at the 22nd Congress, delegates from only half the republics called for the expulsion of the "anti-party" group.

Item: Plans to which the head of the party and government has publicly committed himself, while admitting that "some comrades" opposed him, have been abandoned: *e.g.*, the issue of the fertilizer target for 1970.[6]

Item: Individual party leaders have made remarks which, though couched in terms within the protocol of collective leadership, can best be interpreted as political criticism of another faction. For example, after the reorganization of the party into industrial and agricultural sections, Kozlov commented that this could "not in any circumstances be allowed" to split the urban and rural party organizations [7]—just what it obviously was doing—and we now know that Kozlov was expressing the reservations of many members of the Presidium. Again, at the 22nd Congress, Kosygin declared that the "anti-party" group was not a present danger, and was only being attacked

> *to show the party and the people once again what the personality cult leads to. . . . We must and will do everything in our power to insure that our party and our society have no room for a personality cult in the future either. . . .* [8]

This writer commented at the time—and surely it was reasonable to do so—that "this was an obvious criticism of the Khrushchev cult." [9]

It is true that this sort of evidence requires delicate handling and considerable confirmation from the context. But it is not to be dismissed out of hand and will be disregarded only by those who have inadequately studied the tone of Soviet pronouncements. To be sure, alternative explanations *can* be found for all types of evidence we have listed, but though it may be fragmentary, inadequate, and sometimes even misleading, it is the only evidence we have, and properly interpreted, it has always led to sounder conclusions than have assumptions of its meaninglessness.

So much, then, for the non-conflict model. But this is not the only relevant issue which has been debated over the last years in these pages as well as in others. For, it may be urged, even a good old-fashioned, non-Platonic, down-to-earth conflict model admits of various interpretations. There is, for instance, nothing in it that would necessarily have prevented one from concluding that Khrushchev is bound to win any conflict. And some such position was widely maintained.

As one of the contributors to this journal who did not hold that view, and as one who is on record as putting forward the possibility that

[3] Compare the original slogan with the amendment; *Pravda*, April 8 and April 11, 1963, respectively. See also Carl Linden's article "Khrushchev and the Party Battle," *Problems of Communism*, Sept.-Oct. 1963, p. 34.

[4] See Linden, *op. cit.*, pp. 30-31.

[5] See Suslov's speech of Feb. 14, 1964, published in *Pravda*, April 3, 1964, and the discussions by Carl Linden and Wolfgang Leonhard in *Problems of Communism*, Nov.-Dec. 1963, pp. 56-58 and 61-64.

[6] See Khrushchev's speech at Krasnodar, Sept. 26, 1963, *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, Oct. 2, 1963.

[7] *Leningradskaia pravda*, Feb. 27, 1963.

[8] *Pravda*, Oct. 23, 1961.

[9] *New Leader* (New York), Nov. 27, 1961.

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Khrushchev might fall, I should say that the key word is "possibility." There were many good arguments about the strength of Khrushchev's position, and it was perfectly reasonable to give him the odds. It was simply a methodological error to construct a model of Soviet politics in which a possibility was excluded. It turned out that Khrushchev's ouster was precisely the possibility that happened to become a fact, and so the thesis proved self-refuting. But if Khrushchev had won, that would not have proved the inevitability of his victory. The lesson of the recent events is that in dealing with Soviet politics we must never think that a restricted view of the possibilities is prudent, or commonsensical, or respectable, or admirable in any other way. From the vantage point of 1953, the major events of the first post-Stalin decade would have been contrary to "reasonable" anticipation. We should realize once and for all that communism is in a state of continuous crisis, and that it is basically unhistorical to predict for it a smooth and logical evolution. If we do not allow for even quite extravagant possibilities, we are bound to be taken by surprise. Serious consideration of Soviet prospects must deal with every variation that is formally possible.

Meanwhile, we can at least predict further struggle. For it is clear that the frictions of the past few years were not polarized between Khrushchev on the one hand and all the other members of the Presidium on the other. There must have been some support, besides Khrushchev's, for the political acts now most condemned, and there must certainly be some who were less opposed to him than others. In any case, the conspiracy against him would scarcely have waited until it had attained absolute unanimity in the Presidium. Rather, the conspirators struck as soon as their forces were adequate; the alternative would have been appallingly poor security. So there must now be vulnerable men at the top.

But even the allies who mounted the coup, and are now benefiting from it, are united only in their opposition to Khrushchev. In the Soviet past, every group that has risen against a rival has, after victory, quarreled over the disposal of the spoils, as well as on policy grounds. It is hard to see how the present rulers, even if they see the advantages of an agreed share-out, could possibly find a formula adequate to end this old tendency, this law of Soviet politics.

There are all sorts of elements in the current situation—the provocative and anomalous power of the Ukrainian contingent in the leadership, for example—which augur continued struggle. But rather than start, at this stage, on a detailed Kremlinological analysis, it may be worth registering a general point which seems to distinguish this period from earlier ones.

When Shamil, the great leader of Caucasian resistance to the Russians, asked his council who would succeed him, the answer was: "Venerated Imam, your successor will be the man with the sharpest sword." Conditions in the Kremlin are different from those in the *auls* of Daghestan and Chechenia, and it might be suggested that the knife in the back, rather than the scimitar at the breast, is the symbolic weapon more appropriate to Kremlin conditions. In any case, there are certain qualities specially required of a man if he is to become, in any true sense, Khrushchev's successor as the leader of the Soviet Communist Party and the Soviet state.

In the first place, political prestige seems essential. We saw in 1957 that a great concentration of such prestige is not adequate in itself; there must be credibility about a man's assumption to the leading position. And he must also, in the ordinary course of events, have the necessary skill and experience in the required infighting and manipulation of the *apparat*.

Strictly speaking, Khrushchev was the only member of the Presidium who had all these qualities. The immediate future must then involve either a series of attempts to maintain collective leadership—a situation which is automatically unstable in Soviet conditions; *or* the calling-in of fallen leaders with greater prestige; *or* the rather quick development of the necessary leadership qualities by one or another of the present contenders. Meanwhile, we are entitled to regard the period as inherently unstable.

In the post-Stalin succession crisis, a handful of leaders in the Presidium had so much more experience, confidence and prestige than the rank-and-file members of the Central Committee that none of the latter could have reasonably entertained the possibility of an early rise to the top. But when the leading contenders are a Brezhnev or a Podgorny, there are a score or so, at the very least, of officials who only a few years ago ranked with the men currently at the front, or even above them, and they are unlikely to think of the Brezhnevs as in any way their superiors. The thought must be natural that the way to the top is now open, or might be open, to any ambitious provincial secretary. As Finlay writes of a Byzantine ruler,

he had risen to the highest rank without rendering himself remarkable either for his valor

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or his ability; the successful career of Romanus therefore excited . . . the ambition of every enterprising officer.[10]

In dealing with the membership of the present Presidium and Secretariat, we should never fail to keep in mind the fact that, over the past six or seven years, membership of these bodies has been precarious, and that they contain a number of men whose advancement over their contemporaries is recent and unlikely to be thought of as part of the established nature of things by either their seniors or their juniors.

[10] *History of the Byzantine Empire.*

Although Khrushchev, with his erratic and changeable policies, has to some degree shaken the old solidarities and certitudes of the party, he has, nevertheless, provided the main element of political stability and continuity in the recent period. For the regime has at least been centered in one man of long experience and political credibility. With his removal, we now see the disintegration, which has long marked the economic and intellectual spheres, reach into the political realm as well. Although it would be going too far to say that this development is irreversible, it yet seems quite probable that the Soviet system has thereby entered a general crisis from which it can only emerge transformed out of all recognition.

Moscow and the "Third World"

By Uri Ra'anan

The search for rewarding methods of exploiting the opportunities offered by the rise of the "Third World" has exercised Soviet leaders at least since the 19th Party Congress of 1952, Stalin's last year. Since the newly-independent regimes, while emotionally anti-Western, were also non-Communist, the problem has presented doctrinal complexities for Moscow. Ideological questions have been particularly hard to tackle, since they have been elevated to the level of a central issue both by the Chinese—would-be rivals of the USSR in ex-colonial areas—and by competing factions inside Moscow. Thus Khrushchev, for instance, while attempting an appraisal of the situation in various developing countries, simultaneously had to fend off attacks from Peking and from within.

While a practical policy towards the "Third World" had evolved by 1955, it took until 1960-61 for theory to be wedded to the new reality. The formula of "national democracy," advanced by the 1960 Moscow Declaration of 81 Communist Parties, and its subsequent qualifications in the CPSU Draft Party Program of 1961, appeared to meet the demands of the situation. Throughout the subsequent period, the pretense was to be maintained that the 1960-61 definitions constituted the touchstone of all political action. In fact, however, these modernized formulations, essentially born of compromise, were to prove wanting within 18 months.

Some time in 1963, certain groups within the Soviet elite seemed to lose patience with efforts to tackle the problem within the framework of classical doctrine, and embarked upon an attempt to make some Afro-Asian countries the testing ground for a policy experiment radical

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in its practical consequences and revolutionary in its ideological implications. By 1964, it became apparent to some Western observers that Khrushchev himself had become involved in this attempt—though not without serious resistance from some Soviet circles, especially during the First Secretary's visit to Egypt. These developments were fascinating, particularly in the light of the subsequent charges against Khrushchev, which were "leaked" to the outside world after his ouster, and which referred clearly to this particular conflict.

In reconstructing this comparatively unnoticed chapter of Khrushchev's struggle, some misgivings must be voiced: First, Soviet internal conflicts may only overtly be concerned with ideology, thus providing no definitive material for conclusions as to the future policies of the survivors. One need hardly recall here the well-known instances in which the victors have adopted the policies of the vanquished soon after the struggle ceased. Second, the following analysis is confined to one single, although important, aspect of Soviet policy. This was neither the only nor, necessarily, the decisive cause of Khrushchev's downfall, but merely one of the factors contributing to his ouster.

Doctrines and Realities

Already by the mid-1950's, it was evident that the relatively rigid formulations of Stalin and Mao Tse-tung had proved unsuited to meet the realities of the "Third World." Stalin had followed classic Marxist assumptions in postulating that ex-colonial countries would have to go through a bourgeois revolution. Mao had added the thought that, in some cases, a "new democracy" might be brought into being through which the Communists might be able to dominate a broad front even during the first, nominally bourgeois, stage of colonial revolution. Both theories, if faithfully followed, could severely limit action in cases where a former colonial country had practically no proletariat and even less of a Communist party.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the Soviet Union departed in practice from these formulations in 1954-55 (initially with China's endorsement), at first initiating close bilateral relationships with new bourgeois-nationalist regimes, and later granting them massive military and economic aid.

In an attempt to let doctrine catch up with the facts, the 1960 Moscow Declaration of 81 Communist Parties issued the slogan of "the independent state of national democracy." This was a compromise platform hammered out with the Chinese. The 1961 Draft Program of the CPSU defined this concept more closely. The expectation of early Communist leadership of newly independent countries was by no means abandoned. Non-Communist regimes, however, were embraced whenever they fought Western political and economic influence, maintained military neutralism together with close friendship for the USSR, implemented radical social and economic reforms and permitted political liberties to flourish (*i.e.*, gave local Communist parties the right to exist and organize).

In some countries, the "state of national democracy," based primarily upon a strong peasant-proletarian alliance with petty-bourgeois support, might conceivably prepare the "road to a non-capitalist development," one Soviet authority speculated. This was Boris N. Ponomarev, now Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee in charge of relations with non-bloc parties, who has for some years been the party authority on developing countries. He hastened to explain, however, that only *revolutionary* changes could actually lead to "socialism," and he specifically warned against any attempts to pick out individual countries and assume that they were already embarking upon the "non-capitalist" path.[1]

Khrushchev, on the other hand, was prepared even then to claim that "today practically any country, irrespective of its level of development, can enter on the road leading to socialism." With characteristic inconsistency, however, he was, in May 1962, still among those who denigrated "African Socialism," "Arab Socialism," etc.[2] In so doing, he merely followed the Draft Party Program of 1961, which attacked regimes that "advance theories of 'socialism of the national type,' propagate . . . variations of the petty-bourgeois illusion of socialism . . . which rules out the class struggle."[3] Thus the 1960-61 compromise permitted practical aid to non-Communist regimes, but it forbade their ideological endorsement at the expense of "scientific socialism"—*i.e.*, the local Communists.

Tinkering with Marxism

As late as their note to the CPSU early in 1963, the Chinese naively assumed the permanency of this formulation. However, already in the late summer of 1962, the dynamics of Cuban developments had apparently tempted sections

[1] *Kommunist*, No. 8, 1961.
[2] *Pravda*, May 20, 1962.
[3] Program of CPSU (draft), Part 1, chap. VII, 1961.

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of the Soviet leadership to believe that the tedium of prolonged dialectical processes could now be conjured away, even in Africa and Asia. As was stated in Moscow many months later, "a new and distinctive period" had opened up, and one could expect to see "petty-bourgeois and even bourgeois leaders of the national liberation movements going over to the positions of the working class." [4]

In March of 1963, without as yet openly confessing to such an emasculation of Marxist beliefs, Khrushchev's circle intimated, in a communication to the Chinese, that there were now hopes of tilting the balance against the West, and that this required intimate collaboration with various "third world" leaders. Some of these leaders, it was admitted, might "establish for a time reactionary political regimes and subject Communists . . . to persecution"; however, the prospective victims were offered the cold consolation that "such regimes are short-lived." [5] The Chinese retorted that they would accept "even certain kings, princes and aristocrats" as allies, but that it was essential for local Communists to maintain "independence and insist on leadership of the revolution." Clearly referring to Khrushchev's whetted appetite for quick contests without effort, they added that "if the proletariat becomes the tail of the landlords and bourgeoisie in the revolution, no real or thorough victory in the national democratic revolution is possible, and even if victory of a kind is gained, it will be impossible to consolidate it.[6] The Soviet reply of July 1963 placed all the onus of proving their right to exist upon the local Communist parties themselves, saying that by their "selflessness" and "wholehearted service" they would have to "win recognition" and "convince their allies that their leadership is a reliable guarantee of both their own victory and the victory of their allies." [7]

Possibly a little abashed by their own boldness, some Soviet voices now made defensive and apologetic noises. During the summer and fall of 1963, it was stressed that the Soviet Union had not really abandoned the revolutionary contest and was, indeed, supporting "struggling" groups of the "national liberation movement." Even some of the journalist-scholars who, in 1964, were to become the standard-bearers of the most radical form of "revisionism" in this field still questioned, during 1963, the orthodoxy of nationalization and national socialism in non-Communist developing countries.

Then, in December 1963, Khrushchev personally grasped the initiative. In an "interview" answering queries ostensibly put by certain Algerian, Ghanaian and Burmese newspapers,[8] the Soviet leader now turned his back on the 1961 Party Program and explicitly endorsed "socialism of the national type." While attacking pro-Western leaders in the young states who "talk about socialism, although they fear social reforms like fire," he warmly praised "revolutionary-democratic statesmen" who "sincerely advocate non-capitalist methods for the solution of national problems and declare their determination to build socialism. We welcome their declarations . . . we fully support their measures . . ." He still qualified his *volte-face*, however, by warning that "measures cannot be effected for which the necessary social and economic conditions have not been created" and that "socialism cannot be built . . . by opposing the countries in which socialism is victorious or by persecuting Communists . . ."

In effect, Khrushchev was offering to recognize the revolutionary standing of certain "national socialist" leaders provided they met certain conditions—above all, friendship towards the Soviet Union and an amnesty for imprisoned Communists. Viewed in retrospect, the December 1963 "interview" seems to have been an important turning point in the controversy. After that date, the upper hand appeared clearly to rest with those who favored embracing regimes of this kind.

The Growing Debate

Nevertheless, a detailed analysis of Soviet statements and publications on this subject throughout 1964 reveals the continuation of striking divergencies of view. On several occasions it was intimated that the question had been opened to public debate among the experts. However, closer study indicates that this was not due to any modest decision by the political leadership to defer to the scholars; rather, there appears to have been a clash of opinion among the leaders themselves, creating an atmosphere in which other flowers could bloom.

Roughly speaking, the following parties to the dispute may be distinguished, going from

[4] Articles by K. Ostravitianov and V. Tiagunenko, in *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyie otnosheniia*, No. 4, 1964, pp. 116-131, and No. 6, 1964, pp. 62-81.

[5] CPSU Central Committee letter to CCP Central Committee, *Pravda*, April 3, 1963.

[6] CCP Central Committee reply to CPSU Central Committee, *Pravda*, July 14, 1963.

[7] *Ibid.*

[8] The "interview" was published in both *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, Dec. 22, 1963.

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"right" to "left": a) academician-journalists, some of them young political economists, from the Oriental (*i.e.*, Near Eastern) and African Institutes, grouped mostly around the journal *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyie otnosheniia* but enjoying growing support (through Khrushchev's son-in-law, Adzhubei?) from the central organs of publication; b) Khrushchev himself, erratic and inconsistent, but tending more and more towards a sweeping abandonment of accepted doctrinal compromises; and c) a section of the party apparatus in charge of external questions and contact with non-bloc Communist parties (especially Mikhail A. Suslov, Boris N. Ponomarev, and Aleksei M. Rumiantsev), cautiously treading middle ground between the requirements of policy toward the "non-committed," of defense against Chinese attacks, and of some kind of rational doctrinal consistency. This last group, especially, was influenced to a degree by the need to consider the interests of local Communist leaders in the developing countries, who naturally did not share the prevailing enthusiasm in Moscow for regimes with which they were locked in bitter conflict.

It was the first group, the academician-journalists, who provided the most striking evidence of doctrinal upheaval. Already in 1962 and 1963, some of them had started to probe in a new direction, expressing themselves through various media, but especially *Mirovaia ekonomika*. On the right wing of this group stood an expert on the United Arab Republic (UAR), G. Mirski, who early in 1963 put forward views which Khrushchev himself was to repeat in essence eleven months later. Mirski scornfully rejected the view, held until then by the party's ideological experts, that the regimes in developing countries were basically bourgeois. Instead he maintained:

They are rather representatives of the progressive intelligentsia, revolutionary democrats, *who understand the necessity of turning the anti-colonialist revolution into an anti-capitalist one. For example, the patriotic army circles who came to power in the UAR in 1952 were finally and logically drawn, in their struggle against imperialism and feudalism, to make inroads on the bases of the capitalist system of production.*

. . . the intelligentsia and the army . . . the world outlook of these people may undergo evolution, and since they have real power in their hands, they are quite able suddenly to change their tack. . . . To ignore such prospects . . . means to divorce oneself from historical reality. . . .[9]

The editors of *Mirovaia ekonomika* shortly thereafter informed their readers that Mirski's article had aroused both interest and criticism. They subsequently published a counter-article whose joint authors included a former collaborator of Mirski, R. Avakov, who called Mirski's piece extremist and denied that one could speak of the UAR having made inroads on the bases of capitalism.[10] Avakov himself had essentially shared Mirski's views before, and he was to share them again later; thus, it would appear that the unnamed forces who had criticized Mirski's article had prevailed upon the editors to get some other experts on the UAR to write a piece cancelling out Mirski's views.

The next development came some months later, in November 1963, when *Pravda* itself—under the editorship of P. A. Satiukov—published an article repeating Mirski's thesis. The article held that reforms in the UAR had "above all struck at the interests of the bourgeoisie and of all capitalist elements" and that "the preconditions for the country's transition to the non-capitalist path of development are being created."[11] Like Mirski himself, the author merely called for the fulfilment of one condition by the "non-capitalist" UAR regime, namely, to permit the participation of local Communists in public life—a reasonable expectation in view of Nasser's earlier promise to release Communist and other political prisoners from confinement.

It was soon thereafter that Khrushchev himself came out with his December 1963 "interview" described earlier. This reflected quite a few of Mirski's ideas and thus made it clearer whose backing had emboldened Mirski to propagate those views, and by inference who had objected. Shortly after the Khrushchev statement, Mirski triumphantly wrote that "analysis of the development of the UAR shows that, dogmatist views to the contrary, in our day of a world socialist system the prospects before former colonies and semi-colonies are infinitely wider and more diversified than before.[12]

The "dogmatists" referred to were obviously not the Chinese, but rather the persons who had earlier caused *Mirovaia ekonomika* to recant. In this connection, it may be noted that Mirski and his supporters had taken to the practice of "categorizing" underdeveloped countries as closer to or farther away from the "socialist path." This practice was shunned throughout by the central directors of the party's external

[9] *Mirovaia ekonomika*, No. 2, 1963, pp. 65-66.
[10] *Mirovaia ekonomika*, No. 5, 1963, pp. 50-51.
[11] Article by I. Beliaiev in *Pravda*, Nov. 26.
[12] *New Times*, No. 2, 1964, pp. 5-6.

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relations, Boris Ponomarev in particular having specifically warned against it in 1961 on the ground that "such an approach would be schematic and harmful." [13]

Revisionism Rampant

In the spring of 1964 came the announcements of Khrushchev's projected visit to the UAR and Algerian Premier Ben Bella's trip to the Soviet Union. In the interim prior to these events, Mirski and members of the *Mirovaia ekonomika* group rose to new heights of boldness. In an article in *New Times* enthusiastically quoting Khrushchev, Mirski referred to "the crucially important subjective factor (in some developing countries), a leadership that accepts socialism"—as un-Marxist a formulation as has ever been uttered by a Soviet theoretician on this subject. Mirski added:

The doctrinaires and dogmatists will reply, "Wait!". . . but . . . the national liberation revolution can immediately break out of the framework of bourgeois democratic revolution and begin the transition to socialist revolution. . . . if the conditions for proletarian leadership have not yet matured, the historic mission of breaking with capitalism can be carried out by elements close to the working class. . . . by helping to provide the political, military and economic requisites for the continuous advance of the national liberation revolution . . . , the socialist world system is performing the functions of proletarian vanguard in relation to imperialist-oppressed nations.[14]

In other words, never mind if these countries have no active Communist party; Soviet aid will compensate for this lack!

Meanwhile, the *Mirovaia ekonomika* circle, encouraged by the obvious backing which Mirski had received from on high, staged a conference in the early spring of 1964 to discuss ideological questions relating to the "third world." Seventeen experts, including Mirski, participated in the conference, which was chaired and led by two prominent members of the *Mirovaia ekonomika* editorial board, K. Ostrovitianov and V. Tiagunenko.[15] During the discussions, various spokesmen saw definite hope of "petty bourgeois and even bourgeois leaders of the national liberation movement going over to the positions of the working class." Mirski's collaborator and sometime antagonist, R. Avakov, now went even further than Mirski and Khrushchev, speaking of "a definite transition from the ideology of nationalism to the ideology of socialism of the national type"—precisely the terminology condemned in 1961.

Mirski and others, openly defying Ponomarev's warning against classifying the regimes of developing countries, divided them into a favored group, headed by Algeria, the UAR, Burma, Ghana, Mali and Guinea, which were described as carrying out "non-capitalist measures . . . an initial stage of transition to socialist construction," and another non-bourgeois group, a little less favored, including Indonesia and Senegal. The conference viewed as promising and essentially non-bourgeois such strata as minor bureaucrats, young officers and students in developing countries. Mirski concluded that his antagonists' attacks upon him "were clearly futile." Tiagunenko, sharing in Mirski's triumph, called it "particularly gratifying to note that the conclusions and assessments which until quite recently were shared by a comparatively small circle of people have now begun to be shared by many." Emerging from the conference, Mirski went so far as to say that Algeria's pursuit of "a socialist program at home" and its "growing ties of friendship with the world's first socialist state" offered "good reason to predict that Algeria's future will be bright." This constituted the first Soviet endorsement of a non-Communist country as having "embarked upon socialism." [16]

When Ben Bella appeared in Moscow shortly thereafter, Khrushchev took the almost unprecedented step of having him awarded the decoration of "Hero of the Soviet Union," the official citation for the award referring to the Algerian statesman as "Comrade." [17] During the May Day ceremonies in Moscow's Red Square, Khrushchev ostentatiously had Ben Bella placed next to him on the reviewing stand. In this case, it is true, the Soviet ideological stamp of approval conferred on Ben Bella had the blessing of the Algerian Communists; nevertheless, it was a further indication of Khrushchev's proximity to the views of the *Mirovaia ekonomika* group.

This was the prevailing atmosphere when Khrushchev departed for Cairo in May 1964. The visit was to prove of particular importance since it was the only occasion on which Khrushchev personally had a chance to put the new

[13] *Kommunist*, No. 8, 1961.
[14] *New Times*, No. 18, 1964, pp. 6-9.
[15] All quotations from conference statements are from *Mirovaia ekonomika*, No. 4, 1964, and No. 6, 1964.
[16] *New Times*, No. 17, 1964, pp. 9-13.
[17] *Pravda*, May 2, 1964.

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theories to the test. Much attention has been paid to some typical Khrushchevian outbursts of ebullience during his visit, such as his dramatic discourse on Arab nationalism at Aswan. In fact, these were the less important aspects of the tour, Khrushchev's Aswan outburst having come entirely in reaction to a speech by Iraq's President Aref, in whose country Communists had been massacred in droves, and who rather tactlessly praised the Arab nation for the Aswan achievement rather than the ruler of the country which had given the money and technicians to build the dam.

The most important aspect of Khrushchev's visit was, in fact, his ideological and practical endorsement of the UAR regime, an act that was in full accord with Mirski's thesis mentioned above. On one occasion he said: "I wish you, young citizens of the UAR, *who are embarking on the path of socialist construction*, great success." [18] On another: "We have welcomed with satisfaction your decision to develop . . . the country . . . through a *socialist reconstruction* of society . . ." [19] And the final communiqué stated that "Premier Khrushchev expressed gratitude to President Nasser for the invitation to visit the republic, which has *embarked upon the road of socialist development.*" [20] (Author's italics)

In his first Aswan appearance, Khrushchev had announced that President Nasser would be awarded the decoration of "Hero of the Soviet Union," and in recalling the UAR leader's achievements, he added, "All these things are giving me the right to call you Comrade." [21] In another statement, Khrushchev answered the UAR's request for more arms by saying, "Everything is all right, there will be no difficulties with the weapons when they are necessary." [22]

While Khrushchev was merrily extemporizing in Cairo, however, there were curious signs in Moscow that some circles there were not entirely at ease with his performance. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet dutifully followed up Khrushchev's announcement at Aswan by issuing a decree making Nasser and UAR Vice-President Amer "Heroes of the Soviet Union;" however, in spite of Khrushchev's specific reference to "Comrade" Nasser, the decree (presumably drawn up by Brezhnev in Khrushchev's absence) simply spoke of "Gamal Abdel Nasser, President of the UAR," refraining from bestowing the title of "Comrade" on either him or Amer. This was in contrast to the wording of the decree issued just two weeks earlier with respect to Ben Bella, and it suggests that some of the more orthodox ideologists in Moscow preferred to draw a sharper distinction than Khrushchev between Algeria, where the Communists published their own organ and had given full backing to the FLN, and Egypt, where the Communists had only just emerged from jail. The citations also differentiated between Ben Bella's role in "the establishment and development of *fraternal* Soviet-Algerian friendship" (author's italics) and Nasser's part in "strengthening friendship and cooperation between the peoples of the Soviet Union and the UAR." [23] Still another straw in the wind was the fact that all Soviet versions of Khrushchev's Cairo pledge on weapons aid to the UAR "improved" on it by adding a significant qualification (italicized here): "There will be no delay over arms *should they be necessary to rebuff aggressors.*"

The Widening Breach

As for Khrushchev's belief that the UAR had embarked upon the road of socialist construction, a comparison of his statements with views uttered before, during, and after the Cairo visit by the CPSU leaders directly responsible for relations with foreign Communist parties indicates a wide gap in outlook. The tone had been set by Suslov in his address to the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee of February 14, 1964, which was not published until two months later. Suslov revealed that in July of 1963 the General Secretary of the CCP Central Committee, Teng Hsiao-ping, had dismissed as "meaningless talk" the Soviet belief in the possibility "of a non-capitalist way of development of the liberated countries." While Suslov indicated general approval of some regimes in developing countries which "advocate taking the socialist path and are actually taking steps in this direction," he was very careful not to mention any names or to extend ideological endorsements. On the contrary, he was most precise in distinguishing between the aforementioned regimes, which had "set about effecting radical social reforms," and others which had "already taken the social-

[18] Khrushchev's address to Youth Rally in Cairo Stadium, May 10, 1964.
[19] Khrushchev's address to UAR National Assembly, Cairo, May 11, 1964.
[20] TASS International News Report from Moscow (in English), May 24, 1964.
[21] Associated Press report from Aswan, May 14, 1964.
[22] Cairo Radio broadcast on May 19, 1964, of Khrushchev's speech delivered May 18, 1964 at Cairo Officers' Club.
[23] *Pravda*, May 2, 1964; *ibid.*, May 15, 1964.

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ist road." In the accepted Soviet parlance of February 1964, the latter terminology referred to openly "Communized" countries like Cuba, so that, by Suslov's definition, the Ben Bella or Nasser governments would hardly have been recognized as having embarked on the socialist path.[24]

Months after Khrushchev's visit, Boris Ponomarev, the official link with the non-bloc Communist parties, delivered himself of a definitive, detailed statement on the subject in the international organ of world communism. In it he ignored all of Khrushchev's statements, as well as the Cairo visit itself and all prognostications that developing countries were "embarking upon the non-capitalist path."

The most Ponomarev would grant was that "in some countries the national liberation movement is headed by revolutionary democrats, who associate the struggle for national independence with radical socio-economic reforms . . . This situation *facilitates* the national regeneration of the emergent states along non-capitalist lines, with the fraternal support of the socialist states" (italics added). He immediately qualified this statement by adding that "Marxist-Leninists are well aware of the danger of bourgeois nationalism to the peoples of the young states." [25] Moreover, in a long programmatic speech delivered one month later in Khrushchev's very presence, Ponomarev spoke only of a broad alliance with the struggle for national liberation and—while praising Soviet aid to the developing countries—did not dignify the "non-capitalist path" with a single word.[26]

As opposed to this approach, it is a striking fact that only a few days before Khrushchev's ouster, Adzhubei's *Izvestia* was still speaking of "countries that have recently chosen the path of socialist development, such as Algeria, the UAR, Ghana, Mali and Burma." [27]

The difference of viewpoints was underscored with particular sharpness in the pages of *World Marxist Review: Problems of Peace and Socialism,* the official information organ linking the world's Communist parties. The journal's editor, Aleksei Rumiantsev, originally one of Khrushchev's protégés, had in recent years worked intimately with Suslov's section of the party apparatus. In more than a dozen important articles published in 1964 on problems concerning the developing countries, the *World Marxist Review* never mentioned Khrushchev's pronouncements or his Cairo visit at all. Rumiantsev himself, in a signed editorial written about a month after Khrushchev's return from Cairo, also ignored the Premier's stance; instead, he echoed Suslov's February Plenum speech almost verbatim—omitting, however, all references to the "non-capitalist path" being trod by "revolutionary democrats" in the developing countries.[28]

What is more striking, the journal opened its pages to a sharp discussion between the representatives of various Arab Communist parties, including as major participants the Syrian Communist leader, Khaled Bagdash, his colleague Zahir Abdelsamod, and the Lebanese Communist, Sawaja Sawaja. This discussion produced repeated attacks of varying intensity on Nasser, Nasserism, Nasserites, the UAR scheme for Arab unity, etc., in flagrant defiance of Khrushchev's pronouncements. (Egyptians did not take part in the debate; the Egyptian Communists were then just emerging from jail, while the party itself remained illegal.) Among other statements Bagdash declared:

Unless we criticize the dictatorial regime in the UAR and the unwillingness of the Egyptian leaders to rely on the popular masses, we shall not be able to help steer events in the right direction. . . . our experience shows that the anti-communism of the Egyptian leaders is due not to the fact that the political line of the Communist Party does not coincide with their line, as some people claim, *assuming that it would be enough for the party to change its policy for the Egyptian leaders to renounce anti-communism. . . . theoretically speaking, the possibility of a restoration of capitalism is not excluded in Egypt. To close one's eyes to this fact would be a mistake. A one-man dictatorship and a bureaucratic state machine will find it hard to prevent such an eventuality.*[29] (Italics added.)

Sawaja Sawaja added:

Ideologically, Egyptian "Arab socialism" is a conglomeration of scientific and utopian socialism, petty-bourgeois ideas, narrow nationalism, religious prejudices and subjective idealism. It does not aim at abolishing the exploitation of man by man. . . .

While the *World Marxist Review* had previously also published the views of a pro-Nasserite

[24] M. Suslov's speech of Feb. 14, 1964, as reported by Novosti Press Agency, April 20, 1964.
[25] *World Marxist Review,* August 1964, p. 66.
[26] *Pravda,* Sept. 29, 1964.
[27] Article by A. Samartsev & N. Rossov on the Cairo Conference, in *Izvestia,* Oct. 4, 1964.
[28] *World Marxist Review,* July 1964, p. 10.
[29] *Ibid.,* July 1964, p. 10.

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Communist, the Jordanian Fuad Nasser, it did so with an explanatory note and followed it with a refutation by the Sudanese A. Suleiman.[30]

The reactions of Arab Communists were of more than theoretical importance since, following Nasser's amnesty of Egyptian Communists, some Soviet leaders felt it "logical to pose the question of establishing the cooperation of all those who are concerned with the victory of the socialist UAR." [31] A section of the Lebanese CP took this up as a call for Communist-Nationalist collaboration,[32] and Khaled Bagdash was asked to come to Moscow from his place of exile in Prague. In the Soviet capital he refrained from supporting the Khrushchev line beyond general and rather reluctant lip-service to the importance of the Cairo visit and the generosity of Soviet support to the Arabs. An official statement said that agreement had been reached on global and Chinese issues, but maintained discreet silence on Near Eastern questions.[33]

After his visit, Bagdash published another article in which he restrained his criticism of the UAR a little, but clearly remained unrepentant, criticizing Nasser's dictatorship, his domineering concept of Arab unity, his agrarian policy, and his collaboration with the United States and West Germany. These remarks stood out especially in contrast to Bagdash's willingness to accept the Soviet concept of Ben Bella's Algeria as a country genuinely "embarked on non-capitalist development." [34] It is conceivable that Bagdash's firm attitude was influenced by the fact that his discussions in Moscow had been carried on with Ponomarev, who may not have pressured him unduly.

From Defense to Debacle

It is this cold and critical reaction from sections of the Soviet party apparatus and some foreign Communist leaders alike which explains the curiously defensive, almost apologetic tones adopted by Khrushchev upon his return from Cairo, when he addressed the Soviet nation over television. He embarked upon a detailed political explanation of his acts in Cairo —a step which he had not felt necessary after earlier overseas visits—and repeatedly stressed his "frankness" in speaking to Nasser, as if replying to criticism that he had failed to present the Soviet case. He also seemed to imply that he deserved some credit for Nasser's release of the Egyptian Communists.[35]

It would appear that Palmiro Togliatti, at least, knew that Khrushchev's policy towards the developing countries was under fire in some Moscow circles, for in his famous last memorandum written in Yalta he gratuitously went out of his way to describe "the visit of Comrade Khrushchev in Egypt" as one of the "important victories obtained over the Chinese." However, Togliatti left the door open for further discussion covering "the pattern of development of formerly colonial countries, what the objective of socialism means for them, and so on." Realizing, apparently, the controversial nature of this subject in the USSR, he thought to remove it altogether from that arena by having "an international meeting convened by some Western Communist parties, with widespread representation from the democratic countries of the 'third world' and their progressive movements, in order to elaborate a concrete line of cooperation." [36]

Before any such plan could be discussed, however, Togliatti died and Khrushchev was removed from power.

Within a few days of the change-over in Moscow, news got out that party representatives were addressing meetings and describing quite explicitly the charges against Khrushchev voiced by Suslov in the Central Committee. Soon the details, revealed by foreign Communists, or possibly leaked by the Soviet leaders themselves, were reported in the Rome paper *Expresso* and by several news agencies.[37] Almost identical details were printed in different places, and it is significant that a subsequent denial by Pancaldi, Moscow correspondent of the Italian Communist organ *L'Unità*, dealt only with the formal presentation of the news stories without attempting to dispute the authenticity of their contents; on the contrary, the details as reported in *L'Unità* generally squared with those in *Expresso*. In the present context, the most interesting charges were the following:

Many of the journeys on which Comrade Khrushchev embarked in 1962 and later were decided upon without any prior consultation with the

[30] *Ibid.*, February 1964, pp. 18-24, March 1964, pp. 44-46.
[31] *Pravda*, May 24, 1964.
[32] Lebanese Communist weekly *Al Akhbar*, May 31, 1964.
[33] *Pravda*, July 4, 1964.
[34] *World Marxist Review*, August 1964, pp. 50-58.
[35] Moscow Radio Domestic Service report (in Russian), May 27, 1964.
[36] *New York Times*, Sept. 5, 1964, p. 2.
[37] *Expresso*, Agence France Presse, and other versions, as quoted in *Le Monde* (Paris), Oct. 30, 1964, *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, Oct. 31, and *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, Oct. 31.

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other members of the Central Committee Presidium or the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.

Frequently the results of those missions did not accord with the interests of the Soviet Union.

In the course of his journey last May to Egypt for the inauguration of the Aswan Dam, he personally awarded President Nasser and Vice President Amer the highest Soviet decoration, that of "Hero of the Soviet Union."

Another version adds:

As the party sees it, this order may under no circumstances be awarded to non-Communist leaders.

A third version puts it:

Very recently a loan of $280 million was handed to the UAR and the Order of "Hero of the Soviet Union" was given to President Nasser without prior consultation with the authorities concerned in the Soviet Union.

It is, perhaps, not fanciful to conclude that the close resemblance between these charges and the earlier signs of internal conflict, as interpreted here, is more than merely fortuitous. To put it in a nutshell, an old man, in a hurry to offset the losses of his reign by some showy gains and pressured to prove tangibly that his approach was superior to the Chinese line, was happy to seize upon the iconoclastic theories of some bright young men who seemed to offer an easy way to success. In fact, Khrushchev's gains proved verbal at most, and neither the Soviet officials responsible for relations with foreign Communists nor the Communist parties concerned were prepared to pay any serious price for such dubious advantages.

The Aftermath

The coalition created early in October 1964 to remove Khrushchev had to give something to each of its ill-assorted constituents. Thus, Suslov was permitted to voice charges against some facets of Khrushchev's revisionism, apparently to reward those who had indicated their misgivings over the deviations of spring and summer. This move also happened to be in line with the new leaders' general decision to make at least one last attempt at reaching some *modus vivendi* with Peking, which had long been unhappy over Moscow's attitude towards the "Third World."

The liability of the situation was such, however, that this juxtaposition of elements altered basically within a few weeks. The approaches to the Chinese proved quite unproductive. Alignments within the ruling coalition began to change: Suslov appeared to go into decline while the Chinese talks were aborting; Podgorny suddenly erupted in the CPSU's external relations field, rushing in where Suslov had trodden and where Brezhnev still wandered. These developments seemed to strengthen those elements, probably abetted by Mikoyan, which had objected only to the personality, not the ideology, of the fallen leader. In any case, reappraisals of Khrushchev's "Third World" revision proved difficult when they impinged upon highly sensitive regimes, as in Cairo, which immediately demanded reassurances from Moscow. The new leadership's reluctance to offend the Afro-Asian community became particularly marked when the Congo situation offered apparently irresistible temptations, requiring, moreover, a degree of Afro-Soviet collaboration in arms transshipments and on the political scene.

The result of the clash of policies and personalities was an absence of an agreed ideology to replace "Khrushchevism," and, at first, a state of complete confusion. Soon thereafter, a new struggle seemed to erupt, which at the time of writing gives no sign of abatement. The author hopes, at a later date, to offer a more detailed analysis of these trends; here there is room only for a rough indication of the post-Khrushchev developments:

The cleavage between "left" and "right" among the pro-Soviet Afro-Asian Communist parties has widened perceptibly. At an important East Berlin conference—held days before Khrushchev's overthrow but only recently publicized in the USSR—Khaled Bagdash openly denounced as heretics those who shortsightedly favor regimes which implement nationalization while contemptuously disregarding the local Communists. Significantly, Alexander Sobolev, former assistant to Rumiantsev (elevated in the meantime to the editorship of *Pravda*), added that nationalization and socialism were not identical, nor was the "non-capitalist path" to be confused with a much less reversible stage, the "building of socialism." In this, he was supported by the Ceylonese representative. On the other hand, the Algerian and Iraqi representatives, as well as the deeply-divided Indians, took up sharply "revisionist" positions, in what was euphemistically described as a "lively discussion." [38] Shortly thereafter, Bagdash was

[38] *World Marxist Review*, November 1964, pp. 71-80, 85-87, 35-42.

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singled out for honors at the October Revolution celebrations and he and his party received exceptionally warm messages signed, among others, by Brezhnev. At the same time, however, the Russians, embarrassed from within and without, hinted that a compromise was desirable.[39]

In December, Arab Communist leaders met to hammer out a declaration which recognized Algeria as having entered "the socialist path," but which placed the UAR only upon the "non-capitalist path," unless certain conditions were met.[40]

It is unclear whether Bagdash personally agreed to this platform, which coincided with an approach favored by some Soviet leaders, apparently headed by Brezhnev. According to this approach, regimes enjoying full support from—and integration with— the local CP, or compensating for an insignificant CP, as in Algeria and Mali, might be recognized as "building socialism." In other cases one could merely speak of "progressive transformations" or "non-capitalist development." This has been the line generally maintained in official documents and pronouncements since Khrushchev's fall. At the same time, Soviet journals, radio commentaries, etc., have revealed a bewildering array of conflicting approaches.[41] Late in November, revisionist academicians suddenly reentered the picture. Mirski's patron, Tiagunenko, published an article in the military *Red Star*, of all places, in which he cautiously upheld the distinction between Algeria and the UAR. He was followed in December by Solodovnikov of the African Institute, who extended blanket endorsements to African regimes of the most divergent types. In a chaotic hotchpotch of philosophies, some publications distinguished between "non-capitalist" and "socialist" paths, while others indicated that the paths were interchangeable; some avoided mentioning names, while others trotted out lists (never identical) of favored regimes.[42]

This confusion continues at the time of writing. With competing forces in the Moscow power struggle apparently still evenly balanced, there seems to be no one to impose a consistent ideological line, even though relations with the "Third World" have become a crucial issue for the Soviet regime. It is safe to predict that the issue will loom even larger in the months ahead.

[39] Moscow Radio Domestic Service (in Russian), Nov. 6, 1964; TASS International (in English), Nov. 6, 1964; Moscow to Arab World (in Arabic), Oct. 28, 1964 and Oct. 30, 1964.

[40] *Pravda*, Dec. 11, 1964.

[41] Moscow to Africa (in French), Oct. 30, 1964; Moscow to Arab World (in Arabic) Oct. 31, 1964; Moscow to Africa (in French), Dec. 1, 1964.

[42] Moscow to Cuba (in Spanish), Oct. 16, 1964; *Pravda* editorial, Nov. 1, 1964; Moscow to U.K. (in English), Nov. 3, 1964; *Pravda*, Nov. 5, 1964, article by Academician Zhukov; *Red Star*, Oct. 11, 1964, article by Dr. Tiagunenko; Moscow to Southeast Asia (in English), Dec. 3, 1964; *Pravda*, Dec. 1, 1964, article by Solodovnikov.

After Khrushchev: Fiddles in Sinkiang

Artush, Sinkiang, 5 December—More than 8,000 people of a dozen nationalities met yesterday in Artush, capital of the Kezlesu Khalkhas Autonomous Chou in Sinkiang, with red flags, streamers, and colorful arches for the occasion. Early in the morning, people dressed in bright national costumes were on the streets. The city was filled with tunes played on fiddles and the rhythm of drums. . . .

The Kezlesu Khalkhas Autonomous Chou, embracing four counties, is in the westernmost part of Sinkiang. It covers more than 72,000 square kilometers. Khalkhas people account for 30 percent of the population, which includes Uighurs, Hans, Tajiks, Huis, and other nationalities. . . .

On behalf of the Nationalities Committee of the NPC and the Commission for Nationalities Affairs of the State Council, Chang Chieh said that . . . the fight of the people of the autonomous chou against imperialists, reactionaries, and modern revisionists remains a protracted, complex, and arduous historical task. He declared that any infamous attempt to disrupt the national unity of the country and undermine the unity of the country's various nationalities, and any ambition to seize its territory by force, are doomed to failure and will end in shame. . . .

He stressed that the people of the various nationalities in the autonomous chou, which is a border region, should redouble their vigilance and be ready to crush any subversive and sabotage activities by the imperialists, reactionaries and modern revisionists.

—New China News Agency, Peking, December 5, 1964.

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Hungary:
Can the New Course Survive?

By George Mueller and Herman Singer

On his return from Poland—after meeting with Wladislaw Gomulka to discuss the deposition of Soviet Premier Khrushchev—Hungary's Premier and First Party Secretary Janos Kadar was greeted with what foreign correspondents in Budapest described as spontaneous enthusiasm, evoked by his tribute to Khrushchev's past friendliness toward Hungary. That praise of Khrushchev by Kadar—the two men most immediately responsible for crushing the 1956 uprising in Hungary—should occasion plaudits in Budapest might seem paradoxical. The explanation lies in the policy pursued by Kadar for the past three years, one of the fundamental aims of which has been to reconcile the great mass of the population (once condemned by Kadar as counterrevolutionary) to the Communist government.

Thus, by a strange turn of historical events, the removal of Khrushchev has brought Kadar and a vital section of the Hungarian people closer together in the hope that the New Course, which began in 1961 and which has slowly evolved toward a degree of independence for Hungary within the Soviet bloc, would not be jeopardized. Apprehensions have been aggravated by fear that the unreconstructed Stalinist forces in the Hungarian Socialist Workers (Communist) Party would find in the Khrushchev demotion an opportunity to challenge the New Course. These were the emotions in play at the Budapest railway station, when cheers greeted Kadar—the symbol of the hated past, who has nevertheless managed to create an aura of hope for Hungary's future.

Kadar first gave voice to a change of policy upon his return from the 22nd CPSU Congress

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of October 1961, where a program was launched to destalinize the Soviet bloc countries. At the time, Kadar announced that official policy would be guided henceforth by the belief that "whoever is not against us is with us." [1] This declaration in effect ended the unpublicized civil war which had raged between party and people since 1956. It ushered in the first signs of relaxation since the initial "New Course" in Hungary in the years 1953-56, a period marked by the gradual erosion of Stalinist control that had finally erupted in the October-November uprising.

The new "New Course" differed from the old in that its initiative came from above. It quickly became evident that Kadar had embarked on a three-way drive (1) to dissociate himself from the "hard-line" Stalinists; (2) to extend the hand of friendship to elements hitherto hostile or apathetic toward the Communist Party; and (3) to create an image of himself as a moderate —albeit firmly a Communist. In its internal aspects, Kadar's policy represented a conscious effort on the part of the regime to undo the recent past. From 1956 on Communist propaganda had doggedly asserted that the vast majority of participants in the uprising had been counterrevolutionaries, implying in effect that the whole nation had been engaged in an anti-Soviet revolution. Kadar tried to wipe out the entire post-revolutionary period in a speech delivered before the workers of the Ikarusz bus factory on February 27, 1962:

We must bear in mind how many people of different pasts and points of view have remained and now live in our People's Democracy. They live peacefully and work honestly. What shall we do? Live on a war-footing with them? We only want to fight those who try to overthrow the people's power. . . . The elementary obligation of our party is to work as hard as if there were 20 parties in Hungary and we had to win votes by secret ballot every day, for this is the only way for us to secure the support of the people. We have learned this quite well, and this is why the faults of earlier times must be combatted relentlessly.[2]

In its total effect, Kadar's speech gave the impression that the Communist Party was no longer to be considered the supreme authority over all aspects of human endeavor. He seemed to imply the end of the perpetual tyranny of the party in every sphere, ranging from the economy to literature and the arts. Moreover, in violation of all precedent, the party leader himself seemed to be offering up the party as a target for public analysis and criticism.

While such a move might have been inconsequential back in 1956, when hope for the complete dissolution of the Communist Party was a unifying force in the revolt, Kadar's downgrading of the leading role of the party was nevertheless a dramatic step without parallel in Eastern Europe. In Poland, the party had in fact been given primary credit for the degree of independence from Soviet control that was achieved in 1956. By contrast, Kadar seemed to be saying that non-party elements might well be the fundamental source of strength for the achievement of the national tasks ahead.

The most immediate application of the new policy was the infusion of non-party experts into the governmental structure, particularly in the technical ministries. Even before Kadar's speech, the official government organ *Magyar Kozlony* had on February 11 reported the appointment of a number of new deputy ministers in the ministries of mining, engineering, metallurgy and agriculture, all experts in their fields, and the simultaneous retirement or transfer to other posts of officials whose major qualification had been faithfulness to the party line. In its February issue, *Tarsadali Szemle,* the party's ideological organ, drove home the point that a new day was dawning by warning party members that the non-party experts were to receive a welcome worthy of their talents, since "we thereby enlarge the mass-base of the proletarian dictatorship."

Kadar next took steps to weed out the hard core of Stalinists from the party. In August 1962 the top echelons of the party underwent a thorough shakeup; most of the 25 victims were identified as adherents of the policy of suppression which followed the unsuccessful 1956 revolt. (Earlier, in December 1961, Ferenc Munnich had been retired from the premiership, which Kadar himself took over, and Karoly Kiss had been dropped from the Politburo.) In a bit of belated destalinization, Matyas Rakosi and Ernest Gero—Hungary's Stalinists *par excellence*—were stripped of membership in the party. Kadar, emerging as one of Khrushchev's firmest disciples, was also quick to employ the charge of dogmatism—the major Khrushchevian weapon in the polemics with Peking—as a stick with which to beat the hard-liners who

[1] *Nepszabadsag* (Budapest), Dec. 3, 1961.
[2] *Ibid.*, March 4, 1962.

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remained in the party. (They have continued, however, as a base of resistance in the middle echelons of the party. Some groups have even expressed pro-Chinese sentiments, largely for the purpose of establishing an ideological stand from which to defend their jobs. More on this shortly.)

Having neutralized the dogmatists and established himself as the Kremlin's—or at least Khrushchev's—favorite of the East European leaders, Kadar proceeded along his New Course with vigor, emerging as the most active and dynamic among his colleagues of the Soviet-bloc countries. His program, unlike that of the pre-revolt period of 1953 to 1956, has of course been narrowly circumscribed in the sense that it has had to have Moscow's approval. Units of the Red Army are still dispersed in key areas of Hungary. Kadar's strength is wholly dependent on friendly relations with the Soviet leaders, whoever they may be, and his political line cannot stray far from that enunciated in the Kremlin.

Within these confines, however, Kadar's program has moved ahead with considerable éclat. The employment of non-party specialists without prejudice in important posts has been pursued without faltering, despite rumblings of discontent from the party faithful in the rural areas. The official party organ, in a recent blast against those entrenched bureaucrats who have resisted the employment of non-party experts, issued a forceful restatement of the leadership's stance:

No policy, and no working-class policy, is worth a damn if we do not give priority to streamlining and modernizing our plants and seeing to it that they are managed expertly. Today we do not hold that people who are devoted to their jobs are unpolitically-minded. Fidelity to socialism will not make up for lack of knowledge, although knowledge itself will not replace fidelity to socialism. . . . The workers' power is no longer represented by commissars educated by the old regime to keep an eye on the experts.[3]

The utilization of experts has been made necessary by what is perhaps the most important aspect in the post-1961 program, an economic turn toward the West. It has become an article of economic faith with the Hungarian planners that prosperity is dependent on producing for world markets, and there have been persistent exhortations to meet their qualitative standards. The experts are essential not only to improve production but to represent Hungary abroad as salesmen and diplomats.

Hungary's new economic orientation grew out of the fact that the country's industrial development, as well as its agriculture, were trailing behind the advances being made in other nations of the Soviet bloc. In this situation, the theories of such revisionist Soviet economic thinkers as Liberman, Kantorovich, and Nemchinov became the subject of intensive study and some experimentation in Hungary, a process facilitated of course by the great interest these theories aroused in the USSR itself. A number of industrial innovations were introduced, including the levying of interest on fixed and working capital, the expansion of profit-sharing schemes and the granting of some limited influence to the factory councils, which had been under the party's thumb since the suppression of the 1956 revolt. These moves toward freeing the economy were augmented by an industrial reorganization plan aimed at eliminating duplication and waste, and a program of selective subsidies. The end aim was to improve Hungary's trading position, primarily for the purpose of earning hard Western currency.

In this effort, the Kadar regime has met with some degree of success. In the three years from 1960 to 1963, Hungary's trade with non-Communist countries, predominantly with Western Europe, has registered a slow rise. The increase can be gauged by the following indices for 1963, with 1960 representing a base period of 100:[4]

Italy	191.6
France	158.2
Great Britain	141.1
Austria	124.5
West Germany	120.9

Hungary's trade with the West now constitutes 30 percent of her total foreign trade. The Budapest regime is engaged in an effort to expand its share of Western trade, and to put it on a permanent basis through long-term credit agreements.

Hungarian officials have complained that the Western powers have not responded to their overtures for expanded relations. Yet Great Britain in October 1964 agreed to build an ammonia plant in West Hungary on the basis

[3] *Ibid.*, July 21, 1964.

[4] *Statistical Yearbook*, Budapest, Central Statistical Office, 1963.

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of a $7.42 million loan repayable over a period of 13 years, thereby breaking the line on the five-year credit limit previously applied to Soviet-bloc countries. Trade missions have been exchanged with Austria, which has become Hungary's most important Western trading partner after West Germany and Italy. Both Austria and Hungary have shown interest in organizing joint operations to sell goods on the world market. Such joint operations have proved successful in outfitting power plants in Lebanon and India and in building a chalk plant in Italy. In addition, the two countries are working on plans to integrate some parts of their steel industries, to cooperate in the building of chemical plants in Hungary, and to collaborate on the processing of synthetic fibers.

Obviously Hungary's interest in cementing economic ties with Austria has met with readiness on Vienna's part to establish a special relationship with the Kadar regime. Austria may thus become the friendly broker of Hungarian interests in the West. Following a four-day meeting in Budapest in October 1964, during which agreement was reached on property claims and border demarcations, Austria's Foreign Minister, Dr. Bruno Kreisky, said:

It is not my job to comment on Hungarian foreign policy, but as regards our talks, I can only say that the Hungarian side has shown great interest in the development of Austro-Hungarian relations, and that one has received the impression here that the Hungarians are giving this relationship great political importance—chiefly for the stabilization of peaceful relations in Central Europe.[5]

Kadar's new stance toward the West has been evident in several other developments. For example, he broke new ground when in September 1964 Budapest became the first East European Communist regime to establish formal ties with the Vatican. The accord was formally referred to by both sides as a first step which could possibly pave the way to a "more complete understanding." [6] By this move, Kadar bid for more support from the Catholic clergy, whose influence on the religious among the peasantry is strong and whose passive resistance to collectivization has been widespread. It served, too, to give Kadar another window on the West.

Caption left: "The American Uncle in Budapest"
Right:—"Do you really love me so much, dear boy?"
—"Of course! I am even using you as a reference these days!"
—**Ludas matyi *(Budapest), July 2, 1964.***

Another aspect of Westernization has been the easing of travel restrictions to and from Hungary. While this relaxation was mainly motivated by Hungary's need for the foreign currency which tourism brings, it has inevitably resulted in closer contacts with Western Europe, whence the number of visitors almost tripled in the years between 1960 and 1963, rising from 49,600 to 146,800. There has been a corresponding growth in the number of Hungarians traveling to Western Europe, the number rising from 32,000 in 1961 to 83,000 in 1963, with the greatest proportion visiting Austria.[7]

The turn toward the West has also been evidenced by the increased publication of works by authors hitherto on the ideologically prohibited index. Perhaps most remarkable—and another first for a Communist country—was the holding of a meeting of the Executive Committee of the International Poets, Essayists and Novelists (P.E.N.) Club in Budapest in October 1964, where attendance included writers

[5] Budapest television, Oct. 30, 1964.
[6] Radio Budapest, Sept. 15, 1964.
[7] *Statistical Yearbook*, 1960, 1961, 1962, and 1963.

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who had left Hungary after the 1956 revolt, and who were free to leave again when the P.E.N. sessions were concluded.

While the new "New Course" has been received with approbation among the non-party segments of the population, particularly intellectuals, it has met with dismay on the part of some party leaders who feel that traditional controls are slipping out of their hands. Their targets have been not only the "New Course" program but also the special ties that Kadar established with Khrushchev, who apparently sanctioned the freedom of maneuver with which Kadar has operated both internally and *vis-à-vis* the West. This special relationship with the Soviet Union recalls an earlier era in Hungarian history, worth mention for the parallels that can be drawn with the situation today.

The Revolution of 1848 was an uprising of the Hungarian people against Austrian dominance. After the crushing of the revolt by Austrian and Russian Armies, there ensued a wave of terror, deportations, and flights abroad by the thousands, similar to the pattern that occurred after the suppression of the October revolution of 1956. In Austrian eyes, Hungary had forfeited the right to be treated as a country, and was ruled through puppets under the direction of "Bach's hussars," named after the Austrian Minister of the Interior Alexander Bach. This period of rule, which combined terrorism and Austrian *Gemütlichkeit,* was characterized by the German historian, von Treitschke, as an "imperial-royal mixture of joviality and bestiality," a description that could well apply to the policies of Khrushchev during and after the Hungarian revolt of 1956.

A turning point in Hungarian relations with Austria developed in 1865, when a gifted Hungarian statesman, Ferenc Deak, who had been a Minister of Justice in the Revolutionary Cabinet and had then gone into retirement, enunciated a new set of principles aimed at reconciliation of the Hungarians to Austrian rule, in return for certain national rights. Although initially treated with indifference, the tenets of the so-called "party of compromise" came to be accepted by the Austrians following their defeat by the Prussians at Koniggratz in 1866. A Hungarian Constitution was proclaimed on February 18, 1867, following negotiations by Deak and the Foreign Minister of Austria, Ferdinand von Beust. Under the Dual Monarchy set up, questions concerning foreign relations, defense and finances were subject to joint settlement, although predominant weight was given to Austrian interests. A customs union was created to facilitate the exchange of Hungarian wheat for Austrian industrial products, with beneficial effects for both countries. The ensuing "Period of Compromise" saw the early development of Hungarian industry and the organization of a modern transportation system.

The progress thus achieved was limited, however, by Austrian support of the system of large landholdings and by the maintenance of strong controls over industrial growth. The failure to ameliorate the lot of the agrarian proletariat, which might have been given a voice under an independent Hungary, represented one of the worst aspects of Austrian dominance. At the same time, restriction on industrial growth inhibited the rise of a middle-class and a working-class. Thus, Austrian policy, regardless of how jovially administered, helped solidify a rigid class structure, the perpetuation of which helped to foster the abortive Communist coup of 1919 and later to facilitate the Communist takeover following World War II.

The Kadar policy of compromise is operating under handicaps equally severe. With the removal of Khrushchev, and the hints from Moscow that one cause of his downfall was his handling of relations with the Soviet-bloc countries, there could emerge new restraints on Kadar's freedom of movement outside the bloc. Given the Soviet propensity for using foreign policy as a polemical weapon in intra-party struggles, it is possible that a new administration in the Kremlin could pull the rug out from under Kadar.

Kadar could hardly ignore a Soviet demand to curb his present policies. And while there is an obvious economic advantage to the Soviet Union in the existence of an ally which can pull its own weight (as opposed to the crippled dependent which in the wake of 1956 required Soviet loans totaling $110 million), nevertheless Kadar's freewheeling cooperation with the West carries dangers which the Kremlin coordinators cannot overlook indefinitely.

As to Kadar's position at home, he is on a tightrope. The mass of people are indifferent to the mandatory adulation of the achievements of the Soviet Union. The appearance of Khrushchev in the streets of Budapest in April 1964 was marked by considerable lack of interest on the part of the populace, despite strenuous efforts of the press and radio to whip up "a warm and cordial welcome." It was during this

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ten-day trip that Khrushchev committed at least three of the "errors" for which he was later to answer to the Presidium: in the course of an attack on the Chinese he came out in favor of a "good plate of goulash" as a touchstone of communism; he chastised the First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party for failure to deliver goods to a Budapest Optical Factory; and he awarded Kadar a slew of medals, including the Order of Lenin, to honor his friendship with the USSR.

The Kadar policy is precarious ideologically as well. The "New Course" is obviously acceptable to the non-party groups, particularly those who are now enabled to use their skills without paying incessant tribute to the overwhelming sagacity of the Communist Party. The diminution of the ideological role of the party, however, poses a pitfall. Despite Kadar's reorganization of the party to shake out the more rabid Stalinists and those who would revert to the methods of Rakosi, such men remain in office in the provinces and in the rural areas, dependable stalwarts and veterans of communism who supply the backbone of party strength. A provincial journal summarized their stand as follows:

We don't have to belong to the party any longer. Party policy has become weak. We need a stronger hand and a stronger policy. Putting non-workers in responsible posts means underrating the abilities of our party members.[8]

It was from among such disaffected elements that recruits were found to volunteer for the distribution of pro-Chinese leaflets—an activity for which at least one man, by name Sandor Nagy (identified as a writer who had been awarded a Stalin Prize) received a three-year jail sentence in June 1964.[9]

Neo-Stalinism is not the only factional problem within the party, comprising all told over 500,000 members. There remains an element which would like to realize the aims of Imre Nagy as expressed during the Revolution, and which has not forgiven Kadar for his role in betraying those ideals to the Soviets. Still others have not forgotten their loyalty to Laszlo Rajk, the party leader who was executed in 1949, and in whose denunciation Kadar played a role. There are also thousands of members who view the party merely as a passport to political or professional advancement, and whose support might be swayed by expediency.

Given the sharp rupture in Hungarian political life caused by the 1956 Revolution—the scars of which are not likely to be effaced in the present generation—Kadar inevitably faced hostility from one or another of these party groups, a fact that made it difficult for him to reconstruct the party as a viable instrument for carrying out Communist policy. Instead he deliberately bypassed the party in proposing plans to reinvigorate Hungary, a decision forced on him to some extent by the slow recovery of industry and agriculture. In a somewhat less spectacular way than Khrushchev, Kadar sought to establish himself among the people as a representative of national communism, returning to a role with which he had been identified in the 1950's.

This role, however, can only be played out against a background of support from the Soviet Union, and in the Khrushchev period, this meant a close personal relationship with the Soviet First Secretary. Kadar had been tapped by Khrushchev as the man most likely to carry out Moscow's policy during the suppression of the revolt. In return, when the dust had settled, Kadar obtained relative freedom of maneuver on the international scene.

At home, liberalization measures have not gone very far beyond those being enacted in the Soviet Union. Perhaps the one area in which Hungarians have enjoyed more "freedom" than citizens of the other Soviet-bloc countries has been in the circulation of anti-Soviet and anti-Communist jokes, Budapest wits having their pick of raw material on which to work. There has been little reluctance on the people's part

[8] *Vas Nepe* (Vas County), April 14, 1964.



RIGHTIST EXAGGERATION LEFTIST EXAGGERATION

—Ludas matyi (Budapest), Sept. 24, 1964.

[9] *Magyar Tavirati Iroda* (Hungarian News Bureau), June 27, 1964.

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to challenge the basic elements of communism itself, as a current joke shows:

What are the historic components of communism?
From antiquity we got our tools.
From slavery—our wage system.
From feudalism—our petty tyrants.
From capitalism—our crises.

Hungary's ultimate dependence on Soviet approval of the policy of rapprochement with the West can be seen in the formal resolution adopted by the Central Committee of the Socialist Workers Party more than a week after the removal of Khrushchev. The document, adopted following Kadar's report on the changes in the Soviet Union, paid tribute to Khrushchev in a cautious way—in sharp contrast to the extraordinary praise heaped upon him throughout his years in power—and pleaded with the new leaders to permit the continuation of the New Course. Behind the pleas was undoubtedly a hope that Kadar and his close collaborators would be permitted to continue in power. The resolution said:

On the basis of the information received, the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party understands that Comrade Khrushchev, who rendered great services in the exposure of the cult of the personality [which is] alien to socialism, in the working out of the historic line of the 20th and 22nd congresses of the CPSU, and in the struggle for peace and international security, was no longer able to perform in practical work the tasks incumbent on him owing to his positions. Regrettably, there were errors in his methods of leadership, and owing to his age and the deterioration of his health these errors were increasing.

The Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party at this time again expresses its full confidence in the Central Committee of the CPSU. It greets Comrade Brezhnev, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU and Comrade Kosygin, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, whom we knew as participating in working out the political line formed at the 20th Congress, and as old champions of the cause of communism and peace.[10]

Thus, the fate of Hungary's New Course—and of its protagonists—goes back into the laps of men who, as Khrushchev's subordinates, sanctioned its emergence, and who now have the power to let it continue or to destroy it entirely.

[10] Radio Budapest, Oct. 25, 1964.

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Troubles with Statistics

By Leo Orleans

Comprehensive, timely and accurate statistical data are essential to the rational implementation and evaluation of planned economic development and social change. This is particularly true for Communist countries, where government planning plays a dominant role in national economic and social evolution. In China the Communists in 1949 assumed control of a country with many millions of square miles of land and hundreds of millions of people; a country in which the heritage of data was numerical rather than statistical, where professional statisticians and clerks were few and statistical equipment almost nonexistent. The odds against the rapid procurement of essential statistical data were therefore tremendous.

It is true that similar obstacles confront most underdeveloped countries—often, indeed, to an even greater degree. Communist China, however, in its haste to become an important world power, did not wait to acquire, gradually, some of the prerequisites whose absence has tended to restrain more cautious nations. Among the necessities it "left behind" was a statistical system that would be capable of meeting the new demands imposed by a rapidly growing economy. As a result, statistics became by-products, easily produced and casually cited, carrying with them that aura of authenticity which seems to be inherent in numbers. Grand figures and pseudo-precise percentages became the common denominators of the regime's goals and vaunted achievements.

Any activity yielded numerical records. The following incredible counting job was reported in *Jen-min Jih-pao*, the central newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party:

The Central Committee for the Patriotic Public Health Movement reports that, as of September 9, 1,510,000,000 rodents, 1,550,000,000 sparrows and 74,000,000 and 8,600,000 kilos, respectively, of flies and mosquitoes had been eliminated . . .[1]

The collection and tabulation of information was pervasive and served to define problems as well as to point morals:

The tendency toward early love and marriage in I-ch'ang has had bad mental, spiritual, and physical effects on young girl students. . . .

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[1] Sept. 11, 1958.

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There are 967 students in our school, 550 boys and 417 girls. Among them, 44 girls indulge in love affairs, and 26 girls are married; this is approximately 17 percent of the girl students. In some classes 50 percent of the girls have love affairs or are married. . .[2]

These and innumerable other reports of a similar nature might seem to indicate that Communist China had transformed itself within less than a decade from a nation of almost no statistics to one with a superabundance of them. A country that is capable of presenting mosquito casualties in kilos, it would appear, should have little difficulty in assembling any other quantitative data.

In fact, however, the reports cited above simply demonstrate the affinity for numbers that is so highly developed in China. Translated into practical terms, the first quotation serves to convey that an all-out effort was made to exterminate pests, while the second report suggests the inadvisability of early marriage. The numerical methods utilized in communicating these thoughts were merely intended to make a deeper impression on the groups to whom they were directed than would the use of words alone. But, unfortunately, such a casual use of numbers is not limited to incidental intelligence; all too often it is evident in official data of major significance to both Communist China and the world at large.

Several studies have already described the structure of the Chinese Communist statistical system, the organization of the State Statistical Bureau, and the policies of the regime as they pertain to the accumulation, processing and publication of statistical data.[3] The scope of the present article is therefore limited to identifying the prerequisities which are indispensable to the establishment of a workable statistical system, and which are admittedly lacking in China today. Although the quality of Chinese statistics has varied perceptibly in different periods [4] the basic problems involved in the development of a viable statistical system in China have not changed, and for this reason no effort is made here to present a chronological picture. Rather, illustrative examples and statements are offered to show conditions that have been apparent, to a greater or lesser degree, throughout the period under discussion.

Deficiencies in Personnel

The first prerequisite for the establishment of an effective statistical system is an adequate body of personnel capable of collecting, processing, and analyzing statistical data. The Chinese Communists readily admit that China has a very small statistical staff, and that the overwhelming majority of persons used in the procurement and handling of data are trained poorly, if at all.

There are no figures on the numbers and distribution of professional and subprofessional workers trained in statistics and related subjects. Prior to 1949 there were few statisticians in all of China, and none outside the great cities or centers of learning. Villages and small communities had tradesmen, persons engaged in local commerce, and petty officials, some of whom could keep simple books and records concerning the social and economic life of the community. The meager statistical data available from the countryside were gathered under the direction of trained government or university personnel who were sent out from the cities to supervise the collection of information required by a particular survey. Some assistance may have been solicited from the small literate segment of the local population, but for the most part even the canvassers were brought in from urban centers—usually students from nearby universities. Even under these conditions, there were few economic or sociological studies which met minimum standards with respect to completeness and accuracy of statistical enumeration, sufficiency in tabulation, and adequacy of analysis.

The small nucleus of statistical personnel that China had before 1949 was, as already mentioned, concentrated in urban areas. Some were associated with the central Nationalist government in Nanking, others lived in the provincial capitals, and still others worked in some capacity at one of the institutions of higher education. Many of these government and university statisticians left before the Communist regime was established. Consequently, when the Communists attempted to set up a reporting system, they lacked the minimum requirements of personnel trained in statistical concepts and methods. General Communist policy further worsened the situation, since the majority of the small nucleus of professional statisticians in the cities fell into the category of "intellec-

[2] *Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien* (China Youth), No. 5, 1957.

[3] For a detailed treatment of the subject, the reader is referred to Professor Choh-ming Li's excellent study, *The Statistical System of Communist China*, University of California Press, 1962.

[4] It is generally admitted, for example, that the statistics of the 1955-57 period came closer to reflecting actual conditions than those published during the first years of the regime or the "do-it-yourself statistics" of the Great Leap Forward period that commenced in 1958.

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tuals," whom the new regime held suspect by definition, while in the rural areas the small number of tradesmen capable of assuming a leading role in a new reporting system were either "eliminated" during the land-reform drive or considered too unreliable to be entrusted with the responsible job of collecting and handling statistics.

The expansion of educational facilities under the Communists might reasonably have been expected to produce a much greater number of trained statistical personnel than had previously been available, but the major emphasis in the regime's educational program was placed on engineering. Graduates in finance and economics (the departments involved in training statistical personnel) constituted only a fraction of the total graduates from higher educational institutions,[5] and only a few of these specialized in statistics. Indeed, the shortage of all kinds of specialists with higher education forced China to rely to a great extent on the middle echelon of trained personnel—*i.e.*, individuals who had not gone beyond the junior or senior level of secondary school. But here again, the emphasis was on "engineering" and other technical courses, with less than 10 percent of the relatively small graduating classes having specialized in finance and economics. What proportion of these persons had specifically statistical training is unknown, but their number cannot have been large considering the demands of the economy for other types of specialists with economic and financial backgrounds.

Until the recent forced movement of young people to the countryside, few if any of the graduates of higher and secondary schools found their way into rural China. The overwhelming majority have been employed in the urban administrative and industrial centers—in factories, mines, government offices, and other branches of the urban economy, all of which are nevertheless admittedly short of statistical and accounting personnel. But what about the needs of rural China? Who keeps the population records for these areas and assembles the voluminous figures needed by the regime on crops, livestock, land utilization, manpower and so forth?

The 130 million peasant families in China comprise perhaps half a billion persons. In the middle 1950's these families were organized into hundreds of thousands of agricultural cooperatives, each a separate unit requiring at least one individual with some aptitude for setting down basic data. At the next administrative level there were in this period some 80,000 *hsiang*, which needed personnel with at least some degree of sophistication and ability in handling statistics to be responsible for assembling the individual reports of the agricultural cooperatives, integrating them, and passing them up to the *hsien* (county) authorities. At this level again, the figures had to pass through further processing before being forwarded to the provincial or special district administrations.

China's deficiencies in the field of statistics became particularly apparent with the introduction of the communes and the launching of the economic "great leap forward." Because the commune was theoretically supposed to be a self-sufficient unit with political, economic, cultural, and military responsibilities, the statistical information for which it was made responsible covered a broad range, embracing not only agriculture but communal industries, supply and marketing cooperatives, enrollments in the various types of educational facilities, workpoints earned, numbers of militia, and so forth.[6] Considering these requirements and the shortage of trained personnel, it is not surprising that rural statistics have repeatedly been singled out by the official press as the "weakest link in the statistical system." In a speech to the Sixth National Statistical Work Conference in October 1957, Vice-Premier Po I-po summarized the basic problem as follows:

Most of our statistical cadres, especially those responsible for guidance work and general statistical operations, have not studied the science of statistics, and they lack a systematic theoretical knowledge of the science of statistics. This is a problem in the development of China's socialist statistical work that must be solved. In other words, our statistical workers are now just a team at a rather low theoretical level. It will be difficult for this kind of team to fulfill the important task of the nation's statistical

[5] For data on education, see L. Orleans, *Professional Manpower and Education in Communist China*, Washington, D.C., 1961.

[6] One commune in Honan Province complained that it was required to report an average of more than 10,000 figures a day to *hsien*-level organizations. *Chihua Yu T'ung-chi* (Planning Statistics), No. 9, June 23, 1959, Joint Publications Research Service (hereafter JPRS) 1157D, Feb. 5, 1960. Although this figure seems fantastic, it becomes believable when some of the suggested record systems for communes are considered, as for example in several 1959 issues of *Nung-yeh K'o-hsueh T'ung-hsun* (Agricultural Scientific Information): see JPRS 9450, June 15, 1961.

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operation as long as their knowledge is not increased through training. . . .[7]

Po went on to say that there was much "subjectivism, bureaucracy, and sectarianism" as well as "idleness" in statistical work.

The need to train statistical workers in order to improve the reporting and analysis of data was recognized by all responsible Chinese Communist leaders. However, serious efforts to provide such training (largely "on-the-job") had barely gotten under way when the whole attitude toward statistics changed under the impact of the "great leap forward." With the "leap," "politics assumed command" of everything—including statistics. Practically speaking, statistical activities were removed from the control of the few people who had gained some statistical experience and were placed under the complete control of the party. In implementing this policy, the party deliberately sought to minimize the role of "experts," as evidenced by the following criticism of statistical organs:

The provincial, municipal, administrative district, and hsien *statistical organs blindly followed the regulations and systems of the State Statistical Bureau and the higher statistical bureaus. . . . Doctrinaires hold that statistical work can only be done by a few experts and is beyond the ability of the masses, that statistical work is done in an office without the necessity to go to the masses, and that all that is required is for experts to institute systems, work out methods of calculation, and draw up statistical schemes according to the principles of statistics. . . . In reforming our statistical work we must thoroughly criticize doctrinairism. . . . The state organs of statistics proceeded from foreign experiences and book theories instead of from the actual conditions of our country.*[8]

The new approach to statistics was most succinctly expressed by Chia Ch'i-yun, the new head of the State Statistical Bureau. His speeches at a conference of statistical officials in Peking in the fall of 1959 were surprisingly frank. Two short quotations will suffice:

If statistical material does not express a clear political idea but merely reflects real conditions, then obviously it will be used by the enemy. What a dangerous thing this is!

Chia concluded with the following statement:

Statistical work is a weapon of class struggle and of political struggle. Our statistical reports must reflect the great victory of the party's general line and the progress of all the works guided by the party. They certainly should not be a mere display of objective facts.[9]

The new policy had one apparent benefit: it "solved" the shortage of statistical personnel. Responsibility for gathering statistical data was shifted from statistical workers to the "broad masses," and a major effort was made to provide barely literate peasants and semiliterate workers with spare-time and part-time courses in arithmetic and basic statistics. This effort was reflected in a statement by the Chief of the Division of Agricultural Economics of the State Statistical Bureau:

. . . each locality must strengthen the training of statistical workers in people's communes by adopting the following methods: training classes on the basis of individual cases, short training through long meetings, on-the-spot inspection and learning, setting up spare-time schools or short-period training classes.[10]

These measures, it was thought, would enable the people to understand "the significance, duties, and methods of all types of statistical work."

The mass "training" program produced some fanciful results. "Statistical personnel" in Shansi Province alone were claimed to have increased from 10,000 to 110,000 in a few months,[11] and the regime boasted that "tens of millions of people participated in statistical work" throughout China.[12] With regard to the

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[7] *T'ung-chi Yen'chi* (Statistical Research), No. 1, Jan. 23, 1958, JPRS 960N, Dec. 15, 1958.

[8] *T'ung-chi Kung-tso* (Statistical Work), No. 15, Aug. 14, 1958. Another press comment stressed that "the purpose of socialist statistical work is to serve the party and the government in leading the political struggle and the production struggle. . . . Statistical workers must be obedient servants of the Party." (*Kuang-ming Jih-pao*, July 24, 1961. JPRS 10309, Sept. 28, 1961.)

[9] *China News Analysis* (CNA), No. 324, May 20, 1960, quoting from *Chi-hua Yu T'ung-chi*, No. 8, 1959. This issue of CNA presents other excerpts from Chia's speech as well as some interesting commentary on the Chinese statistical scene.

[10] *Chi-hua Yu T'ung-chi*, No. 2, Feb. 1960, JPRS 4023, Sept. 7, 1960.

[11] *Ibid.*, No. 5, May 23, 1960, JPRS 4067, Oct. 1, 1960.

[12] *Ibid.*, No. 2, Feb. 23, 1960, JPRS 4023, Sept. 7, 1960.

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tasks performed by these "leap forward statisticians," the Shansi report claimed that in a period of about two months "more than 12,000 articles of different length concerning statistical analysis were written in the rural areas of the province" and "3,456 analytical articles were presented to the authorities." In urban industrial establishments, too, there was a marked proliferation of so-called "statistical cadres." [13]

The policies of the "great leap" proved as detrimental to statistical progress as they were disastrous for the Chinese economy in general. Referring to "the statistical fiasco of 1958" (which actually extended well beyond that year), Professor Choh-ming Li, of the University of California, writes:

The developments in 1958, particularly those regarding the so-called national statistical work reform, dealt a severe blow to those who had devoted themselves to building up the state statistical system since 1952. Every one of the guiding principles for the development of the system was being discredited, if not discarded.[14]

Deficiencies in Administration

Even prior to the 1958 fiasco, however, the Peking authorities and the Chinese Communist press made little attempt to hide the poor quality of the statistical data produced throughout the country. In 1956 the State Statistical Bureau issued a directive to the statistical bureaus of provinces, autonomous regions, and city governments stating that "statistical agencies below the *hsien* level are still administratively weak"; that "not every *chu* or *hsiang* has set up a statistical agency, while those that have been set up are not functioning properly"; and finally that "a state of confusion prevails (in the statistical system) in the rural areas." [15] Two years later, Vice-Premier Po I-po still had to admit that "our agricultural statistics are not very correct, and the figures of various departments concerned do not check with one another." [16]

The situation was not much better in the cities despite the availability of better-trained personnel. The following extract from a mainland periodical provides a typical description of the serious statistical difficulties experienced by industrial enterprises:

There was no complete and workable system that would provide a check against any technical mistakes. There was little coordination between the industrial departments concerned, and as a result the statistics thus obtained were inconsistent. The statistical workers in industrial departments did not know how to summarize statistical reports, nor did they understand the underlying meaning of the methods of comparison. There were many duplications and omissions.[17]

In addition to the inefficiency of the bulk of poorly-trained statistical personnel, the few qualified individuals were not efficiently utilized, as may be seen from the following letter written by a worker in the Food Bureau of Han-ku Municipality:

In the past few years, financial accounting workers in public organs, enterprises and units in various localities have been changed frequently. Many experienced accounting personnel are switched from their original lines and trades, while inadequate attention is paid to the systematic training of a new force to take their place.[18]

As a result, the letter added, "the present accounting workers are inadequate and their work capacity is low," and "some accounting personnel have a poor sense of responsibility."

An examination of the problems faced by the statistical division of the Planning Department of the Ministry of Construction shows the complexity of the reporting system, the duplication, confusion, and inflexibility of the prescribed statistical forms, and the staggering requirements laid on statistical personnel. According to a published account: [19]

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[13] In the Peking Electron Tube Plant, for example, there were 4,194 so-called "worker-management personnel," of whom 1,107 were "accountants" spending from 5 to 10 minutes each day setting down production figures, cost figures, etc. This method was said to "prevent accounting work from becoming a chore." (*Ta Kung Pao*, July 6, 1959).

[14] *Choh-ming Li, op. cit.*, p. 83.

[15] *T'ung-chi Kung-tso*, No. 5, March 14, 1956, JPRS 387, April 1958.

[16] *T'ung-chi Yen-chiu*, No. 1, Jan. 23, 1958, JPRS 960, Dec. 15, 1958.

[17] *T'ung-chi Kung-tso*, No. 8, April 29, 1956, JPRS 678, Aug. 29, 1958. Referring to data management and filing systems in urban people's communes, the Chief of the Cheng-choi Municipal Statistical Bureau proclaimed that "data management was a mess in all respects." (*Chi-hua Yu T'ung-chi*, No. 5, May 23, 1960).

[18] *Jen-min Jih-pao*, July 6, 1962, JPRS 15,445, Sept. 24, 1950.

[19] *T'ung-chi Kung-tso*, No. 10, May 29, 1958.

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. . . Forty-one statistical forms and regulations are required from each construction organization and its related industrial enterprises. . . . The tables now used for periodic statistical reports by this Ministry (excluding annual reports and occasional surveys) are of 15 kinds and total as many as 118 pages. In addition, a construction organization has to prepare at least 12 other kinds of statistical reports of 200 pages for labor and personnel departments, provincial or city statistical offices, and plant administrations. Furthermore, there are too many details required. For instance, on the grade-table of types of construction there are 74 items to be filled in. Ministry offices need 15 days to post these items in the proper books, to tabulate and audit them. The plant office spends more hours in tabulating these data before submitting them.

As for duplication:

. . . The State Statistical Bureau issued a manual on "The Operating Method of Preparing and Auditing Surveys and Statistical Reports"; the Ministry on Construction Engineering has a manual on "Auditing Surveys and Statistical Reports and Figures"; and the Administration Control Bureau also has an "Operating Manual on Administration Control of Surveys and Statistical Reports." The contents of all these manuals are almost identical.

The same account complains of an excessive emphasis on uniformity and failure to make allowances for conditions in individual enterprises:

All enterprises were considered identical, the goal was uniformity, and the Ministry depends on tables of figures to solve all problems. It merely designed forms and tables with the old philosophy—the more the better, regardless of the size or complexity of the enterprise.

The imposition of unrealistic statistical requirements inevitably gave rise to delays in the submission of reports, which in turn affected the quality of statistics. The following was typical on this score at the fifth session of the National Statistical Work Conference in 1956:

According to a survey conducted in 1955, of 1,023 reports submitted to the State Statistical Bureau, a total of 596, or 58 percent, were late. A total of 71 percent of the trade statistical reports and 87 percent of the finance reports were overdue. Reports submitted by lower-level statistical agencies to the provinces and municipalities were also late. In 1955, for example, of the 141 agricultural reports submitted to the Peking Municipal Statistical Bureau, 80 percent were delayed; of the total of 642 agricultural reports submitted to the Honan Provincial Statistical Bureau in the same year, 72 percent were late and 9 percent were not submitted; of

"Percentagemanship"—Chinese Style

Anyone attempting any kind of analysis of the Chinese economic scene must perforce learn, as the Peking leaders have themselves learned so well, the fine Soviet art of "percentagemanship"; that is, how to quote figures without actually giving facts. The rules of this are very simple; there are three: (1) Be sure to include at least four figures after the decimal point. This insures that even if your figure has the slightest significance, it will be obscured by the haze of ten-thousandths of one percent. (2) Give figures which are a percent of a figure which is already a percent of another percentage figure. This will convince your reader that you are capable of handling the most complex quantities and relationships even if he is not. (3) Always accompany your percentage figures with such adjectives as: "great," "victorious," "amazing," "stupendous," and "overfulfilled."

—*From Richard L. Walker, The Continuing Struggle, New York, 1958.*

The municipal telephone unit of the Amoy Post and Telecommunications Bureau fulfilled its production plans ahead of schedule. The average frequency of connecting telephone calls per hour by employees in this unit was 696 times, and the average time for putting through calls was 5.77 seconds (660 times and 7.5 seconds were the targets set by the administration). Cheng Shu-hsia, an employee in the unit, was able to connect a total of 848 calls per hour, and her average time for putting through calls was 3.79 seconds.

—*From Jen-min Yu-tien (People's Post and Telecommunications—Peking), December 23, 1959.*

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the 650 mutual aid and cooperative reports, 63 percent were late and 10 percent were not submitted. Tardiness in submitting reports existed not only in these particular provinces and cities; they are cited as examples to show the seriousness of the problem.[20]

The multiplicity of reports required, coupled with the pressure to get them in on time, created almost insurmountable problems for China's generally inept statistical personnel. Under such conditions, it is easily understandable that individuals responsible for supplying statistical data might resort to quick estimates in order to meet deadlines and that those charged with integrating reports from lower levels might also be inclined to make estimates on the basis of incomplete or outdated statistics in cases where they were not in receipt of full, up-to-date figures.

Apart from the quality of the data reported, it is also important to determine whether these data were effectively analyzed and utilized. Were they made available to individuals or institutions that "had a need to know"? The evidence would seem to indicate that the inefficiency which marked the collection of statistical information was equally characteristic of its utilization.

A report published in May 1956 stated, for example, that in Honan province, "of the 592 scheduled statistical reports in 1955, only 60 percent were utilized, and over 80 percent of the statistics on education, culture, public health, finance, manpower, and meteorology were not used at all." [21] In Liaoning province, according to the same source, "a number of statistical agencies reported that they only worked on data which were needed by their superior agencies and that the other statistical materials were pigeonholed, some without being opened. In a number of statistical agencies, over 90 percent of the statistical reports were not opened." Other published accounts complained that many statistical workers were incapable of analyzing figures and that much of the data in the possession of statistical offices was not put to proper use or made readily accessible to those who needed it.

But even more important, perhaps, than the availability of statistical workers or the technical efficiency or inefficiency of the system is the human factor—or, more specifically, the motivations and attitudes of the individuals collecting and processing statistical data.

Human Deficiencies

Fear and insecurity among officials at the local level often leads them to withhold information from the higher authorities or, in response to pressure from above, to furnish some kind of data, whether genuine or not. There is widespread indifference to, and inadequate understanding of, the importance of statistical data. Most important of all, there are few social, cultural, or moral inhibitions against the falsification of data. Even some of the most chauvinistic Chinese admit that this has been a problem since pre-Communist times, and it is one that has only intensified under the Communist regime.

Although Chinese official pronouncements of course seldom acknowledge explicitly that statistical reports in Communist China represent something less than the truth, the implication may be read into many comments on the subject. In his speech at the 6th National Statistical Work Conference in 1957, for example, Vice-Premier Po I-po voiced this admonition against false reporting by lower echelons:

Statistics must reflect actual conditions. I have been told that in reporting their material inventory to higher levels, some provinces did not honestly declare the entire inventory. This might be due to the shortcomings of our work in the past, for the comrades at the lower levels feared that if they declared the entire inventory we would order them to transfer the stock for other purposes or would refrain from distributing new material to them. On this point we may make some improvements in the future, but you people must report the entire inventory and not evade declaration of it.[22]

Again, referring to reporting failures in 1959, Huang Chien-chih, Chief of the Division of Agricultural Economics of the State Statistical Bureau, complained that "the handling of statistical work in a perfunctory way must be avoided; it is wrong to set up primary records merely for the purpose of filling out statistical tables required by higher offices." [23] An article

[20] *Ibid.*, No. 10, April 29, 1956, JPRS 678, Aug. 29, 1958.
[21] *Ibid.*, No. 10, May 29, 1956, JPRS 678, Aug. 29, 1958.
[22] *T'ung-chi Yen-chiu*, No. 1, Jan. 23, 1958, JPRS 960, Dec. 15, 1958.
[23] *Chi-hua Yu T'ung-chi*, No. 2, Feb. 23, 1960, JPRS 4023, Sept. 7, 1960.

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in a statistical journal pointed to still more serious derelictions in "working style":

There are still districts and basic-level units which neglect the accuracy and reliability of certain urgently needed statistical data. . . . Falsification and blind estimates must be resolutely curbed. . . . Crude methods and lack of responsibility should be checked and corrected. The working style marked by crude work and irresponsibility is serious in some departments of statistics. . . . They go after quantity and speed, and neglect quality.[24]

A newspaper article saw one cause of unreliable statistical reporting in the fact that some people are of the opinion that a slight discrepancy in figures does no harm and that an inaccurate figure is better than not having any figures at all, and they therefore adopt unscientific methods for working out statistics by making rough estimates, by averaging, or by reasoning."[25] But perhaps the most damaging admission came from the party secretary and governor of Shansi province, at the provincial statistical conference in 1959:

At present, in some places and some fields, statistical figures are so lacking in accuracy, with estimates made without the necessary basic data, that some figures are changeable at will. In some cases the statistical worker, afraid that he might be criticized for rightist conservatism, even prepared two different sets of figures representing two different levels of growth and let the user choose between them.[26]

Those who have followed developments in Communist China over the past decade will not be surprised by this frank statement.

Other evidence points to a general attitude of indifference on the part of statistical personnel toward their work—an attitude which has undoubtedly been nurtured by Communist ideological propaganda glorifying productive labor rather than administrative types of work. The author of an article in a Chinese statistical journal writes:

I have heard that some of the statistical cadres do not feel content with their work. They believe that there is not much to be accomplished in statistical work, that the usefulness of statistical data is limited, and that there is not much prospect for those engaged in such work. Some even dare advocate the abolition of statistical organizations. This is an extremely mistaken point of view.[27]

Even in Peking, where one would normally expect to find a greater sense of responsibility among statistical workers, the State Statistical Bureau announced that "some comrades in the departments lacked initiative and a sense of duty, because they held the view that the statistical reports were not of much value to the leadership of their agency.[28] Thus, it is not surprising that a central directive sent to the statistical bureaus of provinces, autonomous regions, and city governments stated that "a study of the quality of statistical reports submitted from various provinces during the last few years reveals that about 50 percent of the errors in statistical reports may be attributed to workers' carelessness.[29]

Conclusions

From the preceding discussion, it is evident that Communist China will have to overcome several major difficulties before it can effect any substantial improvement in the calibre of its official statistics. The most important of these difficulties are: (1) a shortage of trained personnel; (2) administrative deficiencies; and (3) traditional habits of thought which tend to militate against a conscientious regard for accuracy on the part of individuals directly or indirectly responsible for the collection and processing of statistical data.

The vital question, of course, is whether the Chinese Communists can and will surmount these obstacles. Taken independently, each problem, though formidable, appears potentially solvable. The training of additional statistical personnel, if assigned the necessary priority, could be accelerated. Within a decade a large proportion of key statistical positions could be filled with persons adequately trained to perform and supervise the collection and analysis of data within their particular areas of

[24] *T'ung-chi Kung-tso*, No. 23, Dec. 14, 1958.
[25] *Ta-Kung Pao*, July 30, 1960, Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 2803.
[26] Quoted in Choh-ming Li, *op. cit.*, p. 119, from *Chi-hua Yu T'ung-chi*, No. 6, March 1959.
[27] *T'ung-chi Yen-chiu*, No. 1, Jan. 23, 1958, JPRS 960-N, Dec. 15, 1958.
[28] *T'ung-chi Kung-tso*, No. 8, April 29, 1956, JPRS 678, Aug. 29, 1958.
[29] *Ibid.*, No. 5, March 14, 1956, JPRS 378, April 21, 1958.

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responsibility, as well as capable of training apprentice personnel.

Administrative inefficiencies, severely intensified during the "leap forward" era, have been superimposed on an inherited dearth of administrative know-how. Nevertheless, with China's gradual recovery from the general crisis created by the series of crop failures, some melioration is becoming apparent. There are indications that during the past few years political pressures affecting statistical data have been reduced back to their "normal" pre-1958 level; the period of "do-it-yourself" statistics is on the way out, and much of the responsibility for statistical data is reverting from political cadres to individuals with at least a modicum of statistical orientation.

Despite the much broader educational base that now exists, Communist China is still a country without a tradition of regard for statistics. The importance of exact numerical data remains largely unrecognized at all levels—from the lowest rural functionaries to the highest decision-making echelons. Presumably an intensive nationwide campaign, not unlike the many other ostensibly successful propaganda drives, could awaken the masses to the need for accurate statistics and thus reduce the frequency of both conscious and unconscious falsification of figures. Certainly such a campaign might be expected to produce an improvement in the area of non-economic statistics—*e.g.*, cultural and demographic information—more readily than in the economic field.

But while each of these obstacles by itself appears surmountable, collectively they present a barrier that is not likely to be overcome, at least within the current decade. Even if we assume that the Chinese Communists will make a sincere effort to improve the quality of statistical data, will they be able to carry out corrective measures effectively all the way "down the line" considering the immense area of the country and the size of its population? Weighing the tremendous demands already imposed on the educational system, the emphasis on other kinds of technical training, and the limited resources available, will the regime be willing and able to grant the necessary priority to statistical training? And perhaps most important of all, is it likely that the political atmosphere in Communist China will change so radically that lower-level functionaries will be able to report honest figures without fear of repercussions if the results do not correspond with those desired or anticipated by the regime?

It would seem that at present these questions must be answered in the negative. Although some measure of improvement is certainly possible, there is little hope that given the existing political and social milieu Communist China will be able effectively to overcome the many obstacles to the attainment of accurate statistics. Thus, a continuing dearth of published figures from China will probably be as much the result of a persisting statistical void as of political considerations.

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Lenin: A Bumper Crop

LOUIS FISCHER: *The Life of Lenin.*
Harper & Row, New York, Evanston and London, 1964.
ROBERT PAYNE: *The Life and Death of Lenin.*
Simon & Schuster, New York, 1964.
STEFAN T. POSSONY: Lenin: *The Compulsive Revolutionary.*
Henry Regnery Co., Chicago, 1964.

Reviewed by Victor S. Frank

IT IS HIGHLY unfortunate that three full-length American biographies of Lenin should appear simultaneously—unfortunate for the publishers and the authors, and also for the librarians and reviewers who have to wade through the same muddied waters three times in a row. Still, diversity of human nature saves the day. The three books reflect the three very distinct personalities of the authors: a first-rate journalist with a strong moralistic streak (Mr. Louis Fischer), a fiction writer thinly disguised as an historian (Mr. Robert Payne) and a historian with the mind of a counter-intelligence agent (Dr. Stefan Possony).

The technical difficulties confronting the three writers were identical, and the most formidable of them was surely the abrupt cleavage that breaks Lenin's life-story into two unequal parts—the 47 years up to his final return to Russia from exile in April 1917, and the seven years up to his death. The first part resembles a turbulent but narrow stream with its course and banks neatly defined. The sources feeding the stream can be easily surveyed: Lenin's writings and letters, reminiscences of his contemporaries, occasional references in police archives (Dr. Possony is a mine of information on that count). But in 1917 the narrow stream disgorges itself into a vast ocean; Lenin's life merges with the history of Russia. The sources multiply a thousand-fold, and it becomes impossible to distinguish the river waters from those of the main.

OF THE THREE authors, Mr. Fischer is the one most aware of the problem. While Dr. Possony chooses the easy way out and devotes only about one third of his book to the post-1917 period (surely, a glaring disproportion arising out of Dr. Possony's preoccupation with police files), Mr. Payne allocates about one-half of his space to Lenin's life as the Soviet leader and Mr. Fischer more than three quarters.

Mr. Frank is a Russian-born writer and broadcaster, currently heading the London Bureau of Radio Liberty. He is a frequent contributor on Soviet and Communist affairs to Survey, Forum Service, *and other British publications.*

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Mr. Fischer's learning is vast and many-sided, based as it is not only on assiduous research, but also on his knowledge of Russia (where he lived as a foreign correspondent between 1922 and 1938, and which he revisited several times since) and his personal acquaintance with some of Lenin's younger contemporaries, such as Chicherin, Litvinov, Radek, Bukharin and Maisky. Yet, paradoxically, it is precisely Mr. Fischer's great knowledge which creates specific difficulties for him. A comprehensive history of the Soviet state, even if centered around one man's life, is an enormous undertaking, and the avalanche of facts has compelled Mr. Fischer to organize his material in a series of short monographic essays ("Woodrow Wilson and Russia," for instance, or "Lenin and Maxim Gorky"). As a result the reader has to perform mental acrobatics in following the author from one sub-topic to another and occasionally fight a feeling of slight vertigo caused by the kaleidoscopic array of facts, figures, names and dates.

Yet, Mr. Fischer's conscientiousness as a historian and his sensitive understanding of Russia, old and new, places him far ahead of the two other authors. Take, for instance, the question of Lenin's ethnic origins. The facts themselves are not in dispute—except for the open question whether Lenin's maternal grandfather, Dr. Alexander Blank, was of Jewish or German origin. On his father's side, Lenin had Russian and Kalmuck blood, on his mother's side, Swedish and German (or Jewish). Now, what does this mixed ancestry make him? Mr. Payne (who, by the way, without a shred of solid evidence asserts that Lenin's father was a Chuvash) comes to this conclusion: "He [Lenin] was German, Swedish and Chuvash, and there was not a drop of Russian blood in him." (p. 46)

This conclusion is grossly misleading. Of course, Lenin was of mixed blood, but so are most Russians. In fact, the hallmark of most Great Russians is a generous admixture of Finnish blood, while Russian nobility is a hotchpotch of ethnic strains—Tartar, German, Lithuanian and what have you. Russia has always been a multinational society with no color bars preventing crossbreeding. Lenin was a typical Russian, *because* he was of mixed blood.

MR. FISCHER understands this well. "Lenin's ancestry," he says "spanned Eurasia from Central Asia to Central Europe. In this sense Lenin was what Russia is: a bridge between East and West, partaking of both yet struggling to be neither." (p. 4.)

Psychologically, in any case, Lenin belongs to a type fairly common in Russian history: the rationalistic rigidity, the lack of depth, the rejection of all subtlety, the "one-track mindedness" remind one of such figures as the fanatical 17th-century schismatic Archpriest Avvakum or, *toutes proportions gardées*, Leo Tolstoy (not as an artist, of course, but as a teacher and preacher). There is a wooden stiffness, an intellectual blindness about such men, which makes them poor thinkers but great doers.

Lenin, as all three biographers show, was concerned with two things only: destruction and the organization of means of destruction (and not, as his latter-day Bolshevik worshippers would have it, with production and the organization of means of production). All his mental energies were directed exclusively at these objectives. And since his energies were enormous, he achieved his goals; he did organize a closely-knit party shaped in his own image, and he did destroy the old order and all that it stood for. In this sense he certainly ranks among the greatest destroyers in universal history.

Still a great enigma remains: How could a conservative, conventionally pious and patriotic *milieu* such as that surrounding the staid Ulianov family in the sleepy Volga town of Simbirsk bring forth a man whose one overwhelming ambition was to destroy everything that this *milieu* represented? Dr. Possony devotes a special chapter to this question ("The Psychology of Destruction"), but it is not very enlightening. "Lenin's character," he says, "could be described as 'fixated' at the 'sadistic-anal' stage, with a strong component of intellectual narcissism." (p. 389). No doubt, so it could. But what of it? Again, Dr. Possony marvels at the weakness of Lenin's "sexual libido" (p. 385), and considers his lack of interest in sex slightly sinister. But then most Russian radicals of Lenin's generation were far less obsessed by sex than our contemporaries. One example: A popular Russian students' song of the 1890's deals with an all-night young people's revelry on a river: "They smoke, and they drink," so the song runs, "they sing songs and they do something else besides." Ninety-nine of one hundred of our contemporaries are likely to conclude that the "something else" is a coy reference to sex. In fact (as Russians of the older generation will confirm), it was an easily intelligible allusion to the distribution of subversive leaflets.

NO, PSYCHOANALYSIS in this case does not get us anywhere, the more so since we have no evidence to show that Lenin hated his father, and since, moreover, Lenin was not the only, though perhaps the most outstanding, representative of a generation bent on destruction. Besides, the larger question is that of the psychological and in-

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tellectual roots of the revolution. What forces, what influences made these people strive for the destruction of the only world they knew? Mr. Payne, for once, is very perceptive when he introduces his chapter, "The Education of a Revolutionary," with a quotation from Turgenev's *Fathers and Sons:*

"Permit me to observe," said Nikolai Petrovich, "that if you deny everything, or, to put it more precisely, if you destroy everything, then you must also construct, you know." "That is not our business," Bazarov replied. "Our first task is to clear the ground."

This was Lenin's attitude in a nutshell. (It is of interest to note that Lenin "read and reread" Turgenev's novels as a boy, and that later on, in his Siberian exile, he practiced his German by reading Turgenev in German.) Certainly his views on what ought to follow the act of destruction were vague and contradictory. As Mr. Fischer shows, he lost his bearings in the years after the revolution precisely because construction "was not his business." Dr. Possony and Mr. Payne stress Lenin's dependence on two revolutionaries of the preceding generation —the theoretician Tkachev and the practician Nechaiev. But there is no definite evidence pointing that way, and the psychological antecedents of Lenin and of other Russian revolutionaries remain obscure.

Dr. Possony is not content with establishing Lenin's "villainy" as a historical figure; he is bent on tagging the Bolshevik leader as a villain in a personal sense as well. In pursuit of this end he devotes a large part of his book to a painstaking analysis of records from the files of the Tsarist, German, Austro-Hungarian and Japanese police forces. While he deals mostly in hints and innuendos, it appears to be Dr. Possony's general assumption that at one time or another Lenin was subsidized by the police organs of the four countries concerned and that the German authorities in particular were able, through the threat of blackmail, to control Lenin's policy even after the revolution.

There is, of course, no doubt at all that the Germans transmitted money to the Bolsheviks through various intermediaries, both before and after the November 1917 *coup d état.*[1] Indeed, Lenin was throughout his political life quite indifferent and unscrupulous as to the sources of the money he needed for his purposes. But to explain Lenin's dealings with the German Government in the period between the Bolshevik seizure of power and the German defeat solely in terms of his fear of blackmail is surely to misread the situation. Again and again, Dr. Possony speaks of this threat as a political reality. "The Germans," he says, "forced Lenin to stop all fraternization with German soldiers immediately . . . [In November 1917, because the Bolsheviks were using fraternization to revolutionize Germany and Austria-Hungary.] [They] obviously could hold the threat of blackmail over Lenin, who was now beginning to pay the penalty for his Machiavellian politics." (p. 255) Or:

The Bolsheviks were not sufficiently accommodating to the Germans. On January 7, 1918, the German Foreign Secretary cabled his agents that the time has come to provide a few broad hints through the available safe channels but not in public. "If the truth were to become known in Russia . . . then the Bolsheviks will be finished. Their own dishonesty will ruin them." Subsequently Lenin improved delivery and the Germans never found it necessary to disclose the truth." (p. 257)

Further on (p. 260), Dr. Possony repeats the charge that "the Germans had their secret hold over Lenin," and on p. 274 he says: "Being controlled by the Germans, Lenin simply was forced to deliver the [Brest-Litovsk] peace." In this form the allegation is untenable. If the Germans really had their "secret hold over Lenin," why was it never disclosed—not after the German defeat when the Imperial archives were thrown open; not by the Nazis who certainly would have been interested in compromising the founder of the Soviet state; not, finally, by the Allied historians after World War II? There is plenty of evidence of German money being channelled into the Bolshevik party treasury, but no evidence of a secret hold—as distinct from German threats.[2] Lenin's diplomatic defeat at Brest-Litovsk and the subsequent German advance into Russia were caused by the stark fact that, having destroyed the old Tsarist army, Lenin had nothing to oppose the Germans with. There is no need to invent a "blackmail" threat to explain a situation caused by a flagrant disparity of forces and by Lenin's political inability to go back on the separate-peace propaganda to which he owed his success.

Dr. Possony is so enraptured by his research into overt and covert police subsidies and his pursuit of agents and counter-agents infiltrating police and party organizations that he tends to lose a sense of proportion and as a rule prefers a sensational and involved explanation to a prosaic and simple one.

[1] See Z. A. B. Zeman, *Germany and the Revolution in Russia, 1915-1918. Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Ministry*, London, 1958, *passim.*

[2] *Ibid.*

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FINALLY, A FEW WORDS about Mr. Payne's book. If one wants an interesting, smooth account of Lenin's life unencumbered by scholarly considerations, this should be one's choice. The book is certainly fun, but not a contribution to our knowledge of the man and his times; Dr. Possony's book has a few scholarly merits, however questionable some of the author's methods. Mr. Payne's book is a historical romance produced by an experienced practitioner.

The Death of Marxism

RICHARD LOWENTHAL: *World Communism.*
New York, Oxford University Press, 1964.

Reviewed by Hans Morgenthau

PROFESSOR Richard Lowenthal of the Free University of Berlin has collected in this volume a number of papers he has written since 1955 on the crisis of communism. The result is a penetrating analysis of the intellectual decay and political disintegration which have befallen communism during the last decade. The story of that disintegration and decay has the characteristics of tragedy. For the collapse of communism, torn by inner contradictions and disavowed by one historic experience after the other, was inevitable, and the more its leaders tried to stave off the catastrophe, the more certain they made its coming. There is something tragic, evoking terror and pity in the beholder, in the spectacle of Khrushchev and Mao Tse-tung trying, each in his own way, to close the gates of destruction, only succeeding in opening them wider.

It is not easy to tell the story of the disintegration of communism well; for the story is complex and it has been deliberately obscured by the actors. In the Marxist intellectual world a dogmatic philosophic system masks political reality, changing the facts to fit the dogma or changing the meaning of the dogma to fit the facts, without, however, changing the dogmatic formula. The analytical observer must, then, perform three tasks: he must discover the political reality behind the dogma, he must then find the meaning of the dogma behind its verbalization, and he must discover the political function of the dogma in different periods of history.

IN THESE TASKS, Professor Lowenthal has admirably succeeded. Nothing better has been written on the subject, and it is hard to imagine that it ever will. Professor Lowenthal combines a deep understanding of Marxism, and of the ways Marxists think, with a sensitivity to the subtler realities of power politics. More particularly, he understands the interplay of Marxist ideology and power politics in the minds of the Communist leaders. He does not fall into the dogmatic error of so many Western analysts of communism who, to use his own words:

. . . believe that the Leninist doctrine is by itself sufficient to determine the proper strategy for any given situation; hence statements justifying a major policy decision in doctrinal terms may be taken as adequately indicating the actual motives of that decision. This method of interpretation is dogmatic in the sense that the understanding of actions of Communist leaders is reduced to the immanent exegesis of the dogma they profess.

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Instead, Professor Lowenthal assumes that:

. . . no political doctrine can possibly anticipate all the major choices by which its followers may be faced: at crucial moments, "ideological" politicians are forced to give preference to one element of the doctrine over another with which, owing to unforeseen circumstances, it has come into conflict. Whichever decision has been taken will henceforth be justified by emphasizing the corresponding aspect of the doctrine; hence it is not the unchanging doctrine that has determined the decision but the decision that determines the further evolution of the doctrine. This method of interpretation is functional and critical in the sense that the doctrine is seen as a justifying ideology as well as a motivating force, and it is truly historical in focusing attention on the preferences that determine the crucial choices—even if those preferences may not yet have found a mature formulation.

Professor Lowenthal applies this method with consummate skill and illuminating results. He sees in the Yugoslav defection of 1948 the beginning of the end; for the defection challenged with impunity both the ideological monopoly and the political leadership of the Soviet Union. Stalin's dethronement by Khrushchev in 1956 administered a fatal blow to these Soviet claims; for it disqualified Soviet leaders once and for all from claiming convincingly the monopolistic possession of Marxist truth upon which its authority at home and abroad had rested. The only Communist leader whose ideological credibility remained intact was Mao—the only Communist leader, aside from Tito, whose ideological and political authority has indigenous roots. Thus while Khrushchev tried to restore the ideological and political monopoly of the Soviet Union, first through pragmatic accommodation, and in the end despairingly and implausibly through uncompromising reassertion, Mao grasped the ideological mantle that Khrushchev had torn from Stalin's tomb.

THE ANALYSIS of the factors which led inexorably step by step to the present schism between the Soviet Union and China is the most impressive part of Lowenthal's book. It is original, profound, and persuasive. And it is a testimony to the creativeness, if not the greatness, of Mao Tse-tung. Professor Lowenthal shows convincingly how essentially different Mao's communism has been, from the very outset, from that of Marx and Lenin. He demonstrates that Mao's party was not, any more than Lenin's was, a representative agency of the industrial workers, but "a centralized party organized for total power." Against the advice of a succession of Soviet leaders, the party was based upon the peasants, and not upon the industrial workers. Mao's "strategy had prevailed in the Chinese party not because it had the backing of Moscow—it was eventually approved by Moscow because it had prevailed."

Considering the fundamental divergencies in political conception and style, the friendly relations between the Soviet Union and China in the early 1950's and, more particularly, the initial Chinese support for Khrushchev's destalinization must be seen as an interlude based upon passing national interests and ephemeral tactical considerations. When the ideological and political weakness of the Soviet Union had become obvious in 1956, China started to compete openly with the Soviet Union for the ideological and political leadership of the world Communist movement. According to Professor Lowenthal, China has a great advantage in this competition by virtue of the radical change that has occurred in the political functions of Marxism-Leninism. For that philosphy does not fit at all the conditions of the workers in the highly developed industrial nations for whom it was originally intended. But, especially in its Chinese version, its fits perfectly the psychological and political needs of the new ruling groups in the emerging nations of Africa and Latin America.

LOOKING beyond the spring of 1963, when Professor Lowenthal's story ends, and looking back to the less dramatic decline of communism which occurred before 1955, when his story begins, one is impressed with the new significance Professor Lowenthal's analysis imparts to these two periods of history. The fall of Khrushchev—sudden, brutal, degrading to both executioners and victim—poses for the serious student of politics with renewed poignancy the question of the nature of the Soviet state and the philosophy on which it rests. What kind of political society can afford twice in succession to elevate a man to the pinnacle of wisdom, virtue, and power, and then to depose, or denigrate him posthumously, as a wicked usurper, a blunderer, if not a criminal? The answer is that no political society can afford to squander its moral capital so recklessly, and that a political society that does so can have only a short life-expectancy.

What Khrushchev did to Stalin in 1956 and what his colleagues have just done to Khrushchev are symptoms of the fatal crisis that has befallen communism as a political philosophy and threatens the Soviet state which derives its legitimacy from that philosophy.

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A political order has to rest on one of three foundations of legitimacy: religious—here the government rules "by the grace of God"; democratic—here the government rules by the "will of the people"; charismatic—here the government rules owing to a special endowment of wisdom, virtue, or power. The Soviet government is obviously of the last kind. Lenin, Stalin, and Khrushchev governed and were obeyed because they were supposed to be endowed with a special relationship to the truth about man and society, of which the philosophy of communism is presumed to be the sole repository. Endowed with extraordinary qualities of mind and character, they were the authentic interpreters and augmentors of the Marxist truths. They had the same monopolistic access to those truths as priests have to the truths of revealed religion. Hence their infallibility in thought and action, hence their right to govern, and the citizen's duty to obey. Doubt that infallibility and you doubt the legitimacy of their rule. Unmask them as fallible and wicked, and you have destroyed the legitimacy of their rule.

Yet this is what Khrushchev did in 1956 when he revealed Stalin's crimes, and this is what Khrushchev's colleagues did when they stripped him of his power. By doing this, Khrushchev and his colleagues have done more than destroy the legitimacy of the rule of one particular man. They have cast doubt on Marxist legitimacy as such. If a tyrant like Stalin could rule for thirty years, and so defective a statesman as Khrushchev for eleven, both in the name of Marxist legitimacy, how valid in theory and useful in practice can Marxist legitimacy be? After that question had been raised in 1956 by Khrushchev with respect to Stalin, it was bound to be raised with respect to Khrushchev by others, and it is bound to be raised by others still with respect to his successors, once their hour of truth has come. As a matter of fact, it is already being raised by implication through the demand of non-Russian Communist parties for an explanation of Khrushchev's dismissal; for by questioning the justice of that dismissal, they question the right of Khrushchev's successors to rule.

Once Marxist legitimacy was thus doubted, the question of the validity of Marxism itself as a political and economic system was bound to be raised, too. That question was raised implicitly through the Polish and Hungarian revolts of 1956, and through the intellectual and moral ferment that began to shake the intelligentsia of the Soviet Union and Poland. Kolakowski's *Man without Alternative: About the Possibility and Impossibility of being a Marxist* is a classical example of that questioning. As applied to the specific Soviet manifestation of Marxism, that question has been raised ever since by the Yugoslavs and the Chinese, the Poles and the Rumanians, the Italians and the French, and by intellectuals within the USSR itself.

WHILE THIS PROCESS of obvious disintegration started in 1956 with Stalin's dethronement by Khrushchev, it must not be overlooked that Marxism entered its open, and probably final, crisis already weakened and transformed by a series of encounters with historic experience which found it wanting. The first of these crises occurred in August 1914, when the proletarians of the capitalistic world, instead of uniting, started to kill one another on the behest of their respective ruling classes and on behalf of their respective nations. The second crisis occurred at the end of the First World War and in its immediate aftermath: the October Revolution of 1917, which took place in a backward country—contrary to Marxist expectation—was not followed by proletarian revolutions in the advanced capitalist countries, but remained an isolated event. The third was the phenomenon of fascism, which was a new form of government similar in its political character and techniques to Russian Bolshevism and not, as Marxist dogma had to assume, the last stage of a decaying capitalism, to be followed of necessity by the triumph of communism. Finally the persistent inability of Communist societies to solve the problems of agriculture and industrial production provides a glaring empirical contradiction to the claimed superiority of a Communist system of production and distribution.

IT IS AS A result of these departures from reality that Marxism as a system of political thought and a guide to political action is today dead where it once had its greatest vitality: in Central and Western Europe. This sweeping statement is not contradicted by the fact that in France and Italy Communist candidates are supported by approximately one-fourth of the voters; for those votes are cast not so much for Marxism as a political philosophy as against the social and economic status quo. And in Germany and Austria Marxism is a historic memory altogether. One needs only compare this state of affairs with the enormous intellectual ferment—largely sterile politically, it is true—which Marxism caused in that part of the world in the 1920's, and the faith in its intellectual and moral rightness and promise which it aroused in its followers—to realize its decline as an intellectual, moral, and political force. One

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of my earliest and most vivid childhood recollections is of a visit I paid with my father, a doctor, to the house of a German workingman who was dying of cancer. "Doctor," the man said, "when I am dead, will you please see to it that this book is put in my coffin," and he pointed to a small volume lying on his night table. "Was this the Bible?," I asked my father after we had left. "No, it was *his* Bible," my father answered with a trace of acerbity in his voice, being as class conscious as his patient was. "It was The Communist Manifesto." Can one imagine a German workingman, East or West, uttering such a last wish today?

Perceiving the present open and acute crisis of communism within the Communist domain itself from this historic perspective of a general and steady decline, one can understand this crisis as the last or, at best, the next to the last act of a drama whose roots lie in the very nature of Marxism as an intellectual system, its inner contradictions, and its contradictions with historic experience. It is the story of that act which Professor Lowenthal tells with consummate skill. His book is brilliantly written and easily accessible to the layman. Almost thirty pages of interesting notes, unfortunately tucked away in the back pages, testify to the painstaking research upon which it is based. Its usefulness would have been enhanced by an index.

Glimpses of the Future

HARRY BRAVERMAN: *The Future of Russia.* New York, Macmillan, 1963.
LEONARD SCHAPIRO, ED.: *The USSR and the Future, An Analysis of the New Program of the CPSU.* New York, Praeger, 1963.

Reviewed by Oscar Gass

IN OCTOBER 1961, the 22nd Congress of the Communist party of the Soviet Union adopted a new Party Program. At the Congress itself, there was one clear, if polite, expression of disagreement concerning the significance of the new Program for the world Communist movement: Khrushchev said the Program constituted a step forward "in the revolutionary theory of Marx, Engels and Lenin"; Chou En-Lai would accord it only the status of a great plan "for the Soviet people." Since then, commentators with less of the status of insiders have attempted to utilize the Party Program, together with other information, to speculate on the probable future character of Soviet society and on the intended role of the USSR in world affairs. The two present books reflect such attempts.

Mr. Braverman says the USSR is now laying the foundations of socialism, not communism. He welcomes this foundation. He is confident the USSR will grow prosperous more rapidly than any other country. He believes also that Soviet political practices are becoming more protective of human dignity and more democratic. In a vague way, he is a historical determinist, citing Mr. Isaac Deutscher in praise and finding Soviet policy fixed by "the imperatives of a civilization in reconstruction." His tone and temper may be suggested by a sentence:

We must conclude that the revo-

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lution is still going on, and that it will not come to an end until the nation assumes a shape in which the tensions between progress and backwardness, society and individual, idealization and reality, have been released.

Should not Mr. Braverman perhaps have asked himself whether the tensions between such pairs are ever "released" in a merely human society?

IT IS A great pity, particularly since he makes Soviet economic progress the foundation of all else, that Mr. Braverman's economic history and economic analysis are unsound. Central are three erroneous contentions: first, that the USSR has established a firmly deliverable 5-percent annual increase in output per worker; second, that the USSR has achieved a "phenomenal rate of growth . . . unmatched in economic history except for short bursts in special situations"; third, that this highest rate of economic growth "is elicited *on command* (italics added) from a set of institutions" unique to the USSR. Had Mr. Braverman been in a position to read only ten weighty pages of comparative economic history, written last year by Simon Kuznets,[1] he would have seen that each of his points is quite wrong. The refutation to be derived from those pages covers the period up to 1958. But since then, also, the USSR has neither achieved materially greater rates of increase in production and productivity than Germany, France and Italy, nor equaled the expansion rates of Japan or Israel. Moreover, the Soviet Union has not been immune from irregularities in economic expansion. The Soviet command economy is not always more effective than was King Canute.

For Soviet democratization, Mr. Braverman does not, in the end, present any high targets. He expresses knowledge of some things for which there is either no evidence or only the most problematic evidence, among these the claim that, in the Soviet Union, congresses of the Communist party have now become "all-important" and that these congresses, together with full Central Committee meetings, "have unquestionably become the centers of discussion and decision of basic policy questions." But to Mr. Braverman's credit be it said that he does not accept the view that problems of civil liberty and democratic government will soon become irrelevant in the USSR because communism will have arrived, all interests will have been reconciled, and all passions spent. On the contrary, while seeing democratization as ". . . the major trend, which appears to be beyond dispute," he concludes only that "it is not impossible that we will see within the next period informal alignments of leaders, periodicals, party followers, with dissenting viewpoints." And he concludes that such alignments might lead to compromises "along the lines of the 1956 Gomulka compromise in Poland."

Words will bear any use. One can only reflect in wonder and pain on the political education which permits use of the verbal image of a Gomulka democracy.

Mr. Braverman's book is dignified by good will toward the people of the USSR. It is shaped with a kind of independence of opinion. But it does not have the substantive content which would call for its being recommended to the attention of a reader—except perhaps one interested in the intellectual history of the United States.

THE VOLUME edited by Mr. Leonard Schapiro belongs to a quite different order of value. It has a general Introduction and sixteen specialized essays written by as many different authors. Very usefully, the book also reprints the 1919 and 1961 party programs. The essays are gathered in five approximately equal sections: ideological, international, economic, political and miscellaneous. No one will judge each contribution equally, but all are well-informed, carefully-done and thought-provoking. If I single out three for special mention, they were hard choices among at least twice as many that I found almost equally valuable. I hope the whole book (which has both hard-cover and paperback editions) will be widely read.

In the section on Ideology, an engaging essay is the one by Mr. George Lichtheim. It is learned and searching. It provides insight into the tension between ideology and practice in Soviet society. And perhaps only the unusually alert reader will become aware, in perusing this essay, of the Cimmerian bog toward which Mr. Lichtheim resolutely marches.

Mr. Lichtheim analyzes with unusual felicity the deep-rooted conflict between the authoritarian socialism which the USSR is actually building and the libertarian communism which the USSR continues, in some degree, to profess. Reality leans hard to the pole of coercion: paternal determination of individual values and social objectives; government by personalist party dictatorship; an economy where products and incomes are set by authorities removed from the control of workers and consumers. The ideal (as inherited) remains anarchist freedom—in Mr. Lichtheim's summation of Marx, ". . . a stage of society in which the disjunction between individual wills and social needs has been overcome . . . , a so-

[1] Essay by Simon Kuznets in *Economic Trends in the Soviet Union*, edited by Abram Bergson and Simon Kuznets, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1963, pp. 333-42.

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ciety in which the subordination of the individual to the division of labor—that is, to social constraint based on economic necessity—has come to an end."

It is, I think, not unfair to Mr. Lichtheim to conclude that, in this essay, he finds the reality of authoritarian socialism in the USSR all Russian and Populist—and bad; and the ideal of anarchist communism, all universalist and Marxist—and good. Between Populism and Marxism, all is accounted for. No role of genuine novelty worth mentioning is left for Leninism. That omission will disturb those in search of historical understanding, and they may here find Mr. Lichtheim's historiography quite unsatisfactory. But more disturbing is the extent to which he would apparently make us quietly captive to a Marxist economic and political utopianism.

Mr. Lichtheim does indeed concede that "one may treat this whole perspective [of materialist anarchism] as utopian." But I am not reassured by this neutral disclaimer. More to the point is his later assertion that ". . . an economically stationary society need have no definable scarcities once all 'reasonable' wants are satisfied. . . ." I believe the quoted statement to be entirely erroneous. A poor society which is economically stationary has scarcities: a handful of rice must be foregone for two ladles of beans or for a shoestring. A rich society which is economically stationary (or any other rich society) also has scarcities: the new Volkswagen has to be foregone so that one can take that trip to Rome. Mr. Lichtheim's "reasonable" is only muddle, and his quotation marks are the tribute his intelligence pays to a bad conscience.

But, once we have noted the utopian confusion of Mr. Lichtheim's economic analysis ("beyond scarcity"), we are alerted to look for the same trait in his political philosophy ("beyond coercion"). And we find it, though largely in omission. This side of utopia, Marx was, in his dominant utterance, a proponent of socialist economics *combined with* political democracy. But it is not in relation to its tension with this Marxist standard for our human political life that Mr. Lichtheim prefers to discuss the program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. He focuses on the discordance with a libertarian utopia—beyond the state. In such a competition, it is easy to reject a contestant. Can it be that, for all his subtlety, it is Mr. Lichtheim who is, in considerable part, addressing himself to the wrong political questions?

AMONG THE essays on International Affairs, the one by Mr. Richard Pipes, on *Nationalism and Nationality*, is outstanding. But, with all respect, its greater strength lies perhaps in its treatment of what the Party Program calls "reactionary nationalism." In contrast, Mr. Pipes' commentary on "progressive nationalism" raises troubling questions.

Since 1919, surely, the basic idea of "progressive nationalism" has not changed substantially among the Soviet leadership, and neither has the conception of "reactionary nationalism." A "progressive nationalism" is one that disintegrates you, the alien enemy. A "reactionary nationalism" is one that disintegrates me, the USSR, or challenges my hegemony. In March 1919, when Lenin's personal authority was at its height, the First Congress of the Comintern proclaimed: "Colonial slaves of Africa and Asia! The hour of the proletarian dictatorship in Europe will strike for you as the hour of your deliverance." But during the same month, at a meeting of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Bukharin defended a more articulated policy. For the area ruled by communism, he bespoke a supra-national state, with no silly indulgence of archaic nationalisms. (In this matter, he was not in agreement with Lenin, but in the end, as a practical matter, it was Bukharin's view that prevailed in the USSR of Lenin, Stalin and Khrushchev. For the rest of the world, Bukharin found that self-determination would do very nicely:

If we propound the solution of the right of self-determination for the colonies, the Hottentots, the Negroes, the Indians, etc., we lose nothing by it. On the contrary we gain; . . . The most outright nationalist movement, for example, that of the Hindus, is only water for our mill, since it contributes to the destruction of English imperialism.

Surely Bukharin then seized the permanent core of Soviet policy regarding nationalism, as that policy has prevailed from that day to this.

Mr. Pipes rightly points out that, in a noticeable verbal shift since Lenin's day, "Great-Russian chauvinism" is no longer joined, in equal condemnation, with the minority nationalisms of the USSR. But, in practice, Lenin's sensitivity to Great-Russian chauvinism seems to have been shared by none of his major colleagues. In our day, even the words are missing. Russification is an avowed policy. Did not Khrushchev warn that, in the USSR, "even the smallest manifestation of nationalistic survivals must be eradicated with complete Bolshevik irreconcilability"? Moreover, what its foreign Communist sponsors call "polycentrism" is also identified, in the CPSU Program of 1961, as "reactionary nationalism." Obviously, as polycentrism breaches the hegemony of the USSR in the socialist camp, it must be reactionary. It is even named the chief instrument of reaction. So the Party Program:

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"Nationalism is the chief political and ideological weapon used by international reaction . . . against the unity of the socialist countries."

So far one goes along easily with Mr. Pipes and appreciates his learning. But when he comes to "progressive nationalism," he is puzzling. He writes of the Program of 1961: "The support which it offers the forces of nationalism goes far beyond anything conceivable in Lenin's lifetime." With all consideration, I submit that it does not. The Lenin who could support Kemal Atatürk and Sun Yat-sen could do any of these things. Again, Mr. Pipes is even more puzzling when he writes of the 1961 Program, as if it were something new: "And throughout there is a determined effort to link the Communist movement with the 'national-liberation' movement as if they were two facets of the same thing." Exactly. But this attempted linkage is now at least twenty-three years old. The Communists did it then in Greece (EAM), in Albania, in Yugoslavia, and later (verbally) in Poland. Liu Shao-ch'i made public doctrine of the linkage in 1949, and his comrades of South Vietnam took the old name in 1960. If there is any subject on which the Program of 1961 contains little significant novelty, that subject would seem to be "progressive nationalism."

IN THE economic section, the general conspectus is supplied by Mr. Alfred Zauberman, and he does it with eminent good sense. Perhaps he is rather oversanguine about future Soviet production increases. Maybe, if he were writing today, he would not be as confident as he was in this essay that a 6-percent annual increase in Soviet national income is a "middle-of-the-road" forecast for 1960-80. Let us disregard the very bad crop year 1963. Still, even in the years 1958-62, the USSR apparently achieved only something like a 4.6-percent annual increase in production and 3.3-percent in productivity.[2] (France, Italy, Germany and Japan—not to mention lesser countries—each did better, on both counts.) Perhaps the middle-of-the-road is lower down than Mr. Zauberman thought. But such differences should, in any case, not be pressed hard. As Mr. Zauberman would surely agree, a forecast of general economic growth which an economist makes for a twenty-year period reflects so slight and speculative a judgment that nothing is gained by breaking it ponderously on the wheel.

Mr. Zauberman gives so little credence to the more extravagant claims of the Party Program that he does not bother to repeat them. The program claims: *"In the current decade* (1961-70) the Soviet Union . . . will surpass the strongest and richest capitalist country, the USA, in production per head of population. . . ." Mr. Zauberman calculates that the USSR will equal US per capita production *of 1961* in 1980. The program says: "The CPSU sets the historically important task of *achieving in the Soviet Union a living standard higher than that of any of the capitalist countries.*" Mr. Zauberman calculates that in 1980 consumption levels in the USSR are likely to be similar to those of the United Kingdom in 1961. That would put Soviet consumption per capita in 1980 well below United States consumption in 1950. The USSR would then be not first, but in a poor third or fourth class—after the United States, northern and western Europe, and the advanced countries of the British Commonwealth.

WITH THIS modest perspective of supply, Mr. Zauberman finds it almost too easy to dispose of Marxist utopian communism. It is only by accepting the burden of his own sophistication that he is compelled to suggest that a communism of unconstrained labor and free appropriation, which will not have been established by 1980, will also—in every human probability—not be established thereafter. He does not believe that the USSR will go to a more Marxist system of cost accounting; that would be a step away from rationality. He thinks the Soviet planners now have, clearly in their own minds, a far more consequent logic of cost and scarcity than Marx achieved. He therefore concludes optimistically:

There will henceforth be in Soviet doctrine two kinds of communism. One à la *Marx and Engels, comprising all the unrealisable ingredients—the eschatological version retained for prayers. Another* à la *Khrushchev—the pragmatic "1980." In the history of Communist doctrine the 22nd Congress will go down as the one which sealed the divorce of the two conceptions.*

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[2] U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Annual Economic Indicators For The USSR*, Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1964, esp. Table VIII-3.

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NOTES & VIEWS

Sociology in Eastern Europe

EDITORS' NOTE: Few social sciences have marked as rapid a development since World War II as sociology. Yet, in the Soviet Union and wherever Stalinist regimes ruled, the discipline was totally suppressed as incompatible with Marxism-Leninism and politically subversive. Only in the past few years have the ruling parties in the Soviet camp recognized that through their obscurantism they were depriving themselves of potentially useful political tools, and little by little they set about officially reintroducing sociology—"Marxist sociology," to be sure—in the universities and other institutions of learning. The three articles below summarize recent developments in this field in Poland, Czechoslovakia and East Germany. In a forthcoming issue, Professor Edward Shils will discuss the reestablishment of sociology in the Soviet Union itself.

—Poland—

Emilia Wilder

To an outside observer of events in Communist Poland, developments in that country's art and literature over the last ten years have had all the trappings of a drama. But it is a rather uncommon experience to be struck by a similar impression regarding developments in the area of scientific inquiry—in this case, in the field of sociology.

The war and its effects as well as subsequent political shifts in Poland—from a sort of popular-front line to stalinization, then to destalinization, and finally to the present so-called "stabilization"—have all had an impact on the development of Polish sociological research. The political changes have affected both theory and practice and, as a consequence, the position of Polish sociology in relation to the rest of the bloc. In the realm of theory, the central question facing Polish sociological research has been one of its identification with or separation from historical materialism, and at the same time one of "ideological engagement" versus the ideological indifference of "bourgeois capitalist" sociology. In practice, contemporary political developments have influenced the direction of Polish research, its methodology, and—to some extent—its organization and personnel as well.

To dispel the impression given by some Communist writings that the beginnings of sociological research in Poland date only from the post-

A longtime student of East European and particularly Polish affairs, Miss Wilder has contributed articles on sociological research in the Soviet bloc to various American and British publications.

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Stalin era, a few words about its prewar history seem in order. Besides a number of scholars less known abroad, such as Ludwik Krzywicki, Poland produced such internationally recognized sociologists as Florian Znaniecki, who taught at Poznan University, where the first Polish chair of sociology had been established almost half a century ago. Znaniecki also founded the first Polish sociological institute and became the editor-in-chief of the quarterly *Przeglad Socjologiczny* in 1930.[1] According to Professor J. Chalasinski, the monumental joint study by Znaniecki and William I. Thomas, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*, which was published in the United States in a series of five volumes between 1918 and 1920 (but is not available in Polish), inspired not only the sociological exploitation of autobiographies but also the expansion of monographic research in Poland as well as in the United States and other countries. A contest initiated by the Sociological Institute of Poznan University in 1922 produced the invaluable *Zyciorys wlasny robotnika* (Autobiography of a Worker), published in 1930. Various other research institutions, such as the Rural Culture Institute, the Pulawy Institute, the Silesian Institute, the Institute of Social Affairs, and the Institute of Social Economy, were also wholly or partly engaged in sociological studies before World War II.

The war disrupted but did not altogether terminate such activities. The zeal of the Poles to continue this research was demonstrated by the fact that even under the Nazi occupation sociological studies were secretly carried on by small groups at the universities of Warsaw and Poznan despite ruthless Gestapo measures to suppress them.

Almost as soon as the war stopped, sociological work revived. In June 1945, a Sociological Center became active in Lodz, and the following month the Polish Institute of Sociology resumed its surveys in Silesia. Various studies were thus set in motion, but a number of them could not be completed or published when Stalinist dogma became the rule of the spirit. During the years 1951 to 1954, the study and teaching of sociology were monopolized by the Institute of Social Science attached to the Central Committee of the PZPR, the ruling Communist party of Poland. This meant, in effect, the exclusive study and teaching of historical materialism.[2]

The first step toward a revival of genuine sociological work in Poland was taken during the "thaw" in the years 1954-55. It was then that a Center of Sociological Research was created at the Polish Academy of Sciences. The practical importance of sociological inquiry subsequently received its first recognition by a Communist regime when the tribunal trying participants in the Poznan riots of June 1956 called on the expertise of Polish sociologists to establish whether the defendants had acted under the influence of mass psychosis.

However, it was after the bloodless "revolution" of October 1956 that the development of sociological research in Poland took on a wellnigh explosive character. The enthusiasm, tenacity, and independence displayed by Polish sociologists in the face of the hostile and threatening attitudes expressed by spokesmen in other bloc countries[3] is perhaps explained, in part, by the relatively advanced stage of Polish research before its interruption and by the comparatively short duration of the hiatus. But one is tempted to think also of the intense frustration which the Polish scientists, striving for more knowledge about their nation, must have felt at the total rejection of their effort during the reign of Stalinism. The characteristic propensity of the Poles for self-analysis as a nation may have added to the unprecedented popular enthusiasm shown for the various opinion and attitude polls which sprouted all over the country in these first years of rebirth after the "Spring in October."[4] Last but not least, the substantial degree to which the new Gomulka government recognized the usefulness of —and granted financial backing to —these inquiries must have imparted even greater confidence and greater ambitions to the entire sociological profession.

During this stage, party and non-party sociologists alike blamed Stalinist dogmatism, with its thesis of sharpening class struggle requiring increased vigilance against bourgeois encroachments, for the stagnation of their research before the "thaw." Among the former, Professor Jan Szczepanski, currently director of the Basic Sociological Research

[1] On prewar sociological development in Poland, see *Internationales Soziologen Lexicon*, Berlin, 1959; articles by T. Abel in *American Sociological Review*, August 1958; by J. Chalasinski in *Przeglad Socjologiczny*, Vol. XVII, No. 1, 1963; and by S. Ossowski in *Studia Socjologiczne*, No. 2(2), 1961.

[2] Chairs of sociology in Polish universities were replaced by chairs of Marxism or History of Social Thought. *Przeglad Socjologiczny* was suspended and replaced by *Mysl Filozoficzna* (Philosophical Thought), representing the party line. Various sociological research teams were obliged to discontinue their field work.

[3] *E.g.*, see *Voprosy Filosofii* (Moscow), No. 4, 1957, pp. 227-98, and No. 7, 1958, pp. 3-19; also the Bulgarian Communist monthly *Novo Vreme*, December 1957. As late as the end of 1959, the East German party youth organ *Forum* attacked the Polish participants in the World Congress of Sociology at Stresa as "revisionists."

[4] See *Survey* (London) July 1963, pp. 121-23. Apart from public readiness to answer press and radio queries, popular enthusiasm for the polls has been demonstrated by the fact that, since the Public Opinion Research Center started operating in 1958, its more than one thousand interviewers have worked on a volunteer basis, motivated mainly by the "civic character" of the polls.

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Center of the Polish Academy of Sciences, presented his Western colleagues with precisely such an explanation of the fate of Polish sociology under Stalinism.[5]

One manifestation of the new spirit animating sociological work in Poland was the all-encompassing adoption of Western methods of empirical research. Exchanges of scholars with the West and, above all, American exchange scholarship grants made it possible for almost every Polish sociologist of note or promise to study Western methods and techniques and apply them to domestic studies.

Unfortunately, however, lack of experience on the part of many of the younger scholars, the amateurism of sensation-hungry press pollsters, and the unpleasant revelations brought to light by some of the polls opened the profession to new attacks. Particularly irksome to party ideologists and the regime were the findings of the much-discussed Public Opinion Research Center poll of Warsaw University students in 1958, which showed the deep and abiding attachment of Polish youth to religion and their detachment from Marxism.[6]

Charges of a "poll mania," a betrayal of Marxist ideology, and a complete surrender to Western bourgeois influences were hurled at the sociologists by party ideological spokesmen,[7] coinciding with a shift by the Gomulka regime to a stronger stand against "revisionism," the Church, workers' rights, etc. Ironically, however, these attacks also coincided with contrary Soviet moves toward establishing contacts with Western sociology and utilizing Western "concrete," "specialized" research techniques. Thus, actually, the basis for a rapprochement between Polish and Soviet sociological concepts—far apart as they had been during the period 1954-1959—seemed in sight.

The common ground on which Marxist sociologists in both countries now appeared in accord was essentially as follows: While "specialized sociological sciences" as developed in the West, with their advanced methods and techniques, should be adopted, Marxism must remain supreme as a general sociological theory to guide concrete research undertakings. The technical task of sociology in a contemporary socialist society is to provide expert support for the implementation of the leadership's organizational and planning tasks, and its ideological function is the shaping of the social consciousness of the people. The former can be greatly aided by the development of research along Western lines, while the latter must be performed from an anti-capitalist and socialist position.

This third phase in the postwar development of Polish sociology, after the era of Stalinist darkness and the subsequent period of exuberance after the "thaw," has been marked by certain changes in personnel and in the organizational setup of Polish research,[8] by an emphasis on specific projects, by the relegation of polling to a subsidiary (but still substantial) role within an all-embracing system of techniques, and by a formal meeting of minds between Polish sociologists and their once hostile counterparts in other bloc countries. There have been continuing discussions between Polish and Soviet sociologists, and parallel research projects have been set up in the two countries. As a consequence, the vicious Soviet press attacks of the past on Polish sociological tendencies have been replaced by such benign appraisals as that given by A. G. Kharchev in an article ("Sociological Research in Poland") published in the Soviet periodical *Voprosy Filosofii* (No. 6, 1963). The Leningrad scientist observed with satisfaction that Polish sociologists had already had their "sociological measles," namely, the American questionnaire mania, warning at the same time that "the demarcation between sociology as such and its special aspects of application at times exists in name only."[9]

But while no longer the butt of attacks from elsewhere in the bloc, Polish sociologists have by no means had altogether clear sailing at home. Seemingly disregarding —or perhaps unaware of—their efforts to conform to the party line without sacrificing the scientific integrity of their research, Gomulka, as recently as the "ideological" Party Plenum in July 1963, singled out the sociologists as the target of a sharp assault. These were his words:

. . . Many of our sociologists are uncritically fascinated by bourgeois theories of [social] stratification and are in fact slipping into positions tantamount to a revision of Leninist class theory, or at least are passing this theory over in silence.

On the basis of these [bourgeois] theories, charts of social stratification were drawn up in which the worker and bourgeois classes "dis-

[5] *Polish Perspectives*, No. 1, 1958; *Sondages*, No. 1, 1959.

[6] Results of the poll were reported, *i.a.*, in *Polish Perspectives*, Nos. 3-4 and 7-8, 1958. See also *American Sociological Review*, February 1960; The *New Leader* (New York), June 12, 1961; *Survey*, July 1963; and *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Fall 1964.

[7] See comments by A. Schaff in *Polityka* (Warsaw) April 21, 1962, and J. J. Wiatr, *ibid.*, May 5, 1962; also speech by W. Jarosinski at the 11th Plenum of the party Central Committee, reported in *Trybuna Ludu*, Dec. 19, 1962; and article by A. Werblan in *Nowe Drogi* (Warsaw), July 1963.

[8] These changes included the removal of Professor J. Chalasinski, in November 1939, from the editorship of two publications of the Polish Academy of Sciences, as well as from his post as head of the Academy's Institute of Sociology and Cultural History. His expected appointment as Deputy Scientific Secretary to the Academy was also withheld. These measures were unconcealed reprisals against Chalasinski's critical report on Polish sociology at the Stresa sociological congress. Organizational changes included the closing of the Institute of Sociology and Cultural History, mentioned above.

[9] See also article by A. Schaff in *Kultura*, Dec. 1, 1963.

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appeared," and the role of the leading social force was being taken over by the so-called new middle strata.

. . . As a result, the class struggle was likewise "fading out," to be replaced by "social mobility" conceived as a movement of individuals on the social ladder from the "lower" to the "higher" strata, and vice versa.

. . . It is significant that during the last few years the authors of numerous studies in the field of sociology . . . based their research widely on West European and American sources and literature, ignoring Soviet literature or even the classics of Marxism. . .[10]

Gomulka's broadside gave impetus to a renewed wave of officially-inspired criticism aimed at "unhealthy" tendencies among Polish sociologists. Writing in *Nowe Drogi* (July 1963), one of the party's ideological spokesmen, Andrzej Werblan, again censured the Warsaw University students' poll because "it was based on premises that would facilitate an interpretation of the findings in a non-Marxist and politically harmful spirit. A number of questions in the poll had been devised under the influence of revisionist concepts and political assessments, a factor which favored truth-distorting conclusions as to the attitudes of youth toward socialism, the Polish [Communist] Youth Union, its leadership, etc." In the same article, Werblan took to task Professor Julian Hochfeld, himself a Marxist theoretician, for his alleged "de-ideologization" of science. He also accused Stanislaw Ossowski of an "open revision of Marxist theory" in his book on class structure and social consciousness, and criticized the young and promising sociologist Andrzej Malewski for taking seriously the "absurd theories" of Milton Rokeach.[11]

Despite the politico-ideological vicissitudes of recent years, sociological research in Poland today appears full of vigor. The regime still supports it, within limits, for its value in "social engineering." Industry, too, is hiring more and more sociologists to serve on enterprise staffs: certainly in no other country of the bloc does one find advertisements in the "help wanted" columns of the newspapers offering jobs to sociologists. The growing popularity of sociology has also been indicated by the fact that in recent years the number of applicants for enrollment in the sociology departments of Polish universities has been six to ten times the number that could be admitted.

Already in April 1960, a published survey of more than 400 Polish research units and institutes showed 136 of them engaged in studies of the national culture, social transformation, and a wide range of socio-economic phenomena.[12] *The Polish Sociological Bulletin* (June-December 1961) described the setup and research work of 17 major sociological research centers, in addition to which the armed forces maintain their own center for sociological studies and have established a Sociology Department in their Political Academy at Warsaw. The most important of these research institutions —from the standpoint of the influence it exerts on the choice of government-sponsored projects and appropriations—is the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences. The Institute's Sociology Section is now composed of the following units: Basic Sociological Research Institute, Work Sociology Institute, Urban Sociology Institute, Rural Sociology Institute, Mass Culture Research Laboratory; Social Psychology Laboratory; Laboratory of Sociology of Political Relations; and Work Culture Research Laboratory.

Four professional sociological journals are published: *Przeglad Socjologiczny* (Sociological Review), *Studia Socjologiczne* (Sociological Studies), *Zeszyty Socjologiczno-Polityczne* (Sociological-Political Cahiers), and *Kultura i Spoleczenstwo* (Culture and Society). Twice a year the Polish Sociological Association, which by now has a membership of almost 400 and branches in six cities, issues a bulletin in the English language, while *Przeglad Socjologiczny* regularly carries in each issue a summary and table of contents in English. According to an incomplete bibliographic survey published in the Warsaw daily *Trybuna Ludu* (April 29, 1964), 62 books and 871 dissertations, essays, and articles on sociology were published in Poland during 1958-61, and the volume of publication has increased further in subsequent years. Some of the books are available in English translation, among them Stanislaw Ossowski's *Class Structure in the Social Consciousness* (New York, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963). Of the eight books by Polish exchange scholars and journalists which were published in Poland during 1962 and which dealt with the United States, five were written by sociologists.

According to J. Szczepanski,[13] Polish sociologists at present "do not confine themselves to micro-sociological research but also try to discover the principles underlying the great historical processes affecting the macrostructure of Polish society." These efforts take the form of long-range studies of structural changes in the society brought about by the effects of war, urbanization, industrialization, migration and resettlement, etc., and of changes in cultural patterns resulting from both social changes and the state's role as the sole distributor of culture in "People's" Poland. The range of current so-

[10] *Trybuna Ludu*, July 6, 1963.

[11] Both Ossowski and Malewski have since died, Ossowski in November 1963, and Malewski soon thereafter.

[12] See *Kultura i Spoleczenstwo*, July-September 1960.

[13] *Polish Perspectives*, July 1963.

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ciological projects is enormous, running from problems of method to the popularity of specific products of the consumer goods industry. At the same time, to the outspoken satisfaction of the orthodox Marxists among them. Polish sociologists have for the most part turned away from the exclusive or predominant use of so-called "Western techniques" (questionnaires, interviews, statistics, etc.) in favor of utilizing all available methods of research. Thus, official reports, production statistics, autobiographies, correspondence, etc., play an increasing role in sociological studies, together with area monographs and "participant observation." A distinctive feature of this multilateral approach is the discussion of research projects with the basic party, trade union, and youth organizations in the locality, enterprise, or social group under study.

In conclusion, then, it is clear that Poland's Communist regime, through its financing power and the preponderant influence of its representatives in academic and professional circles, can and does direct research into channels which it deems "socially" important. Furthermore, it also attempts to exert pressure (see previously-quoted speech by Gomulka) against certain tendencies in sociological research which it considers "unhealthy" or detrimental to its political goals. Yet it has not taken any decisive steps either to prevent or to forbid the types of studies and experiments to which it is ideologically opposed. One of the reasons for this unique spirit of "liberalism" is undoubtedly the fact that the subject matter of sociological inquiry which primarily interests the country's rulers—*i.e.*, the transformation of the nation under the impact of recent history and the new social order—would attract the interest of Polish sociologists under any circumstances. It is this identity of interest that keeps Polish sociological research strong and—the various adverse conditions notwithstanding—scientifically healthy.

Czechoslovakia

Edward Taborsky

The establishment of the Czechoslovak Sociological Society in April 1964 opened a new chapter in the life of Czechoslovak sociology, hitherto the most downtrodden of the social sciences in Communist Czechoslovakia. Coming after months of hesitant preparations, and years after the rehabilitation of "Marxist sociology" in neighboring Poland and even in the Soviet Union, this belated readmission to the ranks of recognized sciences has given sociology in Czechoslovakia an official stamp of respectability. For the first time since the consolidation of Communist control in 1948-49, the pursuit of sociological research has become a fully legitimate endeavor.

In conformity with the general pattern in the Soviet bloc during the Stalin era, sociology came under fire in Czechoslovakia soon after the Communists seized power in 1948.[1] Denounced repeatedly as a useless, shopworn pseudo-science, a "subjectivistic deformation," and a harmful product of alien bourgeois ideology, its demise was quick and complete. First to go, for obvious reasons, was the Czechoslovak Institute for Public Opinion Research, which closed down in 1948. Soon thereafter, the same fate befell the Masaryk Sociological Society and its lively *Sociological Review* (*Sociologicka revue*). Finally, despite many efforts and appeals by academic sociologists, sociology was also stricken from university curricula.[2]

While this contemptuous treatment of sociology was dictated primarily by the necessity of pleasing the Soviets, the leader of Czechoslovak communism had reasons of their own for their vindictiveness. The two late democratic presidents of Czechoslovakia, Thomas Masaryk and Eduard Benes, whose tremendous prestige among the Czechoslovak people had to be demolished to pave the way for Communist indoctrination, had both been sociologists. In their times, Czechoslovak sociology was unreservedly Western-oriented. After World War II, the discipline experienced a vigorous revival, but because of its empirical orientation, it was bound to collide with the dogmatic totalitarianism of the Stalin era. Hence, sociology had to be liquidated.

Nor did Czechoslovak sociologists, driven underground and hibernating precariously in various governmental institutions, benefit much by the death of Joseph Stalin. Under the grip of neo-Stalinist dogmatism, which persisted in Czechoslovakia longer than in neighboring Poland and Hungary, sociology as a social science remained in obscurity. Nevertheless, a few sociological or quasi-sociological projects were launched at the time—in a more or less clandestine fashion—within related fields, such as demography, statistics, psychiatry, social morphology, ecology and

[1] See, for instance, *Lidove noviny* (Prague), Dec. 1 and 7, 1948; *Rude pravo* (Prague), Feb. 17, 1949; *Sociologicka revue* (Prague), Vol. XIV, No. 4, 1949, pp. 306 ff.

[2] *Sociologicka revue*, Vol. XV, No. 1-3, p. 135.

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others.[3] For example, a Committee for Cultural and Social Questions in Agriculture, established in 1953, had really been set up to work as "a society for the sociology of the rural village." [4] Shortly thereafter, a project for public opinion research in the field of housing was organized and provided with a permanent staff. In 1955, a systematic study of the ecology of the cities was initiated and some of its results were published; the Research Institute for Psychiatry embarked upon the study of ecological causes of mental illness; and the State Population Commission undertook an empirical enquiry into contemporary family relations, with special attention given to family problems arising from the gainful occupation of married women. In all these projects, as is apparent, the sociological character of the undertaking was disguised, for sociology continued to be on the official index. A prominent Czechoslovak sociologist was quite right when he stated in 1964: "Sociology as a scientific discipline did not exist in our country for fifteen years, and even mentioning it by name evoked suspicion." [5]

The first steps toward the recognition of sociology as a legitimate social science in its own right were taken in 1959-60. In this endeavor Czechoslovak sociologists were particularly encouraged by the example of their Polish colleagues, who had been able to work in relative freedom since October 1956. Thus in 1960, a major collective project of social research, with the open participation of sociologists, was launched at the giant heavy-engineering enterprise CKD Sokolovo in Prague. Its purpose was to inquire into "the elements of communism in the work and social-life relations of the Czechoslovak working class, with particular emphasis on the problem of its new attitude toward work." [6] What is more, sociological studies began appearing in print again, such as J. Kohout's *Inteligence a soudoba burzoasni sociologie* (The Intelligentsia and Contemporary Bourgeois Sociology) and the preliminary report of the above-mentioned CKD-Sokolovo project—*Brigady socialisticke prace a socialni premeny v nasi spolecnosti* (Socialist Labor Brigades and Social Transformations in Our Society).

But the final breakthrough did not come until 1963-64, in conjunction with the powerful surge of antidogmatic trends that swept through the Czechoslovak ruling party and shook the very pinnacle of Communist leadership.[7] All of a sudden, sociology became a live topic of public discussion.[8] "After a period of oppression and vegetation during the time of the personality cult," wrote sociologist Bedrich Weiner, professor in the Department of Marxism-Leninism at the Technical University of Prague, "the time for expansion in the field of sociology has arrived." [9]

In April 1964, as mentioned above, after some four years of protracted negotiations, the party leadership finally allowed the establishment of the Czechoslovak Sociological Society, attached to the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences; a Slovak Sociological Society was organized simultaneously at Bratislava. Very shortly thereafter, branches of the Society were set up in Brno, Olomouc and Ostrava, and by June 1964, the membership totaled 507 members from the Czech provinces and 226 from Slovakia.[10] The Society acquired a degree of international recognition when a congress of Soviet-bloc sociologists, held in June in Central Bohemia, selected it to serve as a "coordinating and scientific center of sociological research in the socialist countries." [11] Preparations had already been started for the publication of a sociological journal, and the Society announced that it was planning a series of lectures, seminars, discussions and exhibitions in various Czechoslovak cities and even intended to award prizes for sociological work.

At the same time, Czechoslovak sociologists began pressing for the reintroduction of sociology in university curricula, for the refurbishing of sociological libraries, for access to foreign, in particular Western, sociological literature, for participation in international sociological conferences, and for publication in Czech and Slovak of the classical as well as contemporary texts in Western sociology, including works by Durkheim, Comte, Worms, Weber, Pareto, Simmel, G. Mead, Cooley, Tonies, Parsons, Merton, Homans, Lazarsfeld, König and Gurvitch.[12] Departments of sociology, in fact, are already being established at Czechoslovakia's universities, and sociological centers have appeared in various state research institutions, governmental agencies and some major industrial enterprises. Even the Institute of Social Sciences at the Higher Party School is sched-

[3] The data contained in this paragraph derive mainly from a published interview with three Czechoslovak sociologists who, according to the interviewing editor, "occupied themselves with empirical sociology at a time when they could expect trouble rather than glory, if not something worse." See "Sociolog v praxi" (The Sociologist in Practice), *Kulturni tvorba* (Prague), March 12, 1964.

[4] *Ibid.*

[5] *Ibid.*

[6] Miroslav Klivar, "Sociologie ma ostre oci," *Vecerni Praha*, April 18, 1964.

[7] See, for instance, Edward Taborsky, "Czechoslovakia: Out of Stalinism?" *Problems of Communism*, Vol. XIII, No. 3, 1964, pp. 5 ff.

[8] For a few samples see *Rude pravo*, Jan. 18, April 11 and June 2, 1964; *Literarni noviny* (Prague), June 13, 1964; *Kulturni tvorba*, Jan. 1, March 12 and June 25, 1964; *Pravda* (Bratislava), Jan. 29 and April 22, 1964; *Zemedelske noviny* (Prague), Jan. 11 and Feb. 19, 1964; and *Zivot strany* (Prague), No. 14, July 1964.

[9] *Literarni noviny*, Jan. 11, 1964.

[10] *Osvetova prace* (Prague), June 1964

[11] *East Europe* (New York), Vol. 8, 1964, p. 32.

[12] *Kulturni tvorba*, March 12, 1964.

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uled to introduce courses in sociology this year.[13]

In spite of the recent progress in restoring sociology to its legitimate role in Czechoslovakia, much of the old suspicion and hostility toward the discipline still lingers on.[14] In order to overcome such negative attitudes and to persuade the skeptics within the party of the practical and theoretical usefulness of their science, Czechoslovak sociologists take great pains to define the purposes of sociology along lines compatible with both Marxism-Leninism and the party's monopoly of power. In a major article on "The Significance of Sociology for the Practical Work of the Party," published in July 1964 in the Communist Party's journal *Zivot strany*, J. Klofac, Chairman of the Czechoslovak Sociological Society, based his case on the imperative necessity to provide the party with a thorough and accurate analysis of the extremely complex social phenomena of modern industrial society. Only thus, he asserted, could the party reach the best possible decisions and solve adequately the problems brought about by ever-changing social relations. A study of these problems, Klofac continued, is much more important under socialism than under capitalism because the ruling parties of socialist countries are the leading and directing force of society, responsible for all that happens "not only to the peoples of their own countries, but also to nations that are not yet under socialism." Defining sociology as a theoretical-empirical science that explores the interdependence of social phenomena and thus forms "the basis for the formulation of general societal laws," the author insisted that sociology is "an inseparable part of Marxism-Leninism" and an "integral component of the party's rich life and, in particular, its process of cognition." [15]

Even the case of public opinion polls, a rather delicate issue in the Communist-controlled countries, has been cleverly tied to doctrine. Referring to the well-known Marxist-Leninist tenet of the ever-growing importance of public opinion as society advances toward communism, D. Slejska, Scientific Secretary of the Czechoslovak Sociological Society, has made a daring bid for the introduction of Gallup-type public opinion polls, coupled with an even bolder demand that public opinion thus measured play a major role in the direction of society.[16]

Interestingly enough some of the defenders of sociology have also resorted to arguments which are either non-Marxist or at any rate do not seem to conform to the official interpretation of Communist doctrine. Thus in his article mentioned above, Mr. Klofac sought to justify the increased need for sociological research by dwelling upon the desirability of exploring the expanding role of the "subjective factor" in socialism, which he described as "not something merely abstract" but a "conscious activity of concrete people, social classes and strata resulting from their attitudes, interests and goals." Similarly, several other sociologists have argued the case for their discipline by stressing the inadequacy of explaining human behavior by "narrow" economic considerations and the limitations of purely material incentives which, though important, "cannot by far solve everything." [17] The same writers also criticised the neglect of "man as the active creator of himself as a social subject" and the "dogma that revolutionary changes of fundamental social conditions (such as the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat) will automatically solve even the more subtle social and psychological problems," a dogma which in the past had led to the denunciation of sociology as a "bourgeois pseudo-science." [18] The sociologist M. Jodl has stressed instead the "humanitarian" function of sociology which "enables the governing organs as well as all members of society to see themselves as social beings, to find their bearings in the development of society, to determine their own course of action accordingly, and thus to become freer through knowledge." Although dutifully rejecting "bourgeois" sociology as helping to maintain capitalism, he concedes that Western sociology "is capable of a scientific cognizance of certain phenomena and processes," and that it is possible and even desirable to adopt some of its methods and techniques.[19]

Since the paramount duty of Marxist sociology is to serve socialism and the construction of Communist society, the sociologists' tasks and topics are selected accordingly. As stated by Mr. Klofac in his article in *Zivot strany*, Czechoslovak sociologists are directed to "concern themselves above all with the problems which the party must solve as a prerequisite to the development of our socialist society" and to give the party "a faithful picture of the situation in the most delicate and most pressing spheres of our contemporary life." Mentioned by the same author as most important among such problems and topics are: changes in the social structure brought about

[13] J. Klofac, "Vyznam sociologie pro praktickou cinnost strany" (The Importance of Sociology for the Practical Work of the Party), *Zivot strany*, No. 14, July 1964.

[14] See statements by B. Weiner and M. Jodl in *Literarni noviny*, Jan. 11, 1964, and J. Klofac's speech at the constituent meeting of the Slovak Sociological Society, *Pravda* (Bratislava), April 22, 1964.

[15] See also similar discussions in "Sociolog v praxi," *loc. cit.*, and *Prace* (Prague), Oct. 2, 1964.

[16] Jak zkoumat verejne mineni" (How to Explore Public Opinion?) an interview in *Zemedelske noviny*, Feb. 19, 1964.

[17] "Sociolog v praxi," *loc. cit.*

[18] *Ibid.*

[19] An interview with M. Jodl in *Zemedelske noviny*, Jan. 11, 1964.

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by new production relations, the division of labor and developments in technology; the growing participation of broad masses in the direction of society; problems resulting from changes in the sphere of consciousness, in ways of life and viewpoints and in the entire domain of ideology; problems pertaining to social groups (family, youth, etc.) and human relations at work and in society in general; the relationship between individual and collective interests; and various negative social phenomena, such as hooliganism, criminality and loafing. In view of the perennial Communist difficulties in agriculture, it is not surprising that the rural village and the changing social relations in agricultural establishments are also stressed as worthy subjects for sociological inquiry.[20] Even the use of leisure, a social problem that has been paid a good deal of attention in recent Western writings but hitherto little if any in Marxist literature, is being urged by some Czechoslovak sociologists for scientific exploration.[21]

Taken together, these tasks amount to quite an ambitious program, and since sociological research in its own right was resumed in Czechoslovakia only recently, actual published results are meager so far. However, with the growing number of new projects reportedly in progress, results should before long be forthcoming in a steady stream.

As for research equipment and techniques, these leave much to be desired, as Czechoslovak sociologists readily admit. "Our highest technological equipment is the typewriter and the camera," a prominent Czechoslovak sociologist complained last year. And having mentioned with a touch of envy how the sociological section of the Polish Academy of Sciences worked with complex mathematical machines, he added: "We do not even have the most elementary manual on the utilization of mathematics in sociology." [22] Another sociologist lamented: "What is lacking is the continuity of experience, trained experts—simply everything except the good will of people, who want to begin." [23] A particular weakness of Czechoslovak sociologists is the lack of training in sociometrics.[24] As a result, the main techniques used so far have been questionnaires, interviews, direct observation, and an occasional and rather bashful use of limited opinion polls.

Renascent Czechoslovak sociology is thus beset by a number of vexing problems: inadequate training and experience; unfamiliarity with up-to-date methodology; scarcity of modern sociological literature; paucity of contacts with Western sociologists; lack of adequate equipment; and lingering official distrust inherited from the Stalinist era. But the most serious difficulty that stands in the way of a truly free and effective development of sociology in Czechoslovakia is the ever present danger of collision with Communist doctrine and party interests.

As to the danger of conflict with ideology, there is now cause for some optimism. It is true, as noted above, that the regime has declared sociology to be a part of Marxist-Leninist teaching and a scientific discipline that is to serve the party in the solution of important social problems. "Marxist" sociology, furthermore, is viewed as the party's ally in the struggle against "bourgeois ideologies"; [25] "party-mindedness" is to guide its work;[26] and the "method of historical materialism" is singled out as being "without any doubt" its fundamental method—even though, it is conceded, the discipline should also be "enriched by the results of social research." [27]

While all this would appear to put sociology into a tight ideological harness, there are countervailing forces at work in the country that support development toward a measure of free inquiry. There is, above all, the new intellectual climate which, after belated destalin-

From Optimistic to Pessimistic Subjectivism

Most studies on the problems of our society during the period of the personality cult were of an apodictical and postulative nature and employed deductive methods. The criticism of these works has produced a real hunger for facts and stimulated re-examination of social phenomena with all the contradictions involved in them. Unjustified optimistic subjectivism of the works from that period is now often replaced by pessimistic subjectivism. We must not, however, belittle yet another similar tendency, namely the inclination to switch from apriorism to vulgar empiricism. We can avoid this danger only if in our sociological research we shall consistently employ the principles of Marxist philosophy and revise the methods used by empirical sociology.

—Dr. J. Pasiak, Head of the Department for Sociological Research, Philosophical Institute, Slovak Academy of Sciences; quoted in Otázky Marxistickej filozofie (Bratislava), Jan.-Feb. 1964

[20] "Sociolog v praxi," *loc. cit.*
[21] Blanka Filipcova, "Volny cas a burzoasni sociologie," (Leisure and Bourgeois Sociology), *Kulturni tvorba*, June 25, 1964.
[22] Jan Tauber of the Research Institute of Agricultural Economics in "Sociolog v praxi," *loc. cit.*
[23] Blanka Filipcova, *op. cit.*
[24] "Sociolog v praxi," *loc. cit.*
[25] B. Weiner's statement in *Literarni noviny*, Jan. 11, 1964.
[26] M. Jodl's statement in *Literarni noviny*, Jan. 11, 1964.
[27] Jan Tauber in "Sociolog v praxi," *loc. cit.*

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ization, has been asserting itself in Czechoslovakia during the past two years, and which, for the first time since the Communist take-over in 1948, offers prospects for a measure of free scholarly research. This development is importantly supported by the critical economic difficulties the country now faces and by the growing doubt, even among high-ranking party members, about the validity of a number of fundamental tenets of the Communist doctrine as well as the wisdom and ability of the party leadership. As a result, the party leaders' respect and need for knowledge, for expertise, for the straight facts of life, have increased precipitously. And so, confronted by serious problems demanding solutions, the regime now feels inclined to let experts go to work without too much doctrinal interference. Here, if anywhere, lies the promise of a limited degree of academic freedom.

The second caveat, involving the danger of a clash between sociological research and immediate party interests, is more serious, for while the party may easily enough sacrifice ideological principle in exchange for technical services from the sociological community, it will certainly not tolerate anything that might bring into question its monopoly of power in the state. It will therefore tolerate, or even encourage, sociological research only to the extent that it finds such work useful, or at least politically harmless.

To keep the sociologists working within these limits should not prove too difficult—given the party's control of financial and technical resources and its political hold on the administrations of the educational and research institutions. How much scope this will leave for the reborn Czechoslovak sociology remains to be seen, but there should be room for a beginning. What is more, the findings of the social scientists may confront the party with new or forgotten facts of life, and thus temper its policies and improve the lot of the people.

East Germany

Peter C. Ludz

The rediscovery of sociology has come very late in the German Democratic Republic compared with other East-bloc countries.[1] At first glance this appears to be quite astonishing; for there is an important sociological tradition in Germany rooted in Marxism. Thus, Karl Marx and Lorenz von Stein were two of the founders of German sociology, and the works of Georg Simmel, Max Weber and Ferdinand Tönnies, all influenced by Marxist thought to a large degree, nowadays are sociological classics of world-wide reputation.

This tradition was long neglected by the East German Communist ideologists—even while, in 1958, a Sociological Society was being founded in the USSR; while, in 1962 and 1963, Ilichev was delivering his speeches on the role of sociopolitical sciences in the stage of the the "comprehensive construction of communism"; and while in Poland sociological publications were increasing from year to year, with some of them reaching and even surpassing Western scientific standards. The tardiness of the East German Communist party (SED) in the development of sociology, as well as its past inability to utilize Germany's own Marxist sociological tradition, are just one more sign of its lack of initiative, stemming from extreme dependence on the CPSU.

Only since the 6th Party Congress (Jan. 15 to 21, 1963) and more pronouncedly since the 5th and 7th Plenum (Feb. 3-7 and Dec. 2-5, 1964)[2] has the SED embarked upon a program of sociological research. Running parallel with the Seven-Year Plan (beginning in 1964), this program has been assigned great importance by the SED ideologists. The party leaders in the GDR have perceived that it is impossible for them to supervise efficiently, much less to guide and control, the highly complex and detailed processes of industrial society through the traditional methods of Communist party rule—that is, agitation and propaganda (*agitprop*), tight organization, indoctrination, and terror. In the report of the SED Central Committee to the 6th Party Congress, the social scientists were assigned the task of exploring the "laws of the comprehensive construction of so-

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[1] This is a summarized version of the author's fully documented study, "Soziologie und Empirische Sozialforschung in der DDR," which appeared in *Studien und Materialien zur Soziologie der DDR*, edited by Peter Christian Ludz, *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie* (Köln-Opladen) Special Issue No. 8, 1964, pp. 327-418.

[2] *Protokoll der Verhandlungen des VI. Parteitages der SED*, 4 volumes, Dietz Verlag, East Berlin, 1963. Also Horst Taubert, "Soziologen erforschen gemeinsames Thema," *Neues Deutschland* (East Berlin), April 8, 1964, p. 4.

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cialism."[3] Further, Kurt Hager, a member of the SED Politburo and head of the Politburo's Ideological Commission, proclaimed the general guidelines for establishing a Marxist sociology in the GDR. In the foreground are so-called empirical mass studies (*"Massenuntersuchungen"*) especially concerned with personnel in state economic enterprise (VEB and VVB) and with youth problems:

> *Sociological mass research . . . provides an important contribution to the leading and guiding role of our party and state. At the present stage of the comprehensive construction of socialism, sociological research is centered on those problems and processes which bring with them scientific and technological progress in industry and agriculture, improving the life and development of the various social groups and strata.*[4]

The significance assigned to the social sciences by the SED Politburo is underscored by a recent decree promising the "elaboration of a program for sociological research up to 1970" and by present party efforts to establish a centralized sociological research apparatus.

The proclamation of general guidelines has gone hand in hand with the institutionalization of sociological research. The most important figure in the Politburo in this area is Kurt Hager. Since the ouster of Alfred Kurella, he has directed the SED's ideological work, which since the 6th Party Congress has been channeled through the Ideological Commission. What the party leaders are attempting to do is to set up a party research establishment and thereby to control individual researchers, who for some years have quietly done work in such areas as pedagogics and psychology without relying on the SED.

One of the expert "brain trusts" of the SED Politburo, the Institute for Socio-Political Sciences (Institut für Gesellschaftswissenschaften), has been charged with the detailed development of the sociological research program. At the moment it is responsible for sociological research as well as for research in the field of the "history of the German workers' movement." Since the 5th Plenum a "Sociological Research Division" (Abteilung Soziologische Forschung) has been established in the Institute. Its present head is Horst Taubert. Its main tasks are to elaborate the guidelines drawn up by Kurt Hager and to develop a detailed program for sociological teaching and research.

This detailed program can be roughly sumarized as follows: First of all, the SED leaders and their experts intend to establish sociology as a teaching discipline alongside the fields of historical and dialectical materialism and political economy. Sociology is to be introduced in all universities and technical colleges as well as in the party and trade-union schools. The ties binding these educational establishments to the party leadership are thus to be strengthened. At the present time, however, there are only courses and seminars at the universities in East Berlin, Jena, Leipzig, and Greifswald. Besides establishing sociology as a teaching discipline, the program envisages the development of sociological research with a clear stress on empirical research. From empirical findings in the fields of industrial sociology and the sociology of youth, the party leaders expect information which will enable them to increase labor productivity and to open up new possibilities for the training, in particular, of unskilled workers (especially women) for higher positions.

In designing the program of research and in organizing the analysis of sociological problems in industry and agriculture, the Ideological Commission and the Institute for Socio-Political Sciences, as agencies of the party, closely cooperate with the corresponding state agencies, the Research Council (Forschungsrat) and the State Secretariat for High and Specialized Education (Staatssekretariat für das Hoch- und Fachschulwesen). This cooperation is supplemented by advisory "umbrella" institutions, most notably the German Academy of Sciences at East Berlin (Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin), especially its Philosophical and Economic Divisions, and the Union of Philosophical Institutions of the GDR (Vereinigung der Philosophischen Institutionen der DDR). This latter organization, under Hermann Scheler, is to be built up as the top agency for the discussion of socio-political problems. Likewise it is the "national representative body of sociologists in the GDR." As such it became, in 1963, a member of the International Sociological Association (ISA).

The institutions just named transmit the decrees of the Politburo and a detailed program of scientific teaching and research to those research organizations to which the actual university institutes in the faculties of law, arts and economic sciences are subordinated. Such organizations are the Protectorate for Socio-Political Sciences (Prorektorat für Gesellschaftswissenschaften) at Humboldt University (East Berlin) and the Research Working Group "Sociology and Society" (Forschungsgemeinschaft "Soziologie und Gesellschaft"), established at the Institute for Political Economy. The main function of these two agencies at the middle-range institutional level is to distribute specific tasks of research.

Thus far the working of the centers for guidance and coordination of sociological research has been far from perfect; their func-

[3] *Protokoll der Verhandlungen des VI. Parteitages der SED*, (supra) Vol. IV, p. 196.

[4] Kurt Hager, "Probleme und Aufgaben der Gesellschaftswissenschaften nach dem 5. Plenum des ZK," *Einheit* (East Berlin), Vol. XIX, No. 4, 1964, p. 60.

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tioning, however, is basically assured by personal ties between the members of the decisive agencies. The key positions are held by party sociologists, such as Hermann Scheler and Kurt Braunreuther, who are members of the decision-making centers as well as heads of the regional university institutes.

In order to serve the SED's political and ideological aims, empirical social research has to fulfill four functions:

1) The function of keeping the party leadership informed—an obviously necessary task, given the requirements of a highly complex and technically developed social system.

2) The function of efficiently planning, guiding, and controlling the economy and society under conditions of a technical revolution.

3) The function of improving the organization of work in the national economy, with special regard to the labor shortage.

4) The function of preserving ideological purity in a period of ideological revisionism and political polycentrism. This function is of deep and vital relevance for the SED party leaders, especially in the light of the strong resentment against the system and its leaders on the part of vast segments of East Germany's population.

As might be expected, the "orthodox" party ideologists are attempting to reconcile the rediscovered principles of sociology with the classical ideological axioms of historical and dialectical materialism dating from Marx, Engels, and Lenin. They are well aware of the danger of revisionism that is created by the acceptance of sociology in general and of non-normative, empirical and behaviorist sociology in particular. For many decades, of course, orthodox Marxists regarded sociology as a "bourgeois science" whose only function was to support "capitalist society" and to combat "socialism." So viewed, sociology was obviously incompatible with the Marxist-Leninist principle of *partiinoist* (party-mindedness), and it could hardly fit into the structure of dialectical and historical materialism.

Today, however, the party sociologists—among them Hermann Scheler (Humboldt University), Robert Schulz (University of Leipzig), and numerous members of the Institute for Socio-Political Sciences—are identifying historical materialism with sociology:

As the science of the general laws of society, historical materialism is philosophy of history as well as sociology. It is the general theory and the general method for analyzing society and its history.[5]

This conception of sociology is heard not only in the GDR but often in the Soviet Union. Sociology, in short, is only another word for historical materialism. Accordingly, every attempt at differentiating the social sciences, for example into theoretical sociology, empirical sociology, etc., is rejected by the party ideologists. For, they claim, such a differentiation might endanger the postulated unity of the ideological dogma. The main task of this orthodox Marxist sociology is viewed as the "active transformation of society" rather than the analysis of social structure. The classics, particularly the works of Karl Marx, are also interpreted in this sense. Recently a questionnaire worked out by Marx for research in workers' problems was characterized as "the first empirical questionnaire in the history of Marxism." [6]

A second group of sociologists might be called the "reformer group." Under the guidance of Kurt Braunreuther (Humboldt University), it includes economists, lawyers, doctors and historians. The conception of sociology advanced by this group is first of all analytic. Braunreuther has formulated the approach as follows:

Marxist sociology is engaged in the investigation of the lawfulness of various social situations and behavior patterns of men under socially relevant conditions in the process of development.[7]

This orientation of the reformers goes hand in hand with a less abstract and more empirical conception of sociology. Their wish is not to act primarily as agitators and propagandists, but rather to watch the social process. The empirical research tasks in industry and agriculture laid down by the party leadership are to be carried out through the establishment of an industrial sociology and a sociology of youth. In addition, problems of the sociology of the family are receiving more and more attention.

Accordingly, Braunreuther pleads for a differentiation of sociology into one general theoretical sociology and several special sociologies. These latter embrace a great variety of academic fields: law, social psychology, medicine, literature, art, and music.[8] By demanding such a differentiation, Braunreuther stands in opposition to the party's ideological tenets. He has emancipated himself in large measure from the classical axioms of dialectical and historical materialism. Only his universalistic approach to the social sciences still calls to mind the Marxist principles to which Braunreuther genuinely adheres.

While true to the Marxist methodological tradition of exploring

[5] Robert Schulz, in: *Die deutsche Philosophie von 1917 bis 1945* (*Unser Weltbild*, 18), VEB Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften, East Berlin, 1961, p. 84.

[6] Cf. Volkmar Stanke, "99 Fragen und eine Antwort. Wie Karl Marx soziologische Forschungsmethoden anwandte," *Neues Deutschland*, May 6, 1964, p. 4.

[7] Kurt Braunreuther, "Die marxistische Soziologie und die Pädagogen," *Pädagogik* (East Berlin), No. 2, Vol. XIX, 1964, p. 103.

[8] Cf. Kurt Braunreuther, "Marxistische Soziologie als Gegenwartsaufgabe," *Die Wirtschaft* (East Berlin), May 11, 1964, p. 19.

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the totality of society with a few deduced axioms, the reformers nevertheless list a good many rather indiscriminately selected empirical techniques. Among them are interviews, observations, and the analysis of documents (especially workers' journals insofar as industrial sociology is concerned).

The adoption of methods and techniques of empirical sociology which have been neglected by Marxist ideologists for decades goes forward at a breathtaking tempo. Biting criticism of bourgeois sociology as practiced in West Germany and the United States is accompanied by an often naive and hasty appropriation of its methods. This is hardly surprising when one considers the functions of criticism in Marxism-Leninism. Bound closely to the function of orientation is the function of preserving ideological purity. The hastily acquired sociological orientation of the SED party leadership results in frequent misunderstandings and a lack of differentiation both in criticism and in the adoption and selection of methods of Western empirical sociology.

In taking over empirical techniques from Western sociology, the reformer group is confronted with the problem of fact-value distinction, one of the most discussed subjects in contemporary social science. In fact, the reformer group has been increasingly compelled to recognize the dichotomy between factual statements and value judgments. Of course, an unambiguous acknowledgement of this postulate is opposed to the main principle of Marxism-Leninism: the field worker is expected not only to "register" and analyze the social processes, but also to "participate actively in revolutionary social practice." [9] Consequently, the function of Marxist sociology is still therapy rather than diagnosis.

[9] Heinz Kallabis, "Zur philosophischen und gesellschaftswissenschaftlichen Forschung," *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie* (East Berlin), Vol. X, No. 6, 1962, p. 724.

The contemporary sociology of youth in the GDR is able to refer to previously existing data in the fields of pedagogics and psychology. These were gathered from thousands of pupils and students beginning in 1950, and in greater number since 1958.[10] This fact can be explained by the closeness of psychology to the natural sciences, which, in the GDR, have been much less influenced by ideological axioms than the social sciences. Thus far, however, only the program of a genuine Marxist sociology of youth has been formulated. This program is pragmatic but it is also bound to the Marxist-Leninist principle of *partiinost:* the sociology of youth is supposed "to assist the rising generation in recognizing the front lines in the struggle between the new world and the old." [11]

Among the methods employed by sociologists and psychologists in studying youth, the open-ended questionnaire gets much emphasis. Other methods include: study of school compositions, observation, content analysis, and the conduct of experiments. Several conclusions can be drawn: First, the use of methods which are easy to administer shows that Marxist sociologists have not until now been able to master more complicated techniques, such as factor analysis and scaling. Further, the wide use of the questionnaire makes possible a more detailed control of the interviewees, since the questionnaire can be filled out in group situations. Finally, Marxist sociologists obviously regard data thus fixed in writing as more readily amenable to quantification.

The youth sociologists and psychologists have been mainly concerned with problems of occupational choice, the attitude of pupils toward "productive labor days" during schooltime (Unterrichtstag in der Produktion), leisure time, and the general ideological orientation of young people. In such investigations it has become clear that the policy of assigning students to productive labor during school-time has not functioned at all as intended, insofar as it was to be an instrument for guiding the selection of occupations. The personal interests of young people have proven to be hardly congruent with the vocational planning guidelines of the State Planning Commission. This is particularly clear in the professions of agriculture and forestry: the young people are leaving the countryside.

Empirical studies comparing the desires for travel and "experience" (*Reise und Erlebniswünsche*) with the desire for peace (*Friedenswünsche*) among young people show that the former predominate. Moreover, a high proportion of the youngsters studied are primarily career-oriented, choosing their parents and teachers as their models and neglecting political leaders.

To an overwhelming degree, youth in the GDR is, according to the findings of the empirical researchers, not politically but vocationally oriented; it has found its own way of adapting to the GDR's existing system of society.

Besides the sociology of youth, industrial sociology is playing an increasingly important role. This field is being developed especially by the reformer group under Kurt Braunreuther. Their intention is to institutionalize the study of industrial sociology at the universities in order to broaden the training of managers in line with the "new economic system of planning and guiding the national economy" (Neues ökonomisches System der Planung und Leitung der Volkswirtschaft). Following the example of the USSR, some of the big industrial firms of East Berlin have established so-called "sociological laboratories"

[10] See documentation in the author's above-mentioned article.

[11] Bernd Bittighöfer, "Entwicklungsprobleme der Jugend als Gegenstand wissenschaftlicher Forschung," *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie* (East Berlin) Vol. X, No. 7, 1962, p. 862.

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where scientists, economic functionaires and workers jointly undertake research projects. These include studies of formal and informal groups, group interests and modes of behavior of workers and white-collar employees, and so on. The extent to which formal and informal groups coincide is viewed as a measure of the achievement of the ideological goal of establishing "socialist collectives" in the factories. Further subjects of empirical research are the changing occupational structure and the high turnover among personnel.

In order to facilitate its research, industrial sociology has allied itself with social psychology. Consequently it is not surprising that social psychology too, after several years of being under a cloud, has entered a boom period.[12] The most notable categories binding industrial sociology to social psychology are "group" and "behavior." The application of these categories constitutes a significant departure from the traditional Marxist emphasis on class; officially they are characterized as "the elementary categories of Marxist sociology in general." [13]

It is obvious that industrial sociology in the GDR is still at the very beginning of its development. As far as actual empirical research is concerned, interviews often are bound to the Marxist-Leninist principle of *partiinost* and obscurely formulated. Scientific methods are confused with Leninist elements of agitation and propaganda.

To sum up, only since the beginning of 1963 has East Germany been developing its own sociology. Presently, however, the SED is accelerating the establishment of sociological research. The SED's primary interest in this effort is to improve techniques of information and control. These pragmatic aims are pursued with comparatively little concern over their consequences for the unity of the "scientific Weltanschauung" of Marxism-Leninism.

This latter fact permits some conclusions: On the one hand, the SED party leadership has accepted the reality of revisionism and polycentrism in the Communist world system. On the other hand, the present economic situation in general and the complexity of a highly industrialized system in particular have made necessary new methods of planning, leadership, and social control. These are also demanded by the behavior of the working people, whose marked preference for Western standards of life has been especially evident since 1961. In this context it may be asserted that terror as the characteristic instrument of totalitarian social control is giving way to what may be designated as authoritarian social control. A decisive instrument of this form of control is empirical sociological research.

[12] Cf. Hans Hiebsch and Manfred Vorwerg, "Versuch einer Systematisierung des sozialpsychologischen Forschungsbereichs," *ibid*, 1964, pp. 540-58; "Über Gegenstand, Aufgaben und Methoden der marxistischen Sozialpsychologie," *ibid*. Vol. XI, No. 5, 1963, pp. 577-94.

[13] Kurt Braunreuther and Helmut Steiner, "Soziologische Probleme der sozialistischen Wirtschaftsführung," *Wirtschaftswissenschaft* (East Berlin), 1964, Vol. XII, No. 10, p. 1608.

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HISTORY IN PERSPECTIVE

Eugene Varga: A Reluctant Conformist

By Laszlo M. Tikos

In 1910 Dr. Eugene Jenö Varga, then a little-known Hungarian economist and historian 31 years of age, published a long article attacking the historical and philosophical systems fashionable at the time and avowing that only Marxist theory seemed to offer a reasonable interpretation of mankind's history. In the half century since, up to his death last October, Varga produced some 700 additional articles and books, yet his topic seldom changed. Neither did his approach to economic problems, which was rooted in practical everyday politics. From his student days onward (he graduated from the University of Budapest in 1906), Varga was in the service of political parties which accepted the Marxist interpretation of history —first the Social Democratic Party and then the Communist Party. Most of his works were commissioned by these parties, or by organizations affiliated with them such as the Comintern, or by the USSR Academy of Sciences.

Mr. Tikos fled his native Hungary in the wake of the 1956 revolution. Now teaching Russian at the University of Massachusetts (Amherst), he will soon publish a full-length study on the late E. S. Varga.

Since the focus of Marxist interest was the revolution that was to abolish the capitalist society, the bulk of Varga's writing necessarily dealt with this topic. He started to devote serious attention to the problem in the summer of 1912, when unsuccessful attempts of the Social Democratic Party to obtain some power in the Hungarian parliamentary system through an electoral reform convinced him that only the abolishment of the whole capitalist system could bring about a change in the political life of his country.

An important element of his theory of revolution evolved during World War I, when he became preoccupied with the effect of war efforts on economic life. Varga observed that the anarchy of capitalist production and distribution was greatly curbed through state interference in the economic sphere. He concluded that a socialist economy should be structured along the lines of a war economy, although the aim of production would be different. If the capitalist state could organize centralized production, why shouldn't a socialist system be able to do the same?

Further aspects of his theory of revolution were shaped in the Hungarian Communist revolution of 1919. As Minister of Economy in the short-lived revolutionary dictatorship, he had a brief opportunity to apply in practice his ideas concerning the organization of a socialist economy. He was personally responsible for most of the economic measures of the dictatorship, including the nationalization of the banks, industry, food, and agriculture; the issuance of new paper money; and the introduction of a labor obligation for every "class" of society.

When the dictatorship was overthrown after 100 days, Varga, together with Bela Kun and others among the revolutionary leaders,

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boarded a train for Austria. Here, in exile, he took stock of his experiences, writing one of his most significant works: *Die wirtschaftspolitischen Probleme der Proletardiktatur* (Problems of the Economic Policy of the Proletarian Dictatorship).[1] This analysis of results and failures added another component to his theory of revolution: the necessity of creating a proletarian dictatorship as a transitional stage between capitalism and communism. Such a period would necessarily endure, he estimated, for "about one generation." But he was flexible enough to add that the forms of a proletarian dictatorship might be different under different conditions, and even expressed the hope that "terror would not be necessary everywhere." Discussing the "difficulties" of the Hungarian dictatorship in overcoming its economic problems, he stressed his disappointment in human nature and in the self-serving behavior of the people after the revolution. He complained, for example, that the workers' commissars put in charge of production in nationalized factories concentrated their efforts on keeping themselves, their relatives, and their friends in jobs not requiring physical labor; that the trade unions "kept up their old requirements against the new regime"—*i.e.*, demanded less work and more wages; and that the peasants showed their dissatisfaction with state requisitions by reducing production and returning to a primitive self-supplying economy.

Varga was right in claiming that the Hungarian economy, after four years of war and a revolution, had been in very bad shape when the revolutionary dictatorship was installed, but he was frank enough to admit that the economic measures of the dictatorship had only contributed to a further deterioration of production and the standard of living. Subsequently, his theory of revolution reflected his conviction that such a deterioration both in production and the living standard was unavoidable in the economic reorganization that must follow a Communist seizure of power.

This phenomenon constituted a very serious problem in both ideological and practical terms. It was Varga's belief—in deviation from Marx, but in accord with Lenin (though Varga's conclusions were reached independently[2])—that a proletarian revolution takes place not because of an "objective iron law of history," but because of a subjective factor: the will of the proletariat to fight for a better life. Since the proletariat cannot improve its lot under capitalist conditions, it will overthrow the capitalist society in the hope of an immediate improvement in living conditions. This expectation, however, is doomed to frustration, for the reasons mentioned. Thus, it is possible that the proletariat, disappointed with the meager economic achievements of the dictatorship, will turn its back on the Communists and redirect its hopes for better living conditions toward the bourgeoisie, "as happened in Hungary."[3]

To avow the inevitability of postrevolutionary economic decline was, Varga acknowledged, bad propaganda for the proletarian revolution, especially in view of the 1922 famine in Russia.[4] For tactical reasons he had to play this proposition down, but as an economist he was convinced of the correctness of his view. And indeed, the history of economic development in every Communist country from the Soviet Union through Cuba, the Soviet emphasis on the necessity of "catching up and surpassing," the announcement of "goulash" communism by Khrushchev, all testify to the correctness of Varga's observations.

Besides his emphasis on the "subjective" human factor over the "objective" economic factors causing revolution, Varga also revised another aspect of Marx's theory of revolution. In a view similar to Lenin's but again arrived at independently, he asserted that the most opportune time for revolution was during or after international wars, when the authority of the capitalist state was weakened through general disorganization.[5] This revision of Marx, just as the first, had crucial implications. If war was a good time for revolution, then the proletariat had nothing to fear from a new war (this is the Chinese Communists' idea today, and in this respect they are now closer to Lenin than their comrades in Moscow). Varga also hinted at the probability that certain areas of the world not involved in the war would not have revolutions, by implication contradicting the Marxist thesis of simultaneous world revolution. After 1920, in the course of further studies of the world economy undertaken for the Comintern, Varga concluded that a stabilization of the world capitalistic system was in progress and that Soviet Russia would remain the sole, isolated land of proletarian dictatorship "until the next crisis."[6] Yet the Communist Party

[1] Vienna, 1920; 2nd edition published in *Bibliothek der Kommunistischen Internationale*, No. 8, Hamburg, 1921.

[2] In 1956 Varga stated that he had not met Lenin until 1920 and had not read his works at the time he formulated his theory of revolution. See foreword to 2nd edition of his *A magyar kartellek* (The Hungarian Cartels), Budapest, Szikra, 1956, p. 5. (This work was first published in 1912.)

[3] Varga, *Die wirtschaftspolitischen Probleme . . .*, 2nd edition, p. 4.

[4] See Varga's comments at the Fourth Comintern Congress, held at Moscow in November 1922: *Protokoll des IV. Kongresses der Kommunistischen Internationale*, Hamburg, 1923, pp. 53-69.

[5] Varga, *Die Krise der kapitalistischen Weltwirtschaft* (The Crisis of the Capitalistic World Economy), Hamburg, 1921.

[6] Varga, "Die wirtschaftlichen Grundlagen des Imperialismus der Vereinigten Staaten von Nordamerika" (The Economic Foundations of Imperialism of the United States of North America), *Die Kommunistische Internationale*, No. 17, 1921.

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could not wait idly for the "next crisis"; and so, to console his comrades in the Comintern, Varga in 1924 "discovered" a new phenomenon in the development of capitalism. It consisted of a "permanent crisis" in the capitalist system from which there was no hope of recovery, even if a temporary stabilizatook place.[7] Stalin incorporated this theory into Soviet dogma at the 16th Party Congress in 1930, and ever since the Soviet political economists have talked of the "general crisis" of capitalism as distinct from a particular "present crisis." The convenience of this dualism is obvious: the morale of believers caught in the crush of capitalism could be kept up while the final "present crisis" was postponed indefinitely.

The departure from the Marxist dictum making ripe industrial development an "objective" prerequisite of proletarian revolution also had considerable consequences. First and foremost it created a crucial dilemma concerning countries where some 80 percent of the population belonged to the peasantry, whose century-old dream was the parceling up of the estate owners' land. If the revolutionaries were to support land distribution, they might secure the immediate political backing of the peasants, but they would create a new class of private proprietors, or objects of expropriation, and would lose control over the food supply to the cities. On the other hand, should they "nationalize" the big estates, they might lose the political support of the peasants, which could be just as fatal for the revolution. In 1918 Varga was commissioned by the Hungarian Social Democratic Party to make a study of this problem, and he opted for land distribution. But in 1919 he had to accept the decision of the radical majority to "nationalize" rather than distribute the land. The solution did not work, exactly as Varga had predicted. For tactical reasons, however, Varga defended the latter course in his book of 1920.[8]

Not long afterward, in the course of defending the Soviet regime's "New Economic Policy" against the "Leftists" in the Comintern, Varga came to the conclusion that the 1919 failure in Hungary as well as the NEP in Russia were no accidental phenomena, but the logical consequence of the character of the revolution; and that an NEP period—especially insofar as concessions to the peasants were concerned—would be necessary in any Communist dictatorship established in societies similar to those of Hungary and Russia.[9] This recognition of the peasant problem was to have great significance for the East European Communist parties after 1945, when—with Soviet assistance—they succeeded in assuming power. As a rule, they first declared themselves in favor of the distribution of land to gain the political support of the peasantry; then, when their power apparatus became strong enough, they collectivized the countryside in order to gain control over agricultural production. (A similar Communist tactic is now observable in the underdeveloped countries.)

Varga was a man deeply committed to the Communist cause from his youth on, and he remained loyal to his conviction throughout his life. He was committed, but nonconformist—or, at the least, not happy to have to conform. This was manifest in his numerous debates and humiliations in the Soviet Union, where nonconformism in matters of dogma is even today viewed as the cardinal sin. Varga's basic attitude in ideological discussions was consistent from the beginning. In 1924, in a debate with a Russian Communist about some theoretical questions related to agricultural matters, Varga wrote:

> *I comply unconditionally with the discipline of the party in respect to every practical political question: but even references to Lenin will not hinder me from defending my theoretical position as long as I am convinced of its correctness.*[10]

In answer to the "impatient" revolutionaries who accused him of being too "soft" on capitalism (among them, Bela Kun), Varga wrote in 1925:

> *In our reports on world economics, we have repeatedly pointed out that there is an immanent and definite tendency toward stabilization in the capitalist economy. Frequently this was held against us by certain comrades who did not even want to hear about a certain stabilization, and who, in their "revolutionary impatience" wanted to see the crush of capitalism in the future. Particularly at the Third and Fourth Congresses of the Comintern, I was called a "Rightist," and "Opportunist." Unjustly! There is no "rightist" or "leftist" analysis. There is only a "correct" or "incorrect" analysis, a "correct" or "incorrect" perspective. One might consider oneself an excellent revolutionary, because, at all times, one wished for the victory of the proletariat in the immediate future; but a successful revolutionary policy can be achieved only on the basis*

[7] Varga, *Aufstieg oder Niedergang des Kapitalismus* (Rise or Decline of Capitalism), Hamburg, 1924, p. 15.

[8] Varga, *Die wirtschaftspolitischen Probleme . . .*, 2nd edition, p. 17; also in *Die Agrarfrage in der ungarischen proletarischen Revolution* (The Agrarian Question in the Hungarian Proletarian Revolution), Reichenberg, 1921.

[9] Varga, *Sozialismus und Kapitalismus in Sowjetrussland* (Socialism and Capitalism in Soviet Russia), Leipzig, 1921, p. 10.

[10] *Inprekorr*, 1924, No. 169, p. 825 (a triweekly Comintern publication produced in German, French and English, published in Berlin in 1922, in Vienna in 1923, and again in Berlin from 1926 to 1932; references here are to the German edition).

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of a correct analysis, corresponding to the facts.[11]

Always true to this outlook, Varga in 1946 published a book on the subject of postwar changes in the capitalist economy, expressing views that enraged the Soviet Communist leadership.[12] In essence, he predicted that despite the tremendous destruction and disorganization caused by the war, there would be no opportunity for Communist revolutions in Europe because of American interference in European affairs. The US, he pointed out, was confronted with a crisis of overproduction, while war-devastated Europe faced a crisis of underproduction. The solution for the United States would be to deposit its surplus goods in Europe, which would happily absorb any quantity available. For this reason, Varga felt the Communists would not stand a chance to effect successful revolutions. This viewpoint accorded both with Varga's earlier theory about the causes and conditions of proletarian revolution, and with the actual economic situation of the world. The declaration of the Marshall Plan in 1947 served to prove the basic validity of Varga's analysis.

Stalin and the Soviet Communist leadership of course accused Varga of offering advice to the enemy on how to prevent a widespread Communist revolution, and they counteracted with the 1947 Cominform resolution avowing the opposite of Varga's thesis;[13] at the same time they compelled the East European countries not to accept the Marshall Plan, promoting the Communist take-over of Eastern Europe under the shadow of Soviet guns.

There were times when Varga could get away with his theories, but more often he could not. In such cases, he had to practice the byzantine art of self-humiliation—and this, after longer or shorter periods of resistance he always did. Following the above developments he fell into complete disgrace: his Institute for World Economics and World Politics, of which he had been Director for more than 20 years, was abolished and its periodical suspended from publication. Though he tried, with the aid of certain colleagues, to defend his stance in a series of ensuing debates, relentless pressure from the authorities eventually forced him to produce a "mea culpa" in March 1949.[14] Of this and other recantations, one can only comment that within the limits of his commitment, Varga was a realist who probably considered that he was giving his best service to the cause by staying alive—to witness, later, the correctness of his predictions. His aims, after all, were not different from those of his fellow Communists; it was only his means and methods that sometimes differed. In many cases, however, this meant the difference between brutal Stalinism and a more realistic, more tolerant policy.

For several years after 1949, Varga remained in relative obscurity, although he did produce two revised versions of his 1946 work (in 1953 and 1957). Not until 1959 was he fully "rehabilitated," in a tribute published on the occasion of his 80th birthday.[15] From then until his death he remained the "grand old man" of Soviet economic research on the capitalistic world.

In person, Varga was a short, shy, quiet man—an academician who was never really at ease among any of his comrades, including Bela Kun, Zinoviev, Bukharin or Stalin. Perhaps he was most sympathetic to Trotsky, but to Varga's good fortune their relationship was limited to the early 1920's when Trotsky's name was not yet anathema. Ruth Fischer once said that he was "a fearful little man, a living statistic who did not care about the bitter fight within the Hungarian Communist Party and the Comintern, but devoted himself entirely to his economic research." This was probably the reason for—as well as the price of—his survival through all the purges.

If, in the way a man dies there is something characteristic of the way he has led his life, then Varga's death certainly was characteristic: he died on October 8, 1964, when people in the know were already watching for the un-news about Khrushchev. Thus, Varga, even in death, remained in second place behind his politician comrades.

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[11] *Inprekorr*, 1925, No. 77, p. 1017.

[12] Varga, *Izmeneniia v eknomike kapitalisticheskikh stran v rezultate vtoroi mirovoi voiny* (Changes in the Economy of the Capitalistic Countries as a Result of the Second World War), Moscow-Leningrad, 1946. Subsequent editions of the work were revised to purge the work of its original thesis.

[13] *Bolshevik* (Moscow), 1947, No. 30, pp. 10-26.

[14] Varga, "Protiv reformistkovo napravleniia v rabotakh ob imperializme" (Against the Reformist Trend in Works About Imperialism), *Voprosi Ekonomiki*, No. 3, 1949, pp. 77-88.

[15] *Pravda*, Nov. 7. 1959; see also *Izvestia Akademii Nauk SSSR, Otdelenie ekonomiki i prava* (Report of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Department of Economics and Law), No. 1, 1960.

[16] *Der Monat* (Berlin), April 1949, p. 45.

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CORRESPONDENCE

EDITORS' NOTE: Readers are welcome to comment on matters discussed in this journal. Letters should be addressed to the Editors, Problems of Communism, *U.S. Information Agency, 1776 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W., Washington 25, D.C. (Please note: Subscription orders or inquiries should be addressed according to instructions on the front inside cover.)*

Khrushchev and Kremlinology

TO THE EDITORS: Khrushchev's overthrow and the conclusions to be drawn from it, when analyzed in connection with the recent controversy in *Problems of Communism* on "Khrushchev's Power" (Nos. 5 and 6, 1963, and No. 3, 1964) reveal a number of important points. For example, in light of the fact of Khrushchev's deposal, it is interesting to see why some of the participating writers agreed that the Soviet dictator was in no danger from direct conspiratorial challenges against his regime. Professor Griffith asked whether, in view of the eventual defeat of all of Khrushchev's previous foes, "Khrushchev's batting average (is) likely to encourage further challenges." He referred to "security precautions" taken by Khrushchev ("With the KGB in the wings, how could such a conspiracy form without Khrushchev knowing about it?"). Mr. Allison discussed Khrushchev's power to "reshuffle the Central Committee, its Secretariat and the Presidium" to get rid of any possible foe.

Of course, it would be silly to chastise any of the writers for not "predicting" Khrushchev's fall. But in view of the above points, all militating against a successful conspiracy, we must ask, "Why did a conspiracy nevertheless succeed?" I think that two main conclusions can be drawn: (1) the 1957 anti-party plot did represent an important turning point to the extent that leadership questions were decided by a majority vote (of the top echelons, at least); that this precedent was almost certainly used many times during the years 1957-64 to defeat Khrushchev on certain issues; that it was used to overthrow Khrushchev this time; and that therefore (2) barring a return to either the total subordination of the Presidium or to large-scale terror (both used by Stalin to protect his absolute power), the fate of any future Soviet dictator will be uncertain, despite any precautions such as packing the whole government and party apparat with his men.

Khrushchev's fall may indicate that it is impossible to retain one-man rule over a totalitarian state indefinitely without a Stalinist-type system. For the dynamics of power lead even the dictator's protégés eventually to act against him if they are given the power to do so. Now, the Soviet leadership may have to ponder the choice of either some sort of collective leadership, a succession of strong men whose terms of office would be limited by intra-party conspiracy, or perhaps even a return to Stalinist measures against opposition. Of course, "collective leadership," as long as it retains the one-party framework, can be just as effective as one-man rule in denying freedom to the population at large. But the example of Khrushchev's overthrow will most likely prove contagious, and the possibility of a short-term succession of strong men would certainly have a detrimental effect on the stability of the system as a whole.

STEVEN J. KELMEN
Great Neck, New York

The Russians Who Rule Russia

TO THE EDITORS: I wish to make a few comments about S. Bialer's article, "How Russians Rule Russia" (September-October 1964).

It is unfortunate that the author did not attempt to expand his Table I to indicate, for instance, next to the column showing the percentages of CPSU membership for each nationality in the USSR, a column showing the percentage of each nationality belonging to the party. By examining this second column, provided below, we might see the other side of the coin:

Nationality	% of CPSU Membership 1959-61	% of Nationals in CPSU
Russian	63.0	5.2
Ukrainian	14.5	3.7
Belorussian	3.0	3.5
Uzbek	1.5	2.3
Kazakh	1.5	4.0
Azerbaidzhanian	1.1	3.5
Armenian	1.7	5.6
Georgian	1.8	6.1
Lithuanian	0.5	1.8
Moldavian	0.3	1.2
Latvian	0.4	2.3
Tadzhik	0.4	2.3
Turkmen	0.3	2.6
Estonian	0.3	2.4
Kirgiz	0.3	2.7
Others	8.9	4.0
Average USSR		4.9

A comparison of the two columns shows that while the Russian Communists still maintain an overwhelming majority in the party, the percentage of all Russians belonging to the party is only slightly above the USSR average, and below

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that of the Georgians and Armenians, who appear to be considerably out of proportion to their share in total party membership. This disproportion is also true of the rest of the nationalities, with the exception of the Ukrainians and small minorities dispersed throughout the country. It is, therefore, highly erroneous to say that Russians rule Russia (RSFSR) or, least of all, the USSR. Had the author said "How Russian Communists Rule Russia," there would be no argument on this particular point, but to identify 5.2 percent of the Russians (or 6-8 percent of the adult Russians) with the rest of (92-94%) adult Rusisans is to flout the facts. . . .

The same goes for Mr. Bialer's statement that "throughout its history, the Soviet regime has operated within the framework of Tsarist national expansion." This is a dangerous oversimplification of communism. The Tsarist national expansion had its limits and the natural counterbalance on the part of the other equally nationalistic countries. Suffice it to say that there are millions on this side of the Iron Curtain who would be willing today to welcome Soviet troops as "liberators," something that would have been impossible under the Tsars. Soviet expansion knows no boundaries or other limitations. It is messianic in nature and has the conquest of the whole world as its goal.

The author's reference to the Soviet regime's policy of "Russianization" is equally misleading. The situation is much more complicated than one would think. At first, the Soviet regime downgraded everything Russian. Since the 1930's, it has courted the Russians and relied less on the representatives of other national minorities in top echelons of the party. At the same time, the regime has made extensive attempts to establish its "legitimacy" by building a bridge with the past, by preaching Russian patriotism to the Russians and Soviet patriotism to national minorities, with the Russians being presented as "big brothers". . . . This line, however, has been subordinated to the one of total Sovietization embracing all nationalities . . . What Russian reading fare the national minorities are given for instance, is not Dostoevsky but Marx and Lenin, plus an array of Soviet writers. . . .

The present identification of the entire Russian nation with Russian Communists is staggering. We use the word "Russian" when the word "Soviet" or "Communist" should be used. . . .

ALEXANDER V. CHUKAYEFF
Washington, D.C.

MR. BIALER REPLIES: Mr. Chukayeff's letter touches upon questions that are not directly related to the subject of my article. My article dealt with the national composition of the Soviet *leadership* group, while Mr. Chukayeff addresses himself to questions such as representation of Soviet nationality groups in the CPSU, Russification, Sovietization, and so on. It did not seem possible—nor indeed necessary—for me to express opinions on all these matters, and by the same token I see no need to comment on them now. As regards the subject of my article, I see one objection on Mr. Chukayeff's part: It is wrong, he says, to claim that Russians rule Russia; but he would not disagree with the statement that *Russian Communists* rule Russia. Let me, then, correct what may well have been an omission on my part, and state that I completely, unequivocally, and without reservations agree that the Russians who rule Russia are Communists.

Marx and Communism

TO THE EDITORS: In the article "The New Treason of the Clerks" (September-October 1964, p. 28), I found mentioned "the Communist critic Norberto Bobbio." I confess that I was rather amazed, since—as any other Italian—I was convinced that Prof. Bobbio is a critic of communism from a liberal point of view, which is not exactly the same as to be a "Communist critic." I would like to know what evidence exists of Prof. Bobbio's affiliation to the Communist Party.

After all, Prof. Bobbio is no obscure man indeed, at least in Italy. A prominent member of the Turin Law School (facolta di Giurisprudenza), he is well known also as a writer whose political sympathies are usually considered nearer to socialism than to communism. And I suspect that the adjective "Communist" does not have a flattering meaning in an American magazine . . .

GIORGIO SPINI
Professor of Modern History
University of Florence
Florence, Italy

MR. DEMAITRE REPLIES: The reference to Professor Bobbio as a Communist was due to (1) the fact that his article appeared in *Paese Sera*, a publication that follows consistently the Communist line; and (2) the general tone of his article, which reflected a rather strong commitment to Marxist ideology. What Professor Bobbio suggests in his review of Enzo Paci's book is indeed an "integration" of Husserlian philosophy into Marxism rather than the contrary since, in Professor Bobbio's opinion, "Marxism does not need any philosophical foundation of presuppositions." When it comes to finer points of philosophy, the dividing line between party allegiance and philosophical commitment to Marxist thought becomes somewhat blurred. I would also like to add that, in its November 7, 1964, issue, *Rinascita*, an official organ of the Italian Communist party, publishes a letter in which Professor Bobbio proposes the setting-up of "a great single party of the workers' movement," adding that "we need your (the Communists') strength." However, the reference to Professor Bobbio as a Communist was erroneous, and it is regretted.

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VIET NAM—Saigon, Hue, Can Tho, Dalat

LATIN AMERICA

ARGENTINA—Buenos Aires, Cordoba, Rosaria
BOLIVIA—La Paz, Cochabamba
BRAZIL—Rio de Janeiro, Belem, Belo Horizonte, Brasilia, Curitiba, Fortaleza, Porto Alegre, Recife, Salvador, Sao Paulo
BRITISH GUIANA—Georgetown
CHILE—Santiago
COLOMBIA—Bogota, Cali
COSTA RICA—San Jose
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC—Santo Domingo, Santiago de los Caballeros
ECUADOR—Quito, Guayaquil
EL SALVADOR—San Salvador
FRENCH WEST INDIES—Fort-de-France, Martinique
GUATEMALA—Guatemala City
HAITI—Port-au-Prince
HONDURAS—Tegucigalpa
JAMAICA—Kingston
MEXICO—Mexico City, Guadalajara, Hermosillo, Monterrey
NICARAGUA—Managua
PANAMA—Panama City
PARAGUAY—Asuncion
PERU—Lima, Arequipa
TRINIDAD—Port-of-Spain
URUGUAY—Montevideo
VENEZUELA—Caracas, Maracaibo

NORTH AMERICA

CANADA—Ottawa, Toronto

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